History of the Peloponnesian War

And all these operations of the Hellenes, against one another and against the Barbarian, took place in the interval of about fifty years between the retreat of Xerxes and the beginning of this war.[*](479-432 B.C.)It was in this period that the Athenians established their rule more firmly and themselves advanced to great power. And the Lacedaemonians, though aware of their growing power, made no attempt to check it, except to a trifling extent, remaining indifferent the greater part of the time, since they had never been quick to go to war except under compulsion, and in this case were in some degree precluded from interference by wars of their own.[*](The Helot rebellion, 1.101.)But at last the power of the Athenians began clearly to exalt itself and they were laying hands upon their allies. Then the Lacedaemonians could bear it no longer, but determined that they must attack the Athenian power with all zeal and overthrow it, if they could, by undertaking this war. The Lacedaemonians themselves, then,[*](Resuming the narrative interrupted at the end of Thuc. 1.88.) had decided that the treaty had been broken and that the Athenians were in the wrong, and sending to Delphi they asked the god if it would be advisable for them to go to war.

The god answered them, as it is said, that if they warred with all their might, victory would be theirs, and said that he himself would help them, whether invoked or uninvoked.

But they wished to summon their allies again and put[*](432 B.C.) to them the question whether they should go to war. And when the envoys from the allies had come and an assembly was held, the others said what they wished, most of them complaining of the Athenians and demanding that the war should be entered upon, and especially the Corinthians. They had already, before the meeting, privately begged the allies city by city to vote for the war, fearing lest Potidaea would be destroyed before help came, and now, being also present at this meeting, they came forward last of all and spoke as follows:

" Men of the allies, we can no longer complain of the Lacedaemonians that they have not both themselves voted for the war and also brought us together for this object. And that is right; for it is the duty of leaders, while equitably considering their particular interests, to have special regard for the general weal, just as in other matters they are honoured above all.

Now those of us who have had dealings with the Athenians in the past do not need to be taught to be on our guard against them. But those who dwell more in the interior and away from any trade-route should be warned that, if they do not aid those who are on the seaboard, they will find it more difficult to bring the products of the land down to the sea and to get in return what the sea gives to the mainland; and that they should not be careless judges of what is said here, as though it were no concern of theirs, but should expect that, if they abandon the seacoast to its fate, the danger may possibly some day reach them, and that they are deliberating upon their own interests no less than upon ours.

They ought not, therefore, to hesitate a moment to adopt war in place of peace. For though it is the part of men of discretion to remain tranquil should they not be wronged, it behooves brave men, when wronged, to go from peace to war, but when a favourable opportunity offers to abandon war and resume peace again, allowing themselves neither to be elated by success in war nor to be so enamoured of the quiet of peace as to submit to wrong.

For he who for the sake of his comfort shrinks from war is likely, should he remain tranquil, very speedily to forfeit the delights of ease which caused him to shrink; and he who presumes upon his success in war has failed to reflect how treacherous is the confidence which elates him.

For many enterprises which were ill-planned have succeeded because the adversary has proved to be still worse advised, and yet more, which to all appearances were well advised, have turned out the opposite way and brought disgrace. For no one ever carries out a plan with the same confidence with which he conceives it; on the contrary we form our fond schemes with a feeling of security, but when it comes to their execution, we are possessed by fear and fall short of success.

" And so now in our own case, it is because we are suffering wrongs and have ample grounds for complaint that we are stirring up this war, and as soon as we have avenged our wrongs upon the Athenians we will bring the war to an end when occasion offers.

And for many reasons we are likely to prevail: first, because we are superior in point of numbers and in military experience ;

secondly, because we all with one accord obey the word of command; and, thirdly, on the sea, where their strength lies, we shall be able to equip a fleet, not only with the means which we severally possess, but also with the funds stored up at Delphi and Olympia.[*](cf. Thuc. 2.13.4, where Pericles suggests a similar resource. The Delphic oracle favoured the Peloponnesians, according to 1.118.3.)For by contracting a loan we can use the inducement of higher pay to entice away from them their mercenary sailors; for the forces of the Athenians are made up of hirelings rather than of their own citizens, whereas ours, whose strength lies more in the quality of the men than in the pay they get, would be less subject to such defection.

And so, if we win a single victory at sea, in all probability they are defeated.[*](Through the mercenary sailors flocking to the Peloponnesian side for higher pay.)If, however, they should still hold out, we on our part shall have more time for practice in seamanship, and asp soon as we have brought our skill to a parity with theirs, in courage, assuredly, we shall be superior. For the excellence that nature has given us cannot become theirs through instruction, whereas the advantage they have in skill can be acquired by us through practice.