Institutio Oratoria

further shows that definition is assisted by division, which he distinguishes from partition, making the latter the dissection of a whole into its parts and the former the division of a genus into its forms or species. The number of parts he regards as being uncertain, as for instance the elements of which a state consists; the forms or species are, however, certain, as for instance the number of forms of government, which we are told are three, democracy, oligarchy, and monarchy. It is true that he does not use these illustrations,

since, as he was writing to Trebatius, [*]( A famous lawyer, cp. III. xi. 18. v. 17. ) he preferred to draw his examples from law. I have chosen my illustrations as being more obvious. Properties have relation to questions of fact as well; for instance, it is the property of a good man to act rightly, of an angry man to be violent in speech or action, and consequently we believe that such acts are committed by persons of the appropriate character, or

In a similar way division is valuable both for proof and refutation. For proof, it is sometimes enough to establish one thing.

To be a citizen, a man must either have been born or made such.

he was neither born nor made a citizen.

This may be done in many ways, and constitutes a form of argument by elimination, whereby we show sometimes that the whole is false, sometimes that only that which remains alter the process of elimination is true. An example of the first of these two cases would be:

You say that you lent him money. Either you possessed it yourself, received it from another, found it or stole it. If you did not possess it, receive it from another, find or steal it, you did not lend it to him.

The residue after elimination is shown to be true as follows:

This slave whom you claim was either born in your house or bought or given you or left you by will or captured from the enemy or belongs to another.

does in the pro Caecina, when he asks,

If this is not the point at issue, what is?

There can be no one so hostile to Cluentius as not to grant me one thing: if it be a fact that the verdict then given was the result of bribery, the bribes must have proceeded either from Habitus or Oppianicus: if I show that they did not proceed from Habitus I prove that they proceeded from Oppianicus: if I demonstrate that they were given by Oppianicus, I clear Habitus.

Or we may give our opponent the choice between two alternatives of which one must necessarily be true, and as a result, whichever he chooses, lie will damage his case. Cicero does this in the pro Oppio: [*]( Oppius was accused of embezzling public money and plotting against the life of M. Aurelius Cotta, governor of Bithynia, where Oppius was serving as quaestor. Cicero's defence of him is lost. )

Was the weapon snatched from his hands when he had attacked Cotta, or when he was trying to commit suicide?

You have a choice between two alternatives: either you must show that the choice of this route by Varenus was due to chance or that it was the result of this man's persuasion and inducement.

two propositions are stated of such a character that the admission of either involves the same conclusion, as in the sentence,

We must philosophise, even though we ought not,

What is the use of a figure, [*](See vii. iv. 28, ix. i. 14, ix. ii. 65.) if its meaning is clear? And what is its use, if it is unintelligible?

He who is capable of enduring pain will lie if tortured, and so will he who cannot endure pain.