Institutio Oratoria
Quintilian
Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.
For, as I have said, there is a great variety in the names employed. There are some who, arguing from its meaning of change, hold that ὑπαλλακτική is the translative basis, which is concerned with competence. Others, Caecilius [*](Caec. fr. 49, Burkh.) and Theon for instance, hold that there are the same number of bases, but make them of a different kind, namely, those covered by the questions whether a thing is, what it is, of what kind it is and how great it is.
Aristotle [*]( Ar. Rhet. 1416 b : 1374 a . ) in his Rhetoric states that all enquiry turns on the questions whether a thing is, of what kind it is, how great it is, and of how many parts it consists. In one place however he recognises the force of definition as well, saying that certain points are defended on the following lines:—
I took it, but did not steal it.
I struck him, but did not commit an assault.
Cicero [*](de Inv. I. viii. 10. ) again in his Rhetorica makes the number of bases to be four, namely those concerned with fact, names, kinds, and legal action, that is to say conjecture is concerned with fact, definition with names, quality with kinds, and law with action: under this latter head of law he included questions of competence. But in another passage he treats [*](Part. Or. 31 and 38. ) legal questions as a species of action. Some writers have held that there are five bases:
the conjectural, definitive, qualitative, quantitative and relative. Theodorus, also, as I have said, [*](§ 36.) adopts the same number of general heads, whether a thing is, what it is, of what kind it is, how great it is, and to what it refers. The last he considers to be chiefly concerned with comparison, since better and worse, greater and less
But questions of relation, as I have already pointed out, enter also into translative questions, that is, questions of competence, since in cases such as
Has this man a right to bring an action?or
Is it fitting that he should do such and such a thing, or against this man, or at this time, or in this manner?For all these questions must be referred to a certain standard.
Others hold that there are six bases: conjecture or γένεσις, quality, particularity or ἰδιότης by which word they mean definition, quantity or ἀξία, comparison and competence, for which a new term has been found in μετάστασις I call it new when applied to a basis, for Hermagoras employs it to describe a species of juridical question.
Others think there are seven, while refusing to recognise competence, quantity or comparison, in place of which they substitute four legal bases, [*](See § 46.) completing the seven by the addition of those three which they call rational. [*](Conjectural, definitive, qualitative.)
Others again make eight by the addition of competence to the above-mentioned seven. Some on the other hand have introduced a fresh method of division, reserving the name of bases for the rational, and giving the name of questions to the legal, as I mentioned above, [*](§ 46.) since in the former the problem is concerned with facts, in the latter with the letter of the law. Some on the contrary reverse this nomenclature calling the legal questions bases and the rational grounds questions.
But others have thought that there are only three rational bases, covered by the questions whether a thing is, what it is, and of what kind it is? Hermagoras is alone in thinking that there are four, namely conjecture, particularity, competence, and quality: to the latter he
according to its accidents,illustrating his meaning by putting a case where it is enquired whether a man happen to be good or bad. He then subdivides quality into four species: first that which is concerned with things to he sought or avoided, which belongs to deliberative oratory: