Vitae philosophorum

And the sun and moon and planets were created

And of all the gods in heaven the earth is the oldest. And it was fashioned to make night and day. And being at the centre it moves round the centre.[*](Cf. Plato, Tim. 40 b, c.) And since there are two causes, it must be affirmed, he says, that some things are due to reason and others have a necessary cause,[*](Cf. Plato, Tim. 46 d, e; 47 e; 48 a; 68 e; 69 a.) the latter being air, fire, earth and water, which are not exactly elements but rather recipients of form.[*](Cf. Plato, Tim. 49 a sqq.; 50 b-51 b; 52 a, b.) They are composed of triangles, and are resolved into triangles. The scalene triangle and the isosceles triangle are their constituent elements.[*](Cf. Plato, Tim. 53 c-55 c.)

The principles, then, and causes assumed are the two above mentioned, of which God and matter are the exemplar. Matter is of necessity formless like the other recipients of form. Of all these there is a necessary cause. For it somehow or other receives the ideas and so generates substances, and it moves because its power is not uniform, and, being in

For the two causes existed even before the world was made, as well as becoming in the third place, but they were not distinct, merely traces of them being found, and in disorder. When the world was made, they too acquired order.[*](Cf. Plato, Tim. 52 d; 53 b; 57 c; 69 b, c.) And out of all the bodies there are the universe was fashioned. He holds God, like the soul, to be incorporeal. For only thus is he exempt from change and decay. As already stated, he assumes the Ideas to be causes and principles whereby the world of natural objects is what it is.

On good and evil he would discourse to this effect. He maintained that the end to aim at is assimilation to God, that virtue is in itself sufficient for happiness, but that it needs in addition, as instruments for use, first, bodily advantages like health and strength, sound senses and the like, and, secondly, external advantages such as wealth, good birth and reputation. But the wise man will be no less happy even if he be without these things. Again, he will take part in public affairs, will marry, and will refrain from breaking the laws which have been made. And as far as circumstances allow he will legislate for his own country, unless in the extreme corruption of the people he sees that the state of affairs completely justifies his abstention.

He thinks that the gods take note of human life[*](Cf. Plato, Tim. 30 b; 44 c.) and that there are superhuman beings.[*](Cf. Plato, Tim. 40 d.) He was the first to define the notion of good as that which is bound up with

He also discoursed on the propriety of names, and indeed he was the first to frame a science for rightly asking and answering questions, having employed it himself to excess. And in the dialogues he conceived righteousness to be the law of God because it is stronger to incite men to do righteous acts, that malefactors may not be punished after death also.

Hence to some he appeared too fond of myths. These narratives he intermingles with his works in order to deter men from wickedness, by reminding them how little they know of what awaits them[*](Cf. Plato, Tim. 42 b.) after death. Such, then, are the doctrines he approved.

He used also to divide things, according to Aristotle, in the following manner.[*]( The third appendix begins here, containing the διαιρέσεις which are also attributed to Aristotle; see Rose, Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus, pp. 679 sqq., who gives a Christian recension. The original, the common source of Diogenes Laertius and the Christian writer, he refers vaguely to the Hellenistio age.) Goods are in the mind or in the body, or external. For example, justice, prudence, courage, temperance and such like are in the mind; beauty, a good constitution, health and strength in the body; while friends, the welfare of one’s country and riches are amongst external things.

Thus there are three kinds of goods: goods of the mind, goods of the body and external goods. There are three species of friendship: one species is natural, another social, and another hospitable. By natural friendship we mean the affection which parents have for their offspring and kinsmen for each other. And other animals besides man have inherited this form.

By the social form of friendship we mean that which arises from intimacy and has nothing to do with kinship; for instance, that of Pylades for Orestes. The friendship of hospitality is that which is extended to strangers owing to an introduction or letters of recommendation. Thus friendship is either natural or social or hospitable. Some add a fourth species, that of love.

There are five forms of civil government: one form is democratic, another aristocratic, a third oligarchic, a fourth monarchic, a fifth that of a tyrant. The democratic form is that in which the people has control and chooses at its own pleasure both magistrates and laws. The aristocratic form is that in which the rulers are neither the rich nor the poor nor the nobles, but the state is under the guidance of the best. Oligarchy is that form in which there is a property-qualification for the holding of office; for the rich are fewer than the poor. Monarchy is either regulated by law or hereditary. At Carthage the kingship is regulated by law, the office being put up for sale.[*](Plato probably refers to Carthage when he mentions purchasable kingship, ὠνηταὶ βασιλεῖαι, amongst barbarians, Rep. 544 d. Aristotle repeats the epithet in his description of the Carthaginian constitution, Pol. ii. 11, 1273 a 36. Polybius says that at Carthage magistrates attain office, δῶρα φανερῶς διδόντες, vi. 56. 4. This phrase is some help towards an explanation, but whether it means open bribery —possibly of the people, more probably of the Council— or whether it refers to very large fees payable upon taking office, it is not easy to determine. In either case wealth would preponderate over merit.)