Noctes Atticae

Discussions held by a Stoic philosopher and in opposition by a Peripatetic, with Favorinus as arbiter; and the question at issue was, how far virtue availed in determining a happy life and to what extent happiness was dependent on what are called external circumstances

THERE were two friends of Favorinus, philosophers of no little note in the city of Rome; one of them was a follower of the Peripatetic school, the other of the Stoic. I was once present when these men argued ably and vigorously, each for his own beliefs, when we were all with Favorinus at Ostia. And we were walking along the shore in springtime, just as evening was falling.

And on that occasion the Stoic mantatined [*](III. 56, Arn.) that man could enjoy a happy life only through virtue, and that the greatest wretchedness was due to wickedness only, even though all the other blessings, which are called external, should be lacking to the virtuous man and present with the wicked. The Peripatetic, on the other hand, admitted that a wretched life was due solely to vicious thoughts and wickedness, but he believed that virtue alone was by no means sufficient to round out all the parts of a happy life, since the complete use of one's limbs, good health, a reasonably attractive person, property, good repute, and all the other advantages of body and fortune seemed necessary to make a perfectly happy life.

Here the Stoic made outcry against him, and maintaining that his opponent was advancing two contrary propositions, expressed his surprise that, since wickedness and virtue were two opposites, and a wretched and a happy life were also opposites, he did not preserve in each the force and nature of an opposite, but believed that wickedness alone was sufficient to cause an unhappy life, at the same time declaring that virtue alone was not sufficient to guarantee a happy life. And he said that it was especially inconsistent and contradictory for one who maintained that a life could in no way be made happy if virtue alone were lacking, to deny on the other hand that a life could be happy when virtue alone was present, and thus to take away from virtue when present and demanding it, that honour which he gave and bestowed upon virtue when lacking.

Thereupon the Peripatetic, in truth very wittily, said:

Pray pardon me, and tell me this, whether you think that an amphora [*](Somewhat less than 6 gallons.) of wine from which a congius [*](A little less than 6 pints.) has been taken, is still an amphora?

By no means,

was the reply,

can that be called an amphora of wine, from which a congius is missing.

When the Peripatetic heard this, he retorted:

Then it will have to be said that one congius makes an amphora of wine, since when that one is lacking, it is not an amphora, and when it is added, it becomes an amphora. But if it is absurd to say that an amphora is made from one single congius, it is equally absurd to say that a life is made happy by virtue alone by itself, because when virtue is lacking life can never be happy.

Then Favorinus, turning to the Peripatetic, said:

This clever turn which you have used about the congius of wine is indeed set forth in the books; but, as you know, it ought to be regarded rather as a neat catch than as an honest or plausible argument. For when a congius is lacking, it indeed causes the amphora not to be of full measure; but when it is added and put in, it alone does not make, but completes, an amphora. But virtue, as the Stoics say, is not an addition or a supplement, but it by itself is the equivalent of a happy life, and therefore it alone makes a happy life, when it is present.

These and some other minute and knotty arguments each advanced in support of his own opinion, before Favorinus as umpire. But when the first night-lights appeared and the darkness grew thicker, we escorted Favorinus to the house where he was putting up; and when he went in, we separated.

What kind of questions we used to discuss when spending the Saturnalia at Athens; and some amusing sophistries and enigmas

WE used to spend the Saturnalia at Athens very merrily yet temperately, not

relaxing our minds,

as the saying is—for, as Musonius asserts, [*](p. 133, Hense.) to relax the mind is like losing it—but diverting our minds a little and relieving them by the delights of pleasant and improving conversation. Accordingly, a number of us Romans who had come to Greece, and who attended the same lectures and devoted ourselves to the same teachers, met at the same dinner-table. Then the one who was giving the entertainment in his turn, [*](Cf. note on vii. 13. 2.) offered as a prize for solving a problem the work of some old Greek or Roman writer and a crown woven from laurel, and put to us as many questions as there were guests present. But when he had put them all, the question which each was to discuss and the order of speaking were determined by lot. Then, when a question was correctly answered, the reward was a crown and a prize; if it was not correctly answered, it was passed on to the next in the allotment, and this process was repeated throughout the circle. If no one could answer a particular question, the crown was dedicated to the god in whose honour the festival was held. Now the questions that were proposed were of this kind: an obscure saying of some early poet, amusing rather than perplexing; some point in ancient history; the correction of some tenet of philosophy which was commonly misinterpreted, the solution of some sophistical catch, the investigation of a rare and unusual word, or of an obscure use of the tense of a verb of plain meaning.

And I recollect that once seven questions were put, the first of which was an explanation of these verses in the Saturae of Quintus Ennius, [*](vv. 59 ff., Vahlen2.) in which one word is very neatly used in many different senses. They run as follows:

1. Who tries with craft another to deceive,
2. Deceives himself, if he says he's deceived
3. Whom he'd deceive. For if whom you'd deceive
4. Perceives that he's deceived, the deceiver 'tis
5. Who is deceived, if 'other's not deceived. [*](Rendered as follows by R. J. E. Tiddy in Gordon, English Literature and the Classics, p. 206: The man who thinks to score a pretty score off another, says that he has scored off him off whom he would score—but he hasn't all the same. For he who thinks he's scoring, but isn't all the same, is scored off himself—and so the other scores.)

The second question was how it ought to be understood and interpreted that Plato in the State

which he planned in his books [*](Rep, p. 457, etc.; 460), 468.) said koina\s ta\s gunai=kas, that is, declared that women

should be common property,

and that the rewards of the bravest men and the greatest warriors should be the kisses of boys and maidens. In the third place this was asked, in what words the fallacy of the following catches consisted and how they could be made out and explained:

What you have not lost, that you have. You have not lost horns; therefore you have horns.

Also another catch:

What I am, that you are not. I am a man; therefore you are not a man.

Then it was inquired what was the solution of this sophistry:

When I lie and admit that I lie, do I lie or speak the truth?

Afterwards this question was put, why the patricians are in the habit of entertaining one another on the Megalensia, [*](The festival of Magna Mater, on April 4, established in 204 B.C.) and the plebeians on the Cerealia. [*](The festival of Ceres, on April 19.) Next came this question:

What one of the early poets used the verb verant, in the sense of 'they speak the truth '?

The sixth question was, what kind of plant the

asphodel

was, which Hesiod mentioned in the following lines: [*](Works and Days, 40. Cf. Horace, Odes, i. 31. 16: me pascunt olivae,Me cichorea levesque malvae.)

1. O fools! who know not how much half exceeds the whole, [*](Hesiod means that a simple and frugal life is the best. He had shared his father's property with his brother Perses; but Perses went to law and through the partiality of the judges got possession of the whole inheritance. He soon wasted it, and Hesiod, through his thrift, was able to come to his help. Hence the expression became proverbial. Cicero, on seeing a bust of his brother Quintus, who was of short stature, said: Half of my bother is greater than the whole. (Macrob. Sat. ii. 3. 4.))
2. Or that the asphodel and mallow make fine food.

And also what Hesiod meant when he said that the half was more than the whole. The last of all the questions was this: of what tense the verbs scripserim, legerim and venerim are, perfect or future, or both.

When these questions had been put in the order that I have mentioned, and had been discussed and explained by the several guests on whom the lots fell, we were all presented with crowns and books, except for the one question about the verb verant. For at the time no one remembered that the word was used by Quintus Ennius in the thirteenth book of his Annals in the following line: [*](v. 380, Vallen2.)

1. Do seers speak truth (verant), predicting life's extent?

Therefore the crown for this question was presented to Saturn, the god of that festival.