Institutio Oratoria

secondly those concerned with persons, by which he indicates panegyric: thirdly the practical or pragmatic, which is concerned with things in general without reference to persons, and may be illustrated by questions such as whether he is free who is claimed as a slave and waiting the trial of his case, [*](assertio = a trial in which the question of a person's liberty is involved. When waiting trial, this person is described as in assertiolle. ) whether riches beget insolence, and whether a thing is just or good; lastly there is the juridical species, under which practically the same questions arise, but in relation to certain definite persons, as for instance when it is asked whether that particular man has done well or ill.

I am aware that another explanation is given by Cicero in the first book of his Rhetorica [*](de Inv. i. xi. 14. ) of the species known as practical, where he says that it is

the department under which we consider what is right according to civil usage and equity: this department is regarded by us as the special sphere of the lawyer.

But I have already mentioned [*](de Inv. i. xi. 14. ) what his opinion was about this particular work. The Rhetorica are simply a collection of school-notes on rhetoric which he worked up into this treatise while quite a young man. Such faults as they possess are due to his instructor. In the present instance he may have been influenced by the fact that the first examples given by Hermagoras of this species are drawn from legal questions, or by the fact that the Greeks call interpreters of the law πραγματικοί.

But for these early efforts Cicero

The legal questions were according to Hermagoras of five kinds. First the letter of the law and its intention; the names which he gives to these are κατὰ ῥητόν and ὑπεξαίρεσις, that is to say the letter of the law and the exceptions thereto: the first of these classes is found in all writers, but the term exception is less in use. The number is completed by the ratiocinative basis and those dealing with ambiguity and contradictory laws.

Albutius adopts this classification, but eliminates competence, including it under the juridical basis. Further he holds that in legal questions there is no ratiocinative basis. I know that those who are prepared to read ancient writers on rhetoric more carefully than I have, will be able to discover yet more on this subject, but I fear that I may have been too lengthy even in saying what I have said.

I must admit that I am now inclined to take a different view from that which I once held. It would perhaps be safer for my reputation if I were to make no modification in views which I not only held for so many years, but of which I expressed my open approbation.

But I cannot bear to be thought guilty of concealment of the truth as regards any portion of my views, more especially in a work designed for the profit of young men of sound disposition. For Hippocrates, [*](Epidem V. 14. ) the great physician, in my opinion took the most honourable course in acknowledging some of

Indeed we should have no justification for protracting our studies if we were forbidden to improve upon our original views. Still none of my past teaching was superfluous: for the views which I am now going to produce will be found to be based on the same principles, and consequently no one need be sorry to have attended my lectures, since all that I am now attempting to do is to collect and rearrange my original views so that they may be somewhat more instructive. But I wish to satisfy everybody and not to lay myself open to the accusation that I have allowed a long time to elapse between the formation and publication of my views.