Noctes Atticae

Gellius, Aulus

Gellius, Aulus. The Attic Nights of Aulus Gellius. Rolfe, John C., translator. Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press; William Heinemann, 1927 (printing).

A passage from a speech of Quintus Metellus Numidicus, which it was my pleasure to recall, since it draws attention to the obligation of self-respect and dignity in the conduct of life.

ONE should not vie in abusive language with the basest of men or wrangle with foul words with the shameless and wicked, since you become like them and their exact mate so long as you say things which match and are exactly like what you hear. This truth may be learned no less from an address of Quintus Metellus Numidicus, a man of wisdom, than from the books and the teachings of the philosophers. These are the words of Metellus from his speech Against Gaius Manlius, Tribune of the Commons,[*](O.R.F. p. 274, Meyer2.) by whom he had been assailed and taunted in spiteful terms in a speech delivered before the people:

Now, fellow citizens, so far as Manlius is concerned, since he thinks that he will appear a greater man, if he keeps calling me his enemy, who neither count him as my friend nor take account of him as an enemy, I do not propose to say another word. For I consider him not only wholly unworthy to be well spoken of by good men, but unfit even to be reproached by the upright. For if you name an insignificant fellow of his kind at a time when you cannot punish him, you confer honour upon him rather than ignominy.

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That neither testamentum, as Servius Sulpicius thought, nor sacellum, as Gaius Trebatus believed, is a compound, but the former is an extended form of testatio, the latter a diminutive of sacrum.

I DO not understand what reason led Servius Sulpicius the jurist, the most learned man of his time, to write in the second book of his work On the Annulling of Sacred Rites[*](Fr. 3, Huschke; i, p. 225, Bremer.) that testamentum is a compound word; for he declared that it was made up of mentis contestatio, or

an attesting of the mind.

What then are we to say about calciamentum (shoe), paludamentum (cloak), pavimentum (pavement), vestimentum (clothing), and thousands of other words that have been extended by a suffix of that kind? Are we to call all these also compounds? As a matter of fact, Servius, or whoever it was who first made the statement, was evidently misled by a notion of the presence of mens in testamentum, an idea that is to be sure false, but neither inappropriate nor unattractive, just as indeed Gaius Trebatius too was misled into a similar attractive combination. For he says in the second book of his work On Religions: [*](Fr 4, Huschke; 5, Bremer (i, p. 405).)

A sacellum, or 'shrine,' is a small place consecrated to a god and containing an altar.

Then he adds these words:

Sacellum, I think, is made up of the two words sacer and cella, as if it were sacra cella, or 'a sacred clamber.'

This indeed is what Trebatius wrote, but who does not know both that sacellum is not a compound, and that it is not made up of sacer and cella, but is the diminutive of sacrum?

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On the brief topics discussed at the table of the philosopher Taurus and called Sympoticae, or Table Talk. [*](Really, talk over the wine, or after-dinner talk.)

THIS custom was practised and observed at Athens by those who were on intimate terms with the philosopher Taurus; when he invited us to his home, in order that we might not come wholly tax-free, [*](The reference is to a dinner to which each guest brought his contribution (symbolon); cf. Hor. Odes, iv. 12. 14 f., non ego te meis immunem meditor tinguere poculis; Catull. xiii.) as the saying is, and without a contribution, we brought to the simple meal, not dainty foods, but ingenious topics for discussion. Accordingly, each one of us came with a question which he had thought up and prepared, and when the eating ended, conversation began. The questions, however, were neither weighty nor serious, but certain neat but trifling e)nqumhma/tia, or problems, which would pique a mind enlivened with wine; for instance, the examples of playful subtlety which I shall quote.

The question was asked, when a dying man died—when he was already in the grasp of death, or while he still lived? And when did a rising man rise—when he was already standing, or while he was still seated? And when did one who was learning an art become an artist—when he already was one, or when he was still learning? For whichever answer you make, your statement will be absurd and laughable, and it will seem much more absurd, if you say that it is in either case, or in neither.

But when some declared that all these questions were pointless and idle sophisms, Taurus said:

Do not despise such problems, as if they were mere trifling
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amusements. The most earnest of the philosophers have seriously debated this question. [*](See Pease, Things without Honor, Class. Phil. xxi. (1926), pp. 97 ff.) Some have thought that the term 'die' was properly used, and that the moment of death came, while life still remained; others have left no life in that moment, but have claimed for death all that period which is termed dying.' Also in regard to other similar problems they have argued for different times and maintained opposite opinions. But our master Plato,

[*](Parm. 21, p. 156 D; cf. vi. 21, above. ) said he,

assigned that time neither to life nor to death, and took the same position in every discussion of similar questions. For he saw that the alternatives were mutually contrary, that one of the two opposites could not be maintained while the other existed, and that the question arose from the juxtaposition of two opposing extremes, namely life and death. Therefore he himself devised, and gave a name to, a new period of time, lying on the boundary between the two, which he called in appropriate and exact language h( e)cai/fnhs fu/sis, or 'the moment of sudden separation.' And this very term, as I have given it,

said he,

you will find used by him in the dialogue entitled Parmenides.

Of such a kind were our

contributions

[*](See note 2, p. 125.) at Taurus' house, and such were, as he himself used to put it, the traghma/tia or

sweetmeats

of our desserts.

The three reasons given by the philosophers for punishing crimes; and why Plato mentions only two of these, and not three.

IT has been thought that there should be three reasons for punishing crimes. One of these, which

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the Greeks call either ko/lasis or nouqesi/a, is the infliction of punishment for the purpose of correction and reformation, in order that one who has done wrong thoughtlessly may become more careful and scrupulous. The second is called timwri/a by those who have made a more exact differentiation between terms of this kind. That reason for punishment exists when the dignity and the prestige of the one who is sinned against must be maintained, lest the omission of punishment bring him into contempt and diminish the esteem in which he is held; and therefore they think that it was given a name derived from the preservation of honour (timh/). A third reason for punishment is that which is called by the Greeks para/deigma, when punishment is necessary for the sake of example, in order that others through fear of a recognized penalty may be kept from similar sins, which it is to the common interest to prevent. Therefore our forefathers also used the word exempla, or

examples,

for the severest and heaviest penalties. Accordingly, when there is either strong hope that the culprit will voluntarily correct himself without punishment, or on the other hand when there is no hope that he can be reformed and corrected; or when there is no need to fear loss of prestige in the one who has been sinned against; or if the sin is not of such a sort that punishment must be inflicted in order that it may inspire a necessary feeling of fear—then in the case of all such sins the desire to inflict punishment does not seem to be at all fitting.

Other philosophers have discussed these three reasons for punishment in various places, and so too had our countryman Taurus in the first book of the

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Commentaries which he wrote On the Gorgias of Plato. But Plato himself says in plain terms that there are only two reasons for punishment: one being that which I put first—for the sake of correction; the second, that which I gave in the third place—as an example to inspire fear. These are Plato's own words in the Gorgias: [*](81, p. 525 A.)

It is fitting that everyone who suffers punishment, when justly punished by another, either be made better and profit thereby, or serve as an example to others, in order that they, seeing his punishment, may be reformed through fear.

In these words you may readily understand that Plato used timwri/a, not in the sense that 1 said above is given it by some, but with the general meaning of any punishment. But whether he omitted the maintenance of the prestige of an injured person as a reason for inflicting punishment, on the ground that it was altogether insignificant and worthy of contempt, or rather passed over it as something not germane to his subject, since he was writing about punishments to be inflicted after this life and not during life and among men, this question I leave undecided.

On the verb quiesco, whether it should be pronounced with a long or a short e.

A FRIEND of mine, a man of much learning and devoted to the liberal arts, pronounced the verb quiescit (

be quiet

) in the usual manner, with a short e. Another man, also a friend of mine, marvellous in the use of grammatical rules as jugglers' tricks, so to say, and excessively fastidious

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in rejecting common words, thought that the first man had been guilty of a barbarism, maintaining that he ought to have lengthened the e, rather than shortened it. For he asserted that quiescit ought to be pronounced like calescit, nitescit, stupescit and many other words of that kind. He also added the statement that quies (quiet) is pronounced with the e long, not short. But my first-named friend, with the unassuming modesty which was characteristic of him in all matters, said that not even if the Aelii, the Cincii and the Santrae [*](Mentioned as typical grammarians. The gens Aelia included several famous jurists and men of letters; the reference here is to Lucius Aelius Stilo, the teacher of Varro and Cicero. Santra was a grammarian of the first century B.C.; the Cincii were less well known.) had decided that the word ought to be so pronounced, would he follow their ruling against the universal usage of the Latin language, nor would he speak in such an eccentric fashion as to be discordant and strange in his diction. Nevertheless he wrote a letter on the subject, among some exercises for his own amusement, in which he tried to prove that quiesco is not like those words which I have quoted above; that it is not derived from quies but rather quies from quiesco. He also maintained that quiesco has the form and derivation of a Greek word, [*](A fanciful derivation from Ionic e)/xw, e)/sxw.) and he tried to show, by reasons that were by no means without force, that the word should not be pronounced with a long e. [*](The e is however long; quiésco occurs in C.1.L. vi, 6250 and 25521.)

On a use by the poet Catullus of the word deprecor, which is unusual, it is true, but appropriate and correct; and on the origin of that word, with examples from early writers.

As we chanced to be strolling one evening in the

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Lyceum, [*](A gymnasium at Athens, the favourite resort of Aristotle and his pupils.) we were furnished with sport and amusement by a certain man, of the kind that lays claim to a reputation for eloquence by a superficial and ill-regulated use of language, without having learned any of the usages and principles of the Latin tongue. For while Catullus in one of his poems had used the word deprecor rather cleverly, that fellow, unable to appreciate this, declared that the following verses which I have quoted were very flat, although in the judgment of all men they are most charming: [*](xcii.)

My Lesbia constantly speaks ill of me
And ceases not. By Jove! she cares for me!
How do I know? 'Tis just the same with me;
I rail at, but by Jove! I worship, her.

Our good man thought that deprecor in this passage was used in the sense that is commonly given the word by the vulgar; that is,

I pray earnestly,

I beseech,

I entreat,

where the preposition de is used intensively and emphatically. And if that were so, the verses would indeed be flat. But as a matter of fact the sense is exactly the opposite; for the preposition de, since it has a double force, contains two meanings in one and the same word. For deprecor is used by Catullus in the sense of

denounce, execrate, drive away,

avert by prayers

; but it also has the opposite meaning, when Cicero In Defence of Publius Sulla speaks as follows: [*](§ 72.)

How many men's lives did he beg off (est deprecatus) from Sulla.

Similarly in his speech Against the Agrarian Law Cicero says: [*](ii. 100.)

If I do any
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wrong, there are no masks of ancestors to intercede (deprecentur,
beg off
) for me with you by their prayers.

But Catullus was not alone in using this word with that meaning. Indeed, the books are full of cases of its occurrence in the same sense, and of these I have quoted one or two which had come to mind. Quintus Ennius in the Erectheus, not differing greatly from Catullus, says: [*](128, Ribbeck3.)

Who now win freedom by my own distress
For those whose slavery I by woe avert (deprecor).

He means

I drive away

and

remove,

either by resort to prayer or in some other way. Similarly in the Chresphontes Ennius writes: [*](121, Ribbeck3.)

When I my own life spare, may I avert (deprecer)
Death from mine enemy.

Cicero, in the sixth book of his Republic, wrote: [*](2.2.)

Which indeed was so much the more remarkable, because, while the colleagues were in the same case, they not only did not incur the same hatred, but the affection felt for Gracchus even averted (deprecabatur) the unpopularity of Claudius.

Here too the meaning is not

earnestly entreated,

but

warded off

unpopularity, so to speak, and defended him against it, a meaning which the Greeks express by the parallel word paraitei=sqai.

Cicero also uses the word in the same way in his Defence of Aulus Caecina, saying: [*](§ 30.)

What can you do for a man like this? Can you not sometimes permit one to avert (deprecetur) the odium of the greatest wickedness by the excuse of the most abysmal folly?

Also in the first book of his second

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Arraignment of Verres: [*](ii. 2. 192.)

Now what can Hortensius do? Will he try to avert (deprecetur) the charge of avarice by the praise of economy? But he is defending a man who is utterly disgraced and sunk in lust and crime.

So then Catullus means that he is doing the same as Lesbia, in publicly speaking ill of her, scorning and rejecting her, and constantly praying to be rid of her, and yet loving her to madness.

Who was the first of all to establish a public library; and how many books there were in the public libraries at Athens before the Persian invasions.

THE tyrant Pisistratus is said to have been the first to establish at Athens a public library of books relating to the liberal arts. Then the Athenians themselves added to this collection with considerable diligence and care; but later Xerxes, when he got possession of Athens and burned the entire city except the citadel, [*](In 480 B.C.) removed that whole collection of books and carried them off to Persia. Finally, a long time afterwards, king Seleucus, who was surnamed Nicanor, had all those books taken back to Athens.

At a later time an enormous quantity of books, nearly seven hundred thousand volumes, was either acquired or written [*](i.e. copied from other manuscripts.) in Egypt under the kings known as Ptolemies; but these were all burned during the sack of the city in our first war with Alexandria, [*](In 48 B.C. By no means all of the Alexandrian Library was destroyed at that time, and the losses were made good, at least in part, by Antony in 41 B.C. A part of the library was burned under Aurelian, in A.D. 272, and the destruction seems to have been completed in 391.) not intentionally or by anyone's order, but accidentally by the auxiliary soldiers.

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Whether the expression hesterna nocte, for

last night,

is right or wrong, and what the grammarians have said about those words; also that the decemvirs in the Twelve Tables [*](viii. 12.) used nox for noctu, meaning

by night.

[*](See Macr. Sat. i. 4.)

TEN words pointed out to me by Favorinus which, although in use by the Greeks, are of foreign origin and barbarous; also the same number given him by me which, though of general and common use by those who speak Latin, are by no means Latin and are not to be found in the early literature.

IN what terms and how severely the philosopher Peregrinus in my hearing rebuked a young Roman of equestrian rank, who stood before him inattentive and constantly yawning.

. . . and saw him continually yawning and noticed the degenerate dreaminess expressed in his attitude of mind and body. [*](This fragment is preserved by Nonius, II, p. 121, 19, s. v. halucinari.)

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THAT Herodotus, that most famous writer of history, was wrong in saying [*](vi. 37.) that the pine alone of all trees never puts forth new shoots from the same roots, after being cut down; and that he stated as an established fact [*](ii. 22.) about rainwater and snow a thing which had not been sufficiently investigated.

ON the meaning of Virgil's expression caelum stare pulvere[*](The sky on columns of dust upborne,Aen. xii. 407, where the poet is describing the effect of an advancing troop of cavalry.) and of Lucilius' pectus sentibus stare. [*](The breast with thorns is filled, Lucil. 213, Marx. According to Nonius, p. 392, 2, stat means is full of. Donatus, ad Ter. Andr. iv. 2. 16 (69), quotes Lucilius for stat sentibus fundus, i. e., the farm is full of thorns (1301, Marx).)

THAT when a reconciliation takes place after trifling offences, mutual complaints are useless; and Taurus' discourse on that subject, with a quotation from the treatise of Theophrastus; and what Marcus Cicero also thought about the love arising from friendship, added in his own words. [*](Cf. i. 3. 10 f.)

WHAT we have learned and know of the nature and character of memory from Aristotle's work entitled Peri\ Mnh/mhs or On Memory; and also some other examples, of which we have heard or read, about extraordinary powers of memory or its total loss. [*](See Nonius, s.v. meminisse, p. 441. 4, M.)

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MY experience in trying to interpret and, as it were, to reproduce in Latin certain passages of Plato.

How Theophrastus, the most eloquent philosopher of his entire generation, when on the point of making a brief speech to the people of Athens, was overcome by bashfulness and kept silence; and how Demosthenes had a similar experience when speaking before king Philip.

A DISCUSSION that I had in the town of Eleusis with a conceited grammarian who, although ignorant of the tenses of verbs and the exercises of schoolboys, ostentatiously proposed abstruse questions of a hazy and formidable character, to impress the minds of the unlearned.

Would wish a lying scoundrel. [*](Whether these words, from Nonius, II., p. 120, 12, M., belong here is uncertain.)

THE witty reply of Socrates to his wife Xanthippe, when she asked that they might spend more money for their dinners during the Dionysiac festival.

ON the meaning of plerique omnes, or

almost all,

in the early literature; and on the probable Greek origin of that expression.

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THAT eupsones, a word used by the people of Africa, is not Phoenician, but Greek.