History of the Peloponnesian War

And so they did not withstand the Mede for the sake of liberty—neither these men for that of the Greeks, nor the Greeks for their own—but the former did it to enslave the Greeks to themselves, instead of to the Mede; the latter, to get a new master, one not more unwise, but more wise for evil.

"But, open as the Athenian state is to accusation, we are not come at the present time to prove before those who know this already, in how many respects it is committing injustice; but much rather to censure ourselves, because, with the warnings given us by the Greeks in those quarters, how they were enslaved through not assisting one another, and with the same sophisms being now practised on ourselves— their re-instatements of their Leontine kinsmen, and succours to their Segestan allies—we will not unite together, and show them that the people here are no Ionians, or Hellespontines and islanders, who are always passing to a new master, either the Mede or some one else, and still kept in slavery, but free Dorians from the independent Peloponnese now living in Sicily.

Or do we wait till we have separately been subdued, city by city? knowing, as we do, that in this way only are we vincible; and seeing them having recourse to this method, so as to set some of us at variance by words; to set others at war through hope of finding allies; and to injure others by saying something flattering to them, as they severally can And do we then think, that if our distant fellow countryman is destroyed before us, the danger will not come to each of ourselves also, but that he who suffers before us keeps his misfortune to himself?

"If, again, the thought has presented itself to any one, that although the Syracusans are hostile to the Athenians, he himself is not; and if he consider it a hardship to incur dangers for our country, let him reflect that it is not for ours especially, but in like manner for his own also that he will fight in ours; and that he will do it with proportionately greater safety, inasmuch as he will not enter on the struggle after we have been first ruined, but with us for allies, and not left by himself. And let him consider that the wish of the Athenians is, not to chastise our enmity, but, making us their excuse, to [*]( i. e. so to reduce the power of every state in the island, that none shall have any alternative but to remain the faithful allies of Athens. —Arnold.) secure no less his own friendship.

If, moreover, any one envies us, or is afraid of us, (for to both these feelings are more powerful states exposed,) and for this reason wishes Syracuse to be brought down, that we may be taught moderation, but yet for his own safety's sake would have it escape destruction, he indulges a wish beyond the limit of human power. For it is not Possible for the same to be man to be alike the arbiter of his own desire and of fortune.

And should he fail in views, then, [*](ὀλοφυρθείς.] or, as Pontus and Poppo take it, lamented. ) while lamenting his own misfortunes, he might, perhaps, some time or other, wish again to envy our advantages. But that will be impossible if he abandon us, and will not take his part in the same perils; which are incurred, not for names, but for realities; for though nominally he would preserve our power, he would really secure his own safety.

And it was reasonable that you especially, Camarinaeans, who live on our borders, and are the next to incur the danger, should have provided for this, and not have joined us remissly, as you are now doing; but rather that you should yourselves have come to us; and what you would have entreated, while calling us to your aid, if the Athenians had first come against Camarina, that ought you now, on the same principle, to have come and urged on us as an exhortation, that we should on no point submit. But neither have ye, hitherto, nor the rest, bestirred yourselves for these objects.

"But through cowardice, perhaps, you will study what is just, both towards us and towards the invaders, and allege that there is an alliance between you and the Athenians. Yes, but you did not conclude that to the injury of your friends, but in case any of your enemies might attack you; and to assist the Athenians, surely, when they were wronged by others, and not when they were themselves wronging their neighbours, as they are now.

For not even do the Rhegians, although of Chalcidian extraction, consent to join in the reinstatement of the Chalcidian Leontines. And it is a strange thing if they, suspecting the real meaning of this fine pretence, are wise without any reason to offer for their conduct, while you, with a [*](εὐλόγῳ προφάσει.] εὔλογος is so constantly used to signify what really is reasonable, in opposition to εὐπρεπής what only appears to be so, that I cannot agree with Arnold and Poppo, who give a different sense to it in this passage; the former rendering it with a seeming reasonable pretext; the latter, utentes probabili (seu speciosâ) excusatione (quâ vestram rationem tueamini). ) reasonable plea to urge, choose to assist your natural enemies, and, in concert with your bitterest foes, to ruin men who are still more your natural connexions. Nay, that is not just;

but rather, to assist us, and not to be afraid of their armament. For it is not formidable, if we all take our stand together; but only if, on the contrary, we are separated from each other, which they are so anxious to effect: since even when they came against us alone, and were victorious in battle, they did not achieve what they wished, but quickly went away again.