Noctes Atticae

A defence of some lines of Virgil, in which the grammarian Julius Hyginus alleged that there was a mistake; and also the meaning of lituus; and on the etymology of that word.

1. HERE, wielding his Quirinal augur-staff,
2. Girt with scant shift and bearing on his left
3. The sacred shield, Picus appeared enthroned.

In these verses [*](Aen. vii. 187.) Hyginus wrote [*](Frag. 5, Fun.) that Virgil was in error, alleging that he did not notice that the words ipse Quirinali lituo lacked something.

For,

said he,

if we have not observed that something is lacking, the sentence seems to read ' girt with staff and scant shift,' which,

says he,

is utterly absurd; for since the lituus is a short wand, curved at its thicker end, such as the augurs use, how on earth can one be looked upon as ' girt with a lituus? '

As a matter of fact, it was Hyginus himself who failed to notice that this expression, like very many others, contains an ellipsis. For example, when we say

Marcus Cicero, a man of great eloquence

and

Quintus Roscius, an actor of consummate grace,

neither of these phrases is full and complete, but to the hearer they seem full and complete. As Vergil wrote in another place: [*](Aen. v. 372.)

1. Victorious Butes of huge bulk,

that is, having huge bulk, and also in another passage: [*](Aen. v. 401.) Into the ring he hurled gauntlets of giant weight, and similarly: [*](Aen. iii. 618.)

1. A house of gore and cruel feasts, dark, huge within,

so then it would seem that the phrase in question ought to be interpreted as

Picus was with the Quirinal staff,

just as we say

the statue was with a large head,

and in fact est, erat and fuit are often omitted, with elegant effect and without any loss of meaning. [*](This explanation of Quirinali lituo as an ablative of quality is of course wrong; we simply have zeugma in subcinctus, equipped with and girt with.)

And since mention has been made of the lituus, I must not pass over a question which obviously may be asked, whether the augurs' lituus is called after the trumpet of the same name, or whether the

trumpet derived its name lituus from the augurs' staff; for both have the same form and both alike are curved. [*](The trumpet called lituits was slightly curved at the end, differing from the tuba, which was straight, and the spiral cornn. The augur's staff was like a crook with a short handle.) But if, as some think, the trumpet was called lituus from its sound, because of the Homeric expression li/gce bio/s, [*](Iliad iv. 125.)

1. The bow twanged,

it must be concluded that the augural staff was called litmus from its resemblance to the trumpet. And Virgil uses that word also as synonymous with tuba: [*](Aen. vi. 167.)

1. He even faced the fray
2. Conspicuous both with clarion (lituo) and with spear.

The story of Croesus dumb son, from the books of Herodotus.

THE son of king Croesus, when he was already old enough to speak, was dumb, and after lie had become a well-grown youth, he was still unable to utter a word. Hence he was for a long time regarded as mute and tongue-tied. When his father had been vanquished in a great war, the city in which he lived had been taken, and one of the enemy was rushing upon him with drawn sword, unaware that he was the king, then the young man opened his mouth in an attempt to cry out. And by that effort and the force of his breath he broke the impediment and the bond upon his tongue, and spoke plainly and clearly, shouting to the enemy not to kill king Croesus. Then the foeman withheld his sword, the king's life was saved, and from that

time on the youth began to speak. Herodotus in his Histories [*](i. 85. ) is the chronicler of that event, and the words which he says the son of Croesus first spoke are:

Man, do not kill Croesus.

But also an athlete of Samos—his name was Echeklous—although he had previously been speechless, is said to have begun to speak for a similar reason. For when in a sacred contest the casting of lots between the Samians and their opponents was not being done fairly, and he had noticed that a lot with a false name was being slipped in, he suddenly shouted in a loud voice to the man who was doing it that he saw what he was up to. And he too was freed from the check upon his speech and for all the remaining time of his life spoke without stammering or lack of clearness. [*](Valerius Maximus, i. 8. ext. 4 says: cum ei victoriae quam adeptus erat titulus et praemium eriperetur, indignatione accensus vocalis evasit. Just how he was cheated in the story told by Gellius is not clear, unless the lots were cast to determine which of the contestants should be matched together, and he was matched against an unsuitable opponent.)

On the arguments which by the Greeks are called a)ntistre/fon: ta, and in Latin may be termed reciproca.

AMONG fallacious arguments the one which the Greeks call a)ntistre/fon seems to be by far the most fallacious. Such arguments some of our own philosophers have rather appropriately termed reciproca, or

convertible.

The fallacy arises from the fact that the argument that is presented may be turned in the opposite direction and used against the one who has offered it, and is equally strong for both sides of the question. An example is the well-known argument which Protagoras, the keenest of all sophists, is said to have used against his pupil Euathlus.

For a dispute arose between them and an altercation as to the fee which had been agreed upon, as follows: Euathlus, a wealthy young man, was desirous of instruction in oratory and the pleading of causes. He became a pupil of Protagoras and promised to pay him a large sum of money, as much as Protagoras had demanded. He paid half of the amount at once, before beginning his lessons, and agreed to pay the remaining half on the day when he first pleaded before jurors and won his case. Afterwards, when he had been for some little time a pupil and follower of Protagoras, and had in fact made considerable progress in the study of oratory, he nevertheless did not undertake any cases. And when the time was already getting long, and he seemed to be acting thus in order not to pay the rest of the fee, Protagoras formed what seemed to him at the time a wily scheme; he determined to demand his pay according to the contract, and brought suit against Euathlus.

And when they had appeared before the jurors to bring forward and to contest the case, Protagoras began as follows:

Let me tell you, most foolish of youths, that in either event you will have to pay what I am demanding, whether judgment be pronounced for or against you. For if the case goes against you, the money will be due me in accordance with the verdict, because I have won; but if the decision be in your favour, the money will be due me according to our contract, since you will have won a case.

To this Euatlllus replied:

I might have met this sophism of yours, tricky as it is, by not pleading my own cause but employing another as my advocate. But I take greater satisfaction in a victory in which

v1.p.409

I defeat you, not only in the suit, but also in this argument of yours. So let me tell you in turn, wisest of masters, that in either event I shall not have to pay what you demand, whether judgment be pronounced for or against me. For if the jurors decide in my favour, according to their verdict nothing will be due you, because I have won; but if they give judgment against me, by the terms of our contract I shall owe you nothing, because I have not won a case.

Then the jurors, thinking that the plea on both sides was uncertain and insoluble, for fear that their decision, for whichever side it was rendered, might annul itself, left the matter undecided and postponed the case to a distant day. Thus a celebrated master of oratory was refuted by his youthful pupil with his own argument, and his cleverly devised sophism failed.

The impossibility of regarding Bias' syllogism on marriage as an example of a)ntistre/fon.

SOME think that the famous answer of the wise and noble Bias, like that of Protagoras of which I have just spoken, was a)ntistre/fon.[*](The convertible argument described in x.) For Bias, being asked by a certain man whether lie should marry or lead a single life, said:

You are sure to marry a woman either beautiful or ugly; and if beautiful, you will share her with others, but if ugly, she will be a punishment. [*](In the Greek there is a word-play on koinh/ and poinh/, which it does not seem possible to reproduce in English. Perhaps, a flirt or a hurt, or, a harlot or a hard lot. ) But neither of these things is desirable; therefore do not marry.

Now, they turn this argument about in this way.

If I marry a beautiful woman, she will not be a punishment; but if an ugly one, I shall be her sole possessor; therefore marry.

But this syllogism does not seem to be in the least convertible, since it appears somewhat weaker and less convincing when turned into the second form. For Bias maintained that one should not marry because of one of two disadvantages which must necessarily be suffered by one who took a wife. But he who converts the proposition does not defend himself against the inconvenience which is mentioned, but says that he is free from another which is not mentioned. But to maintain the opinion that Bias expressed, it is enough that a man who has taken a wife must necessarily suffer one or the other of two disadvantages, of having a wife that is unfaithful, or a punishment.

But our countryman Favorinus, when that syllogism which Bias had employed happened to be mentioned, of which the first premise is:

You will marry either a beautiful or an ugly woman,

declared that this was not a fact, and that it was not a fair antithesis, since it was not inevitable that one of the two opposites be true, which must be the case in a disjunctive proposition. For obviously certain outstanding extremes of appearance are postulated, ugliness and beauty. [*](That is, in Bias' syllogism.)

But there is,

said he,

a third possibility also, lying between those two opposites, and that possibility Bias did not observe or regard. For between a very beautiful and a very ugly woman there is a mean in appearance, which is free from the danger to which an excess of beauty is exposed, and also from the feeling of repulsion

v1.p.413

inspired by extreme ugliness. A woman of that kind is called by Quintus Ennius in the Melanippa [*](253, Ribbeck3. ) by the very elegant term ' normal,' and such a woman will be neither unfaithful nor a punishment.

This moderate and modest beauty Favorinus, to my mind most sagaciously, called

conjugal.

Moreover Ennius, in the tragedy which I mentioned, says that those women as a rule are of unblemished chastity who possess normal beauty.