Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

As there are three divisions of time, so the order of events falls into three stages. For everything has a beginning, growth and consummation, as for instance

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a quarrel, blows, murder. Thus arise arguments which lend each other mutual support; for the conclusion is inferred from the beginnings, as in the following case:

I cannot expect a purple-striped toga, when I see that the beginning of the web is black

; or the beginning may be inferred from the conclusion: for instance the fact that Sulla resigned the dictatorship is an argument that Sulla did not take up arms with the intention of establishing a tyranny.

Similarly from the growth of a situation we may infer either its beginning or its end, not only in questions of fact but as regards points of equity, such as whether the conclusion is referable to the beginning, that is,

Should the man that began the quarrel be regarded as guilty of the bloodshed with which it ended?

Arguments are also drawn from similarities:

If self-control is a virtue, abstinence is also a virtue.

If a guardian should be required to be faithful to his trust, so should an agent.

To this class belongs the type of argument called ἐπαγωγή by the Greeks, induction by Cicero. [*](de Inv. i. 31. ) Or arguments may be drawn from unlikes:

It does not follow that if joy is a good thing, pleasure also is a good thing

It does not follow that what applies to the case of a woman applies also to the case of a ward.

Or from contraries:

Frugality is a good thing, since luxury is an evil thing

If war is the cause of ill, peace will prove a remedy

If he who does harm unwittingly deserves pardon, he who does good unwittingly does not deserve a reward.

Or from contradictions:

He who is wise is not a fool.

Or from consequences necessary or probable [*]( It is possible that Quintilian regards adiuncta as = consequentia. The distinction made above is that made by Cicero, Top. xii. ) :

If justice is a good thing, we must give
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right judgment

If breach of faith is a bad thing, we must not deceive.

And such arguments may also be reversed. Similar to these are the following arguments, which must therefore be classed under this same head, since it is to this that they naturally belong:

A man has not lost what he never had

A man does not wittingly injure him whom he loves

If one man has appointed another as his heir, he regarded, still regards and will continue to regard him with affection.

However, such arguments, being incontrovertible, are of the nature of absolute indications. [*](See ch. ix.)

These, however, I call consequent or ἀκόλουθα goodness, for instance, is consequent on wisdom: while in regard to things which merely have taken place afterwards or will take place I use the term insequent or παρεπόμενα, though I do not regard the question of terminology as important. Give them any name you please, as long as the meaning is clear and it is shown that the one depends on time, the other on the nature of things.

I have therefore no hesitation in calling the following forms of argument also consequential, although they argue from the past to the future: some however divide them into two classes, those concerned with action, as in the pro Oppio,

How could he detain against their will those whom he was unable to take to the province against their will?

and those concerned with time, as in the Verrines, [*](Verr. I. xlii. 109. The praetor on entering office on Jan. I issued an edict announcing the principles on which his rulings would be given. This edict was an interpretation of the law of Rome, and held good only during the praetor's year of office. )

If the first of January puts an end to the authority of the praetor's edict, why should the commencement of its authority not likewise date from the first of January?

Both these

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instances are of such a nature that the argument is reversible. For it is a necessary consequence that those who could not be taken to the province against their will could not be retained against their will.

So too I feel clear that we should rank as consequential arguments those derived from facts which lend each other mutual support and are by some regarded as forming a separate kind of argument, which they [*]( Ar. Rhet. II. xxiii. 3. ) call ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα, arguments from things mutually related, while Cicero [*](de Inv. I. xxx. 46. ) styles them arguments drawn from things to which the same line of reasoning applies; take the following example [*](ib. 47. ) :

If it is honourable for the Rhodians to let out their harbour dues, it is honourable likewise for Hermocreon to take the contract,

What it is honourable to learn, it is also honourable to teach.

Such also is the fine sentence of Domitius Afer,