Noctes Atticae

The story of Artemisia; and of the contest at the tomb of Mausolus in which celebrated writers took part.

ARTEMISIA is said to have loved her husband Mausolus with a love surpassing all the tales of passion and beyond one's conception of human

affection. Now Mausolus, as Marcus Tullius tells us, [*](Tusc. Disp. iii. 75.) was king of the land of Caria; according to some Greek historians he was governor of a province, the official whom the Greeks term a satrap. When this Mausolus had met his end amid the lamentations and in the arms of his wife, [*](In 353 B.C.) and had been buried with a magnificent funeral, Artemisia, inflamed with grief and with longing for her spouse, mingled his bones and ashes with spices, ground them into the form of a powder, put them in water, and drank them; and she is said to have given many other proofs of the violence of her passion. For perpetuating the memory of her husband, she also erected, with great expenditure of labour, that highly celebrated tomb, [*](The famous Mausoleum at Halicarnassus, adorned by Scopas, Bryaxis, Timotheus and Leochares with sculptures, the remains of which are now in the British Museum. It was a square building, 140 feet high, surrounded by Ionic columns. It stood upon a lofty base and was surmounted by a pyramid of steps ending in a platform, on which was a four-horse chariot. The term mausoleum was applied by the Romans to large and magnificent tombs such as the mausoleum of Augustus and that of Hadrian.) which has been deemed worthy of being numbered among the seven wonders of the world. [*](The other six wonders were: The walls and hanging gardens of Babylon; the temple of Diana at Ephesus; the statue of Olympian Zeus by Phidias; the Pyramids; and the Pharos, or lighthouse, at Alexandria.) When Artemisia dedicated this monument, consecrated to the deified shades of Mausolus, she instituted an agon, that is to say, a contest in celebrating his praises, offering magnificent prizes of money and other valuables. Three men distinguished for their eminent talent and eloquence are said to have come to contend in this eulogy, Theopompus, Theodectes [*](The more approved spelling is Theodectas; see C.I.G. ii. 977.) and Naucrates; some have even written that Isocrates himself entered the lists with them. But Theopompus was adjudged the victor in that contest. He was a pupil of Isocrates.

The tragedy of Theodectes, entitled Mausolus, is still extant to-day; and that in it Theodectes was more pleasing than in his prose writings is the opinion of Hyginus in his Examples. [*](Fr. 1, Peter.)

That a sin is not removed or lessened by citing in excuse similar sins which others have committed; with a passage front a speech of Demosthenes on that subject.

THE philosopher Taurus once reproved a young man with severe and vigorous censure because he had turned from the rhetoricians and the study of eloquence to the pursuit of philosophy, declaring that he had done something dishonourable and shameful. Now the young man did not deny the allegation, but urged in his defence that it was commonly done and tried to justify the baseness of the fault by citing examples and by the excuse of custom. And then Taurus, being the more irritated by the very nature of his defence, said:

Foolish and worthless fellow, if the authority and rules of philosophy do not deter you from following bad examples, does not even the saying of your own celebrated Demosthenes occur to you? For since it is couched in a polished and graceful form of words, it might, like a sort of rhetorical catch, the more easily remain fixed in your memory. For,

said he,

if I do not forget what as a matter of fact I read in my early youth, these are the words of Demosthenes, spoken against one who, as you now do, tried to justify and excuse his own sin by those of others: [*](Adv. Androt. 7, p. 595. ) 'Say not, Sir, that this has often been done, but that it ought to be so done; for if anything was ever done contrary to the

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laws, and you followed that example, you would not for that reason justly escape punishment, but you would suffer much more severely. For just as, if anyone had suffered a penalty for it, you would not have proposed this, so if you suffer punishment now, no one else will propose it.'

Thus did Taurus, by the use of every kind of persuasion and admonition, incline his disciples to the principles of a virtuous and blameless manner of life.

The meaning of rogatio, lex, plebisscitum and privilegium, and to what extent all those terms differ.

I HEAR it asked what the meaning is of lex, plebisscitum, rogatio, and privilegium. Ateius Capito, a man highly skilled in public and private law, defined the meaning of lex in these words: [*](Fr. 22, Huschke; Coniect. fr. 13, Bremer.)

A law,

said he,

is a general decree of the people, or of the commons, answering an appeal [*](That is, a royatio.) made to them by a magistrate.

If this definition is correct, neither the appeal for Pompey's military command, nor about the recall of Cicero, nor as to the murder or Clodius, nor any similar decrees of the people of commons, can be called laws. For they are not general decrees, and they are framed with regard, not to the whole body of citizens, but to individuals. Hence they ought rather to be called privilegia, or

privileges,

since the ancients used priva where we now use singula (private or individual). This word Lucilius used in the first book of his Satires: [*](v. 49, Marx.)

1. I'll give them, when they come, each his own (priva) piece
2. Of tunny belly and acarne [*](The acarne was a kind of sea-fish.) heads.

Capito, however, in the same definition divided [*](Fr. 23, Huschke; 14, Bremer.) the plebes, [*](The older form of the nominative plebs.) or

commons,

from the populus, or

people,

since in the term

people

are embraced every part of the state and all its orders, but

commons

is properly applied to that part in which the patrician families of the citizens are not included. Therefore, according to Capito, a plebisscitum is a law which the commons, and not the people, adopt.

But the head itself, the origin, and as it were the fount of this whole process of law is the rogatio, whether the appeal (rogatio) is to the people or to the commons, on a matter relating to all or to individuals. For all the words under discussion are understood and included in the fundamental principle and name of rogatio; for unless the people or commons be appealed to (rogetur), no decree of the people or commons can be passed.

But although all this is true, yet in the old records we observe that no great distinction is made among the words in question. For the common term lex is used both of decrees of the commons and of

privileges,

and all are called by the indiscriminate and inexact name rogatio.

Even Sallust, who is most observant of propriety in the use of words, has yielded to custom and applied the term

law

to the

privilege

which was passed with reference to the return of Gnaeus Pompeius. The passage, from the second book of his Histories, reads as follows: [*](ii. 21, Maur.)

For when Sulla, as consul, proposed a law (legem) touching his return, the tribune of the commons, Gaius Herennius, had vetoed it by previous arrangement.

Why Marcus Cicero very scrupulously avoided any use of the words novissime and novissimus.

IT is clear that Marcus Cicero was unwilling to use many a word which is now in general circulation, and was so in his time, because he did not approve of them; for instance, novissimus and novissine. For although both Marcus Cato [*](Fr. inc. 51, Jordan.) and Sallust, [*](Cat. xxxiii. 2; Jug. x. 2; xix. 7, etc.) as well as others also of the same period, have used that word generally, and although many men besides who were not without learning wrote it in their books, yet he seems to have abstained from it, on the ground that it was not good Latin, since Lucius Aelius Stilo, [*](p. 53, 15, Fun.) who was the most learned man of his time, had avoided its use, as that of a novel and improper word.

Moreover, what Marcus Varro too thought of that word I have deemed it fitting to show from his own words in the sixth book of his De Lingua Latina, dedicated to Cicero: [*](vii. 59.)

What used to be called extremum or 'last,'

says he,

is beginning to be called generally novissimum, a word which within my own memory both Aelius and several old men avoided as too new a term; as to its origin, just as from vetus we have vetustior and veterrimus, so from novus we get novior and novissimus.

[*](Novissimus occurs in Caesar and in Cicero, Rosc. Com. 30; novior is avoided wholly by the classical writers.)

A passage taken from Plato's book entitled Gorgias, on the abuses of false philosophy, with which those who are ignorant of the rewards of true philosophy assail philosophers without reason.

PLATO, a man most devoted to the truth and most ready to point it out to all, has said truly and nobly, though not from the mouth of a dignified or suitable character, all that in general may be said against those idle and worthless fellows, who, sheltered under the name of philosophy, follow profitless idleness and darkness of speech and life. For although Callicles, whom he makes his speaker, being ignorant of true philosophy, heaps dishonourable and undeserved abuse upon philosophers, yet what he says is to be taken in such a way that we may gradually come to understand it as a warning to ourselves not to deserve such reproofs, and not by idle and foolish sloth to feign the pursuit and cultivation of philosophy.

I have written down Plato's own words on this subject from the book called Gorgias, not attempting to translate them, because no Latinity, much less my own, can emulate their qualities: [*](Gorgias 40, p. 484 C-D; 485 A-E.)

Philosophy, Socrates, is indeed a nice thing, if one pursue it in youth with moderation; but if one occupy oneself with it longer than is proper, it is a corrupter of men. For even if a man be well endowed by nature and follow philosophy when past his youth, he must necessarily be ignorant of all those things in which a man ought to be versed if he is to be honourable, good and of high repute. For such men are ignorant both of the laws relating to the city, and of the language which

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it is necessary to use in the intercourse of human society, both privately and publicly, and of the pleasures and desires of human life; in brief, they are wholly unacquainted with manners. Accordingly, when they engage in any private or public business, they become a laughing-stock; just exactly as statesmen, I suppose, become ridiculous when they enter into your debates and discussions.

A little later he adds the following: "But I think it best to take part in both. It is good to pursue philosophy merely as a matter of education, and to be a philosopher is not dishonourable when one is young; but when one who is already older persists in the business, the thing becomes laughable, Socrates, and I for my part feel the same towards those who philosophize as towards those who lisp and play. Whenever I see a little boy, to whom it is fitting to speak thus, lisping and playing, I am pleased, and it seems to me becoming and liberal and suited to the age of childhood; but when I hear a small boy speaking with precision, it seems to me to be a disagreeable thing; it wounds my ears and appears to be something befitting a slave. When, however, one hears a man lisping, or sees him playing, it appears ridiculous, unmanly and deserving of stripes. I feel just the same way towards the philosophers When I see philosophy in a young man, I rejoice; it seems to me fitting, and I think that the young man in question is ingenuous; that he who does not study philosophy is not ingenuous and will never himself be worthy of anything noble or generous. But when I see an older man still philosophizing and not giving it up, such a man, Socrates, seems to me to deserve stripes. For, as I have just said, it is possible for such a man, even

though naturally well endowed, to become unmanly, avoiding the business of the city and the marketplace, where, as the poet says, [*](Homer, Iliad ix. 441 f. ou)/pw ei)do/q' o(moii/ou pole/moio Ou)d' a)gore/wn, i(/na t' a)/ndres a)riprepe/es tele/qousin.) men become

most eminent,

and living the rest of his life in hiding with young men, whispering in a corner with three or four of them, but never accomplishing anything liberal, great or satisfactory."

These sentiments, as I have said, Plato put into the mouth of a man of no great worth indeed, yet possessing a reputation for common sense and understanding and a kind of uncompromising frankness. He does not, of course, refer to that philosophy which is the teacher of all the virtues, which excels in the discharge of public and private duties alike, and which, if nothing prevents, governs cities and the State with firmness, courage and wisdom; but rather to that futile and childish attention to trifles which contributes nothing to the conduct and guidance of life, but in which people of that kind grow old in

ill-timed playmaking,

[*](Cf. Hor. Odes iv. 6 15, Troas male feriatos. Since Gellius mentions Horace by name only once, and once by possible implication (see Index), the expression had doubtless become proverbial.) regarded as philosophers by the vulgar, as they were by him from whose lips the words that I have quoted come. [*](That is, Callicles; see § 2.)