Noctes Atticae

Gellius, Aulus

Gellius, Aulus. The Attic Nights of Aulus Gellius. Rolfe, John C., translator. Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press; William Heinemann, 1927 (printing).

The retort which the philosopher Diogenes made, when he was challenged by a logician with an impudent sophistry.

AT Athens during the Saturnalia we engaged in a pleasant and improving diversion of this kind: when a number of us who were interested in the same study had met at the time of the bath, we discussed the catch questions which are called

sophisms,

and each one of us cast them before the company in his turn, like knuckle-bones or dice. The prize for solving a problem, or the penalty for failing to understand it, was a single sestertius. From the money thus collected, as if it had been won at dice, a little dinner was provided for all of us who had taken part in the game. Now the sophisms were somewhat as follows, although they cannot be expressed very elegantly in Latin, or even without clumsiness:

What snow is, that hail is not; but snow is white, therefore hail is not white.

A somewhat similar one is this:

What man is, that a horse is not; man is an animal, therefore a horse is not an animal.

The one who was called upon by the throw of the dice to solve and refute the sophistry was expected to tell in what part of the proposition and in what word the fallacy consisted, and what ought not to be granted and conceded; if he did not succeed, he was fined one sestertius. The fine contributed to the dinner.

I must tell you how wittily Diogenes paid back a sophism of that kind which I have mentioned above, proposed with insulting intent by a logician of the Platonic school. For when the logician had

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asked:

You are not what I am, are you?

and Diogenes had admitted it, he added:

But I am a man.

And when Diogenes had assented to that also and the logician had concluded:

Then you are not a man,

Diogenes retorted:

That is a lie, but if you want it to be true, begin your proposition with me.

What the number is which is called hemiolios and what epitritos; and that our countrymen have not rashly ventured to translate those words into Latin.

CERTAIN numerical figures which the Greeks call by definite terms have no corresponding names in Latin. But those who have written in Latin about numbers have used the Greek expressions and have hesitated to make up Latin equivalents, since that would be absurd. For what name could one give to a number which is said to be hemiolios or epitritos? But hemiolios is a number which contains in itself some other whole number and its half, as three compared with two, fifteen with ten, thirty with twenty; epitritos is a number which contains another whole number and its third part, as four compared with three, twelve with nine, forty with thirty. It does not seem out of place to note and to remember these numerical terms; for unless they are understood, some of the most subtle calculations recorded in the writings of the philosophers cannot be comprehended.

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That Marcus Varro in heroic verse noted a matter demanding very minute and careful observation.

IN the long lines called hexameters, and likewise in senarii, [*](See note on iv. 5. 6 (vol. i, p. 328).) students of metric have observed that the first two feet, and also the last two, may consist each of a single part of speech, but that those between may not, but are always formed of words which are either divided, or combined and run together. [*](That is, the first two feet and the last two may consist of undivided words, but the third and fourth are formed either of words which are divided, or of parts of different words. But that this rule is not invariable was shown by Muretus, Variae Lectiones, xi. 6.) Varro in his book On the Arts [*](Fr. 116, G. and S.) wrote that he had observed in hexameter verse that the fifth half-foot always ends a word, [*](That is, there is a caesura in the fifth foot, according to Varro.) and that the first five half-feet are of equally great importance in making a verse with the following seven; and he argues that this happens in accordance with a certain geometrical ratio.

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The reply of a certain philosopher, when he was asked why he turned pale in a storm at sea.

WE were sailing from Cassiopa [*](A town in the north-eastern part of Corcyra, also called Cassiope.) to Brundisium over the Ionian sea, violent, vast and storm-tossed. During almost the whole of the night which followed our first day a fierce side-wind blew, which had filled our ship with water. Then afterwards, while we were all still lamenting, and working hard at the pumps, day at last dawned. But there was no less danger and no slackening of the violence of the wind; on the contrary, more frequent whirlwinds, a black sky, masses of fog, and a kind of fearful cloud-forms, which they called typhones, [*](Typhon, according to Hesiod, was a son of Typhoeus (see note on xvii. 10. 9) and father of the winds; but by later poets he was identified with Typhos or Typhoeus. His name was given to the violent storms called typhoons.) or

typhoons,

seemed to hang over and threaten us, ready to overwhelm the ship.

In our company was an eminent philosopher of the Stoic sect, whom I had known at Athens as a man of no slight importance, holding the young men who were his pupils under very good control. In the midst of the great dangers of that time and that tumult of sea and sky I looked for him, desiring to know in what state of mind he was and whether he was unterrified and courageous. And then I beheld

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the man frightened and ghastly pale, not indeed uttering any lamentations, as all the rest were doing, nor any outcries of that kind, but in his loss of colour and distracted expression not differing much from the others. But when the sky cleared, the sea grew calm, and the heat of danger cooled, then the Stoic was approached by a rich Greek from Asia, a man of elegant apparel, as we saw, and with an abundance of baggage and many attendants, while he himself showed signs of a luxurious person and disposition. This man, in a bantering tone, said:

What does this mean, Sir philosopher, that when we were in danger you were afraid and turned pale, while I neither feared nor changed colour?

And the philosopher, after hesitating for a moment about the propriety of answering him, said:

If in such a terrible storm I did show a little fear, you are not worthy to be told the reason for it. But, if you please, the famous Aristippus, the pupil of Socrates, shall answer for me, [*](Frag. Phil. Graec. ii. 407. 16.) who on being asked on a similar occasion by a man much like you why he feared, though a philosopher, while his questioner on the contrary had no fear, replied that they had not the same motives, for his questioner need not be very anxious about the life of a worthless coxcomb, but he himself feared for the life of an Aristippus.

With these words then the Stoic rid himself of the rich Asiatic. But later, when we were approaching Brundisium and sea and sky were calm, I asked him what the reason for his fear was, which he had refused to reveal to the man who had improperly addressed him. And he quietly and courteously replied:

Since you are desirous of knowing, hear
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what our forefathers, the founders of the Stoic sect, thought about that brief but inevitable and natural fear, or rather,

said he,

read it, for if you read it, you will be the more ready to believe it and you will remember it better.

Thereupon before my eyes he drew from his little bag the fifth book of the Discourses of the philosopher Epictetus, which, as arranged by Arrian, undoubtedly agree with the writings of Zeno and Chrysippus.

In that book I read this statement, which of course was written in Greek [*](Frag. 9, p. 408, Schenkl., L.C.L. II. 448 ff.) :

The mental visions, which the philosophers call fantasi/ai or 'phantasies,' by which the mind of man on the very first appearance of an object is impelled to the perception of the object, are neither voluntary nor controlled by the will, but through a certain power of their own they force their recognition upon men; but the expressions of assent, which they call sugkataqe/seis, by which these visions are recognized, are voluntary and subject to man's will. Therefore when some terrifying sound, either from heaven or from a falling building or as a sudden announcement of some danger, or anything else of that kind occurs, even the mind of a wise man must necessarily be disturbed, must shrink and feel alarm, not from a preconceived idea of any danger, but from certain swift and unexpected attacks which forestall the power of the mind and of reason. Presently, however, the wise man does not approve ' such phantasies,' that is to say, such terrifying mental visions (to quote the Greek, 'he does not consent to them nor confirm them'), but he rejects and scorns them, nor does he see in them anything that ought to excite fear. And they say that there is this difference between
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the mind of a foolish man and that of a wise man, that the foolish man thinks that such ' visions ' are in fact as dreadful and terrifying as they appear at the original impact of them on his mind, and by his assent he approves of such ideas as if they were rightly to be feared, and 'confirms' them; for prosepidoca/zei is the word which the Stoics use in their discourses on the subject. But the wise man, after being affected for a short time and slightly in his colour and expression, 'does not assent,' but retains the steadfastness and strength of the opinion which he has always had about visions of this kind, namely that they are in no wise to be feared but excite terror by a false appearance and vain alarms.

That these were the opinions and utterances of Epictetus the philosopher in accordance with the beliefs of the Stoics I read in that book which I have mentioned, and I thought that they ought to be recorded for this reason, that when things of the kind which I have named chance to occur, we may not think that to fear for a time and, as it were, turn white is the mark of a foolish and weak man, but in that brief but natural impulse we yield rather to human weakness than because we believe that those things are what they seem.

That of the five senses of the body two in particular we share with beasts; and that pleasure which comes from hearing, sight and smell is base and reprehensible, but that which comes from taste and touch is the most shameful of all, since the last two are felt also by beasts, the others only by mankind.

MEN have five senses, which the Greeks call ai)sqh/seis, by which mental or bodily pleasure is

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evidently sought: taste, touch, smell, sight, hearing. From all of these the enjoyment of any immoderate pleasure is regarded as base and reprehensible. But excessive pleasure from taste or touch in the opinion of philosophers is the basest of all things, and those in particular who have given themselves up to those two animal pleasures the Greeks call by terms of the gravest reproach either a)kratei=s or a)ko/lastoi; we call them either incontinences (incontinent) or intemperantes (intemperate); for if you should desire to have a closer translation of a)ko/lastoi, the equivalent will be too unusual. But those two pleasures of taste and touch, namely, gluttony and venery, are the only ones common to man with the lower animals, and therefore whoever is enslaved to these beastly pleasures is regarded as in the number of brutes and beasts; the remaining pleasures proceeding from the other three senses seem to be peculiar to man alone.

I have added the words of Aristotle the philosopher on this subject, [*](Problemata, xxviii. 7.) in order that the authority of that renowned and illustrious man might turn us from such shameful pleasures:

Why are they called incontinent who indulge to excess in the pleasures of taste and touch? For both those who are immoderate in venery and those who are immoderate in the enjoyment of food are such. But of the latter, some find this gratification in the tongue and others in the throat, and it was for that reason that Philoxenos prayed to have the throat of a crane. Is it because the pleasures derived from such sources are common to us with the other animals? And being thus common they are the most dishonourable and more than the other pleasures, or alone, objects of
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reproach, so that we censure a man who is addicted to them and call him incontinent and incorrigible because he is enslaved to the meanest of pleasures. Now, there being five senses, the other animals are gratified by the two which have been mentioned only, but from the others they either enjoy no pleasure at all, or they merely experience it incidentally.

Who, then, having any human modesty, would take pleasure in those two delights of venery and gluttony, which are common to man with the hog and the ass? Socrates indeed used to say that many men wish to live in order to eat and drink, but that he ate and drank in order to live. Hippocrates, moreover, a man of divine wisdom, believed of venery that it was a part of the horrible disease which our countrymen call comitialis, or

the election disease

; [*](See note on xvi. 4. 4.) for these are his very words as they have come down to us:

that coition is a brief epilepsy.

That it is more disgraceful to be praised coldly than to be accused bitterly.

FAVORINUS the philosopher used to say that it was more shameful to be praised faintly and coldly than to be censured violently and severely:

For,

said he,

the man who reviles and censures you is regarded as unjust and hostile towards you in proportion to the bitterness of his invective, and therefore he is usually not believed. But one who praises grudgingly and faintly seems to lack a theme; he is regarded as the friend of a man whom he would like to praise but as unable to find anything in him which he can justly commend.

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Why the bowels are loosened by sudden terror; also why fire provokes urine.

THERE is a work of Aristotle, entitled Physical Questions, which is most delightful, and filled with choice knowledge of all kinds. In this book he inquires [*](xxvii. 10; vii. 3.) why it happens that those who are seized with sudden fear of some great catastrophe commonly suffer at once from looseness of the bowels. He also inquires why it happens that one who has stood for some time before a fire is overtaken with a desire to make water. And he says that the cause of the loosening and discharge of the bowels because of fear is due to the fact that all terror is cold producing, or yuxropoio/s, as he calls it, and that by the effect of that cold it drives and expels all the blood and heat from the surface of the skin and at the same time causes those who fear to grow pale, because the blood leaves the face.

Now this blood and heat,

he says,

being driven inwards, usually moves the bowels and stimulates them.

For the frequent urinating caused by nearness to a fire he gave this reason:

The fire dissolves the solid matter, as the sun does snow.