History of the Peloponnesian War

For they alone of the allies, when the Siceliots became reconciled, made no treaty with the Athenians, nor would they have done so then if they had not been pressed by the war with the Iponieans and Medmaeans, who lived on their borders and were colonists of theirs. And Phaeax some time after this returned to Athens.

Now when Cleon had sailed round from Torone to Amphipolis, as mentioned above, taking Eion as his base he made an unsuccessful attack upon Stagirus,[*](cf. 4.88.2.) an Andrian colony, but did take by storm Galepsus,[*](cf. 4.107.3.) a colony of the Thasians.

Then sending envoys to Perdiccas, with a request to join him with an army in accordance with the terms of alliance,[*](cf. 4.132.1.) and other envoys to Thrace to Polles, king of the Odomantians, to bring as many Thracian mercenaries as possible, he himself kept quiet at Eion.

But Brasidas, on hearing of these things, took post over against him at Cerdylium. This place is in the territory of the Argilians, on high ground across the river not far from Amphipolis, and commands a view in all directions, so that Cleon could not move his army without being observed; for Brasidas expected that Cleon in contempt of the small numbers of the Lacedaemonians would go up against Amphipolis, with his present army.[*](ie. without waiting for reinforcements.)

At the same time he made further preparations, calling to his aid fifteen hundred Thracian mercenaries and all the Edonians, both targeteers and cavalry. And he had also of the Myrcinians and the Chalcidians one thousand targeteers, in addition to the troops in Amphipolis.

The whole body of hoplites collected by him was about two thousand in number, and he had three hundred Hellenic horsemen. Of these forces Brasidas took about fifteen hundred and stationed himself at Cerdylium; the rest were posted at Amphipolis under the command of Clearidas.

Cleon kept quiet for a while, then was forced to do just what Brasidas had expected.

For when the soldiers began to be annoyed at sitting still and to discuss the quality of his leadership—what experience and daring there was on the other side and what incompetence and cowardice would be pitted against it, and how unwillingly they had come with him from home—he became aware of their grumbling, and unwilling that they should be exasperated by remaining inactive in the same place, marched out with them.

He adopted the same course in which he had been successful at Pylos and so had acquired confidence in his own wisdom; for he had no expectation that anybody would come against him for battle, but he was going up, he said, rather to reconnoitre the place; and in fact he was waiting for the larger force,[*](cf. 5.6.2.) not with a view to gaining the victory without risk should he be forced to fight, but to surrounding the town and taking it by force of arms.

Accordingly he went and posted his force on a strong hill before Amphipolis, and was himself surveying the marshy part of the Strymon and the situation of the city in respect to the surrounding Thracian country, and he thought that he could withdraw whenever he pleased without a battle;

for no one was visible on the wall or was seen coming out by the gates, which were all closed. He therefore thought that he had made a mistake in coming up without storming-machines; for he might have taken the town, since it was undefended.