Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

On the contrary, discrimination is necessary in the acquisition of our stock of words; for we are aiming at true oratory, not at the fluency of a cheapjack. And we shall attain our aim by reading and listening to the best writers and orators, since we shall thus learn not merely the words by which things are to be called, but when each particular word is most appropriate.

For there is a place in oratory for almost every word, with the exception only of a very few, which are not sufficiently seemly. Such words are indeed often praised when they occur in writers of iambics [*](See §§ 59 and 96.) or of the old comedy,

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but we need do no more than consider our own special task. All words, with these exceptions, may be admirably employed in some place or other. For sometimes we shall even require low and common words, while those which would seem coarse if introduced in the more elegant portions of our speech may, under certain circumstances, be appropriate enough.

Now to acquire a knowledge of these words and to be acquainted not merely with their meaning, but with their forms and rhythmical values, so that they may seem appropriate wherever employed, we shall need to read and listen diligently, since all language is received first through the ear. It was owing to this fact that the children who, by order of a king, were brought up by a dumb nurse in a desert place, although they are said to have uttered certain words, lacked the power of speech. [*]( See Herodot. ii. 2. The children were alleged to have cried bekos, Phrygian for bread. )

There are, however, some words of such a nature that they express the same sense by different sounds, so that it makes no difference to the meaning which we use, as, for instance, gladius and ensis, which may be used indifferently when we have to speak of a sword. Others, again, although properly applied to specific objects, are used by means of a trope to express the same sense, as, for example, ferrum (steel) and muro (point), which are both used in the sense of sword.

Thus, by the figure known as abuse, [*]( or catachresis. See viii. ii. 5 and vi. 34. ) we call all those who commit a murder with any weapon whatsoever sicarii (poniarders). In other cases we express our meaning periphrastically, as, for instance, when Virgil [*](Ecl. i. 81. ) describes cheese as

  1. Abundance of pressed milk.
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On the other hand, in a number of instances we employ figures [*](See i. viii. 16; ix. i. 11.) and substitute one expression for another. Instead of
I know,
we say
I am not ignorant,
or
the fact does not escape me,
or
I have not forgotten,
or
who does not know?
or
it can be doubted by none.

But we may also borrow from a word of cognate meaning. For

I understand,
or
I feel
or
I see
are often equivalent to
I know.
Reading will provide us with a rich store of expressions such as these, and will enable us not merely to use them when they occur to us, but also in the appropriate manner. For they are not always interchangeable:

for example, though I may be perfectly correct in saying,

I see
for
I understand,
it does not follow that I can say
I understand
for
my eyes have seen,
and though mucro may be employed to describe a sword, a sword does not necessarily mean the same as mucro (point).

But, although a store of words may be acquired by these means, we must not read or listen to orators merely for the sake of acquiring words. For in everything which we teach examples are more effective even than the rules which are taught in the schools, so long as the student has reached a stage when he can appreciate such examples without the assistance of a teacher, and can rely on his own powers to imitate them. And the reason is this, that the professor of rhetoric lays down rules, while the orator gives a practical demonstration.