Noctes Atticae

A story, taken from the annals, about Tiberius Gracchus, tribune of the commons and father of the Gracchi; and also an exact quotation of the decrees of the tribunes.

A FINE, noble and generous action of Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus is recorded in the Examples.[*](Nepos, Ex,, fr. 3, Peter2,) It runs as follows: Gaius Minucius Augurinus, tribune of the commons, imposed a fine on Lucius Scipio Asiaticus, brother of Scipio Africanus the elder, [*](The famous conqueror of Hannibal at Zama in 202 B.C. He served as legatus under his brother in the war against Antiochus, in 190 B.C.) and demanded that he should give security

The words of their decree, which I have quoted, are taken from the records of the annals:

Whereas Publius Scipio Africanus has asked us to protect his brother, Lucius Scipio Asiaticus, against the violent measures of one of our colleagues, in that, contrary to the laws and the customs of our forefathers, that tribune of the commons, having illegally convened an assembly without consulting the auspices, pronounced sentence upon him and imposed an unprecedented fine, and compels him to furnish security for its payment, or if he does not do so, orders that he be imprisoned; and whereas, on the other hand, our colleague has demanded that we should not interfere with him in the exercise of his legal authority—our unanimous decision in this matter is as follows: If Lucius Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus will furnish security in accordance with the decision of our colleague, we will forbid our colleague to take him to prison; but if he shall not furnish the securities in accordance with our colleague's decision, we will not interfere with our colleague in the exercise of his lawful authority.

After this decree, Lucius Scipio refused to give security and the tribune Augurinus ordered him to be arrested and taken to prison. Thereupon Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, one of the tribunes of the commons and father of Tiberius and Gaius

That decree ran as follows:

Whereas Lucius Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus, during the celebration of a triumph, cast the leaders of the enemy into prison, it seems contrary to the dignity of our country that the Roman people's commander should be consigned to the same place to which he had committed the leaders of the enemy; therefore I forbid my colleague to take violent measures towards Lucius Scipio Asiaticus.

But Valerius Antias, contradicting this record of the decrees and the testimony of the ancient annals, has said [*](Page 267 note, Peter2.) that it was after the death of Africanus that Tiberius Gracchus interposed that veto in behalf of Scipio Asiaticus; also that Scipio was not fined, but that being convicted of embezzlement of the money taken from Antiochus and refusing to give bail, was just being taken to prison when he was saved by this veto of Gracchus.

That Virgil removed Nola from one of his lines and substituted ora because the inhabitants of Nola had refused him water; and also some additional notes on the agreeable euphony of vowels.

I HAVE found it noted in a certain commentary that the following lines were first read and published by Virgil in this form: [*](Georg. ii. 244 f.)

1. Such is the soil that wealthy Capua ploughs
2. And Nola near Vesuvius' height.

1. The region near Vesuvius' height.

With the truth or falsity of this note I am not concerned; but there is no doubt that ora has a more agreeable and musical sound than Nola. For the last vowel in the first line and the first vowel in the following line being the same, the sound is prolonged by an hiatus that is at the same time melodious and pleasing. Indeed, it is possible to find in famous poets many instances of such melody, which appears to be the result of art rather than accident; but in Homer they are more frequent than in all other poets. In fact, in one single passage he introduces a number of sounds of such a nature, and with such an hiatus, in a series of successive words; for example: [*](Iliad xxii. 151.)

1. The other fountain e'en in summer flows,
2. Like unto hail, chill snow, or crystal ice,
[*](The instances referred to are prore/ei ei)kui=a, xala/zh| h)\, and yuxrh=| h)\.)

1. Up to the top he pushed (a)/nw w)/qeske) the stone.

Catullus too, the most graceful of poets, in the following verses, [*](xxvii. 1.)

1. Boy, who servest old Falernian,
2. Pour out stronger cups for me,
3. Following queen [*](Postumia is the magistra bibendi, who regulated the proportion of wine and water and the size of the cups, and imposed penalties for breaking her rules. Cf. Hor. Odes, i. 4. 18.) Postumia's mandate,
4. Tipsier she than tipsy grape,

Why it is that the phrases quoad vivet and quoad morietur indicate the very same time, although based upon opposite things.

WHEN the expressions quoad vivet, or

so long as he shall live,

until he shall die,

as long as the senate shall be in session,

until the senate shall adjourn,

be in session

adjourn

On the custom of the censors of taking their horse from corpulent and excessively fat knights; and the question whether such action also involved degradation or left them their rank as knights.

THE censors used to take his horse from a man who was too fat and corpulent, evidently because they thought that so heavy a person was unfit to perform the duties of a knight. For this was not a punishment, as some think, but the knight was relieved of duty without loss of rank. Yet Cato, in the speech which he wrote On Neglecting Sacrifice,[*](xviii. 5, Jordan.) makes such an occurrence a somewhat serious charge, thus apparently indicating that it was attended with disgrace. If you understand that to have been the case, you must certainly assume that it was because a man was not looked upon as wholly free from the reproach of slothfulness, if his body had bulked and swollen to such unwieldy dimensions.

How Chrysippus replied to those who denied the existence of Providence.

Those who do not believe that the world was created for God and mankind, or that human affairs are ruled by Providence, think that they are using a strong argument when they say:

If there were a Providence, there would be no evils.

There is absolutely nothing more foolish than those men who think that good could exist, if there were at the same time no evil. For since good is the opposite of evil, it necessarily follows that both must exist in opposition to each other, supported as it were by mutual adverse forces; since as a matter of fact no opposite is conceivable without something to oppose it. For how could there be an idea of justice if there were no acts of injustice? or what else is justice than the absence of injustice? How too can courage be understood except by contrast with cowardice? Or temperance except by contrast with intemperance? How also could there be wisdom, if folly did not exist as its opposite? Therefore,

why do not the

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fools also wish that there may be truth, but no falsehood? For it is in the same way that good and evil exist, happiness and unhappiness, pain and pleasure. For, as Plato says, [*](Phaedo, 3, p. 60 B.) they are bound one to the other by their opposing extremes; if you take away one, you will have removed both.

In the same book [*](Fr. ii, 1170, Arn.) Chrysippus also considers and discusses this question, which he thinks worth investigating: whether men's diseases come by nature; that is, whether nature herself, or Providence, if you will, which created this structure of the universe and the human race, also created the diseases, weakness, and bodily infirmities from which mankind suffers. He, however, does not think that it was nature's original intention to make men subject to disease; for that would never have been consistent with nature as the source and mother of all things good.

But,

when she was creating and bringing forth many great things which were highly suitable and useful, there were also produced at the same time troubles closely connected with those good things that she was creating

Exactly as,

when nature fashioned men's bodies, a higher reason and the actual usefulness of what she was creating demanded that the lead be made of very delicate and small bones. But this greater usefulness of one part was attended with an external disadvantage; namely, that the head was but slightly protected and could be damaged by slight blows and shocks. In the same way diseases too and illness were created at the same time with

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health. Exactly, by Heaven!

as vices, through their relationship to the opposite quality, are produced at the same time that virtue is created for mankind by nature's design.

How Chrysippus also maintained the power and inevitable nature of fate, but at the same time declared that we had control over our plans and decisions.

CHRYSIPPUS, the leader of the Stoic philosophy, defined fate, which the Greeks call ei(marme/nh, in about the following terms: [*](Fr. ii. 1000, Arn.)

Fate,

is an eternal and unalterable series of circumstances, and a chain rolling and entangling itself through an unbroken series of consequences, from which it is fashioned and made up.

an orderly series, established by nature, of all events, following one another and joined together from eternity, and their unalterable interdependence.

But the authors of other views and of other schools of philosophy openly criticize this definition as follows:

If Chrysippus,

believes that all things are set in motion and directed by fate, and that the course of fate and its coils cannot be turned aside or evaded, then the sins and faults of men too ought not to cause anger or be attributed to

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themselves and their inclinations, but to a certain unavoidable impulse which arises from fate,

Against these criticisms Chrysippus argues at length, subtilely and cleverly, but the purport of all that he has written on that subject is about this: [*](Fr. ii. 1000, Arn.)

Although it is a fact,

that all things are subject to an inevitable and fundamental law and are closely linked to fate, yet the peculiar properties of our minds are subject to fate only according to their individuality and quality. For if in the beginning they are fashioned by nature for health and usefulness, they will avoid with little opposition and little difficulty all that force with which fate threatens them from without. But if they are rough, ignorant, crude, and without any support from education, through their own perversity and voluntary impulse they plunge into continual faults and sin, even though the assault of some inconvenience due to fate be slight or non-existent. And that this very thing should happen in this way is due to that natural and inevitable connection of events which is called 'fate.' For it is in the nature of things, so to speak, fated and inevitable that evil characters should not be free from sins and faults.

A little later he uses an illustration of this statement of his, which is in truth quite neat and appropriate: [*](Fr. ii. 1000, Arn.)

For instance,

if you roll a cylindrical stone over a sloping, steep piece of ground, you do indeed furnish the beginning and

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cause of its rapid descent, yet soon it speeds onward, not because you make it do so, but because of its peculiar form and natural tendency to roll; just so the order, the law, and the inevitable quality of fate set in motion the various classes of things and the beginnings of causes, but the carrying out of our designs and thoughts, and even our actions, are regulated by each individual's own will and the characteristics of his mind.

Therefore it is said by the Pythagoreans also: [*](Xru/sea )/Eph, 54.)

1. You'll learn that men have ills which they themselves
2. Bring on themselves,

for harm comes to each of them through themselves, and they go astray through their own impulse and are harmed by their own purpose and determination.

The first to express this thought was the oldest and wisest of the poets, in these verses: [*](Homer, Odyss. i. 32.)

1. Alas! how wrongly mortals blame the gods!
2. From us, they say, comes evil; they themselves
3. By their own folly woes unfated bear.

Chrysippus, in spite of all efforts and labour, is perplexed how to explain that everything is ruled by fate, but that we nevertheless have some control over our conduct.

An account, taken from the works of Tubero, of a serpent of unprecedented length.

TUBERO in his Histories has recorded [*](Fr. 8, Peter2.) that in the first Punic war the consul Atilius Regulus, when encamped at the Bagradas river in Africa, [*](In 256 B.C.) fought a stubborn and fierce battle with a single serpent of extraordinary size, which had its lair in that region; that in a mighty struggle with the entire army the reptile was attacked for a long time with hurling engines and catapults; and that when it was finally killed, its skin, a hundred and twenty feet long, was sent to Rome.

A new account, written by the above-mentioned Tubero, of the capture of Regulus by the Carthaginians; and also what Tuditanus wrote about that same Regulus.

I RECENTLY read in the works of Tuditanus the well-known story about Atilius Regulus: [*](Fr. 5, Peter2.) That

Tubero in his Histories says [*](Fr. 9, Peter.) that this Regulus returned to Carthage and was put to death by the Carthaginians with tortures of a novel kind:

They confined him,

in a dark and deep dungeon, and a long time afterwards suddenly brought him out, when the sun was shining most brightly, and exposed him to its direct rays, holding him and forcing him to fix his gaze upon the sky. They even drew his eyelids apart upward and downward and sewed them fast, so that he could not close his eyes.

An error of the jurist Alfenus in the interpretation of early words.

THE jurist Alfenus, a pupil of Servius Sulpicius and a man greatly interested in matters antiquarian,

In a treaty which was made between the Roman people and the Carthaginians the provision is found, that the Carthaginians should pay each year to the Roman people a certain weight of argenti puri puti, and the meaning of puri puti was asked. I replied,

that putus meant very pure,' just as we say novicius for novus (new) and propicius for proprius (proper), when we wish to augment and amplify the meaning of novus and proprius.

Upon reading this, I was surprised that Alfenus should think that the relation of purus and putus was the same as that of novicius and novus; for if the word were puricius, then it would indeed appear to be formed like novicius. It was also surprising that he thought that novicius was used to imply amplification, since in fact novicius does not mean

more new,

to prune,

But the expression purum putum occurs, not only in the treaty with Carthage, but also in many other early writings, including the tragedy of Quintus Ennius entitled Alexander, [*](62, Ribbeck3.) and the satire of Marcus Varro called Di\s Pai=des oi( Ge/rontes, [*](Fr. 91, Bücheler.) or Old Men are Children for a Second Time.