History of the Peloponnesian War

But Brasidas, as soon as he saw the Athenians stirring, went down himself from Cerdylium and entered Amphipolis.

But he did not march out and draw up against the Athenians, because he mistrusted his own force, believing them to be inferior, not in numbers—as they were about equal—but in quality; for the force that was in the field were Athenians of pure blood and the pick of the Lemnians and Imbrians. So he was preparing to attack by means of a stratagem;

for he thought that if he showed the enemy the number and the barely sufficient equipment of the troops with him he should be less likely to gain a victory than if they had no previous sight of his forces and did not look upon them with contempt from seeing their real character.

Accordingly, picking out for himself one hundred and fifty hoplites and assigning the rest to Clearidas, he determined to make a sudden attack before the Athenians withdrew, thinking that he could not again cut them off thus isolated if once reinforcements should reach them. So calling together all the soldiers, wishing to encourage them and explain his plan, he spoke to them as follows:

“Men of the Peloponnesus, let it suffice to remind you briefly from what manner of country we have come, that it has ever been free because of its courage, and that you are going to fight, Dorians against Ionians, whom you have been accustomed to vanquish.

I will, however, explain to you in what way I intend to make the attack, in order that my plan of fighting in detachments and not in a body may not seem to anyone poor tactics and thus cause discouragement.

For I imagine that the enemy ascended the hill in contempt of us and because they could not have expected that anybody would come out for battle against them, and now, with broken ranks and intent upon reconnoitring, are taking small account of us.

Now when an assailant having most clearly observed such errors in the enemy also makes his attack in accordance with the force at his own disposal, not openly and in array of battle, but as may be advantageous under present circumstances, then he would be most likely to succeed.

And those. stratagems have won the highest credit by which a man most completely deceives the enemy and helps his friends.

While, then, the Athenians, still unprepared, are full of confidence and are thinking, so far as I can see, more of withdrawing than of staying where they are, while their tension of mind is relaxed and before they have got their thoughts together, I will take my own troops and if possible surprise them by a dash upon the centre of their army.

Then, Clearidas, the moment you see me pressing on and in all likelihood striking terror into them, do you suddenly throw open the gates and at the head of your own men and the Amphipolitans and the rest of our allies rush out upon them and make all haste to close with them at once. In this way there is the best hope to put them in a panic;