History of the Peloponnesian War
Thucydides
Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.
I know, however, that men of this stamp, and all others who have in any way stood out as illustrious, are indeed in their own lifetime an offence, most of all to their equals, then also to others, while still among them, but that they leave behind to those who come after the claiming of kinship even where there is none; and, whatever their fatherland, to it they leave exultant pride in them, as men who are not aliens or offenders, but who are their own and have done well.
And such being my ambition and these the grounds on which I am decried in my private life, look at my public acts and see whether I execute them worse than another. I brought together the greatest powers[*](Argos, Mantinea and Elis; cf. 5.46., 5.52) of the Peloponnesus without great danger to you or expense and forced the Lacedaemonians to stake all upon a single day at Mantinea[*](cf. 5.66. ff); and in consequence of this, though victorious in the field, even yet they have not firm confidence.
"Thus did my youthfulness and my seemingly abnormal folly cope with the power of the Peloponnesians in fitting words and with a spirit that inspired faith win assent. And now be not afraid of it, but while I am still in the flower of youth, and Nicias has the reputation of good luck, make the most of the services of us both.
And as to the voyage to Sicily, do not change your minds on the ground that you are going against a formidable power. For it is only with a mixed rabble that the cities there[*](Referring to Syracuse and its dependencies.) are populous, and changes and accessions in the body of their citizens[*](Or, reading πολιτειῶν, “changes in old forms of government and adoption of new.”) are easy.
And for this reason no one is equipped, as he would be in behalf of his own country, either with arms for personal protection or with permanent improvements for the cultivation of his land; but whatever each one thinks he can obtain from the common stock by persuasive oratory or by sedition, in the expectation that if he fails he will settle in some other land, this he provides himself with.
And it is not likely that a rabble of this kind would either listen to counsel with one mind or turn to action with a common purpose; but quickly, if anything were said to please them,[*](ie. by Athenian representatives.) they would each for himself come over to our side, especially if they are in a state of revolution as we hear.
Further, as regards hoplites neither have they as many as they boast; nor have the rest of the Hellenes proved to have such numbers as they each reckon; on the contrary, Hellas has been very greatly deceived in its estimates of hoplites and in this war has with difficulty been adequately equipped with them.