Noctes Atticae

On the brief topics discussed at the table of the philosopher Taurus and called Sympoticae, or Table Talk. [*](Really, talk over the wine, or after-dinner talk.)

THIS custom was practised and observed at Athens by those who were on intimate terms with the philosopher Taurus; when he invited us to his home, in order that we might not come wholly tax-free, [*](The reference is to a dinner to which each guest brought his contribution (symbolon); cf. Hor. Odes, iv. 12. 14 f., non ego te meis immunem meditor tinguere poculis; Catull. xiii.) as the saying is, and without a contribution, we brought to the simple meal, not dainty foods, but ingenious topics for discussion. Accordingly, each one of us came with a question which he had thought up and prepared, and when the eating ended, conversation began. The questions, however, were neither weighty nor serious, but certain neat but trifling e)nqumhma/tia, or problems, which would pique a mind enlivened with wine; for instance, the examples of playful subtlety which I shall quote.

The question was asked, when a dying man died—when he was already in the grasp of death, or while he still lived? And when did a rising man rise—when he was already standing, or while he was still seated? And when did one who was learning an art become an artist—when he already was one, or when he was still learning? For whichever answer you make, your statement will be absurd and laughable, and it will seem much more absurd, if you say that it is in either case, or in neither.

But when some declared that all these questions were pointless and idle sophisms, Taurus said:

Do not despise such problems, as if they were mere trifling

v2.p.127

amusements. The most earnest of the philosophers have seriously debated this question. [*](See Pease, Things without Honor, Class. Phil. xxi. (1926), pp. 97 ff.) Some have thought that the term 'die' was properly used, and that the moment of death came, while life still remained; others have left no life in that moment, but have claimed for death all that period which is termed dying.' Also in regard to other similar problems they have argued for different times and maintained opposite opinions. But our master Plato,

[*](Parm. 21, p. 156 D; cf. vi. 21, above. ) said he,

assigned that time neither to life nor to death, and took the same position in every discussion of similar questions. For he saw that the alternatives were mutually contrary, that one of the two opposites could not be maintained while the other existed, and that the question arose from the juxtaposition of two opposing extremes, namely life and death. Therefore he himself devised, and gave a name to, a new period of time, lying on the boundary between the two, which he called in appropriate and exact language h( e)cai/fnhs fu/sis, or 'the moment of sudden separation.' And this very term, as I have given it,

said he,

you will find used by him in the dialogue entitled Parmenides.

Of such a kind were our

contributions

[*](See note 2, p. 125.) at Taurus' house, and such were, as he himself used to put it, the traghma/tia or

sweetmeats

of our desserts.

The three reasons given by the philosophers for punishing crimes; and why Plato mentions only two of these, and not three.

IT has been thought that there should be three reasons for punishing crimes. One of these, which

the Greeks call either ko/lasis or nouqesi/a, is the infliction of punishment for the purpose of correction and reformation, in order that one who has done wrong thoughtlessly may become more careful and scrupulous. The second is called timwri/a by those who have made a more exact differentiation between terms of this kind. That reason for punishment exists when the dignity and the prestige of the one who is sinned against must be maintained, lest the omission of punishment bring him into contempt and diminish the esteem in which he is held; and therefore they think that it was given a name derived from the preservation of honour (timh/). A third reason for punishment is that which is called by the Greeks para/deigma, when punishment is necessary for the sake of example, in order that others through fear of a recognized penalty may be kept from similar sins, which it is to the common interest to prevent. Therefore our forefathers also used the word exempla, or

examples,

for the severest and heaviest penalties. Accordingly, when there is either strong hope that the culprit will voluntarily correct himself without punishment, or on the other hand when there is no hope that he can be reformed and corrected; or when there is no need to fear loss of prestige in the one who has been sinned against; or if the sin is not of such a sort that punishment must be inflicted in order that it may inspire a necessary feeling of fear—then in the case of all such sins the desire to inflict punishment does not seem to be at all fitting.

Other philosophers have discussed these three reasons for punishment in various places, and so too had our countryman Taurus in the first book of the

Commentaries which he wrote On the Gorgias of Plato. But Plato himself says in plain terms that there are only two reasons for punishment: one being that which I put first—for the sake of correction; the second, that which I gave in the third place—as an example to inspire fear. These are Plato's own words in the Gorgias: [*](81, p. 525 A.)

It is fitting that everyone who suffers punishment, when justly punished by another, either be made better and profit thereby, or serve as an example to others, in order that they, seeing his punishment, may be reformed through fear.

In these words you may readily understand that Plato used timwri/a, not in the sense that 1 said above is given it by some, but with the general meaning of any punishment. But whether he omitted the maintenance of the prestige of an injured person as a reason for inflicting punishment, on the ground that it was altogether insignificant and worthy of contempt, or rather passed over it as something not germane to his subject, since he was writing about punishments to be inflicted after this life and not during life and among men, this question I leave undecided.