Noctes Atticae
Gellius, Aulus
Gellius, Aulus. The Attic Nights of Aulus Gellius. Rolfe, John C., translator. Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press; William Heinemann, 1927 (printing).
Lines taken from the seventh book of the Annals of Ennius, in which the courteous bearing of an inferior towards a friend of higher rank is described and defined.
QUINTUS ENNIUS in the seventh book of his Annals describes and defines very vividly and skilfully in his sketch of Geminus Servilius, a man of rank, the tact, courtesy, modesty, fidelity, restraint and propriety in speech, knowledge of ancient history and of customs old and new, scrupulousness in keeping and guarding a secret; in short, the various remedies and methods of relief and solace for guarding against the
- So saying, on a friend he called, with whom
- He oft times gladly shared both board and speech
- And courteously informed of his affairs,
- On coming wearied from the sacred House
- Or Forum broad, where he all day had toiled,
- Directing great affairs with wisdom; one with whom
- He freely spoke of matters great and small,
- Confiding to him thoughts approved or not,
- If he so wished, and found him trustworthy;
- With whom he took much pleasure openly
- Or privily; a man to whom no thought
- Suggested heedlessness or ill intent,
- A cultured, loyal and a winsome man,
- Contented, happy, learned, eloquent,
- Speaking but little and that fittingly,
- Obliging, knowing well all ancient lore,
- All customs old and new, the laws of man
- And of the gods, who with due prudence told
- What he had heard, or kept it to himself:
- Him 'mid the strife Servilius thus accosts.
They say that Lucius Aelius Stilo used to declare [*](p. 51, Fun.) that Quintus Ennius wrote these words about none other than himself, and that this was a description of Quintus Ennius' own character and disposition.
A discourse of the philosopher Taurus on the manner and method of enduring pain, according to the principles of the Stoics.
WHEN the philosopher Taurus was on his way to Delphi, to see the Pythian games and the throng that gathered there from almost all Greece, I was his companion. And when, in the course of the journey, we had come to Lebadia, which is an ancient town in the land of Boeotia, word was brought to Taurus there that a friend of his, an eminent philosopher of the Stoic sect, had been seized with illness and had taken to his bed. Then interrupting our journey, which otherwise would have called for haste, and leaving the carriages, he hastened to visit his friend, and I followed, as I usually did wherever he went. When we came to the house in which the sick man was, we saw that he was suffering anguish from pains in the stomach, such as the Greeks call ko/los, or
colic,and at the same time from a high fever. The stifled groans that burst from him, and the heavy sighs that escaped his panting breast, revealed his suffering, and no less his struggle to overcome it.
Later, when Taurus had sent for physicians and discussed with them the means of cure, and had encouraged the patient to keep up his endurance by commending the fortitude which he was showing,
You were witness of no very pleasant sight, it is true, but one which was, nevertheless, a profitable experience, in beholding the encounter and contest of a philosopher with pain. The violent character of the disorder, for its part, produced anguish and torture of body; reason and the spiritual nature, on the other hand, similarly played their part, supporting and restraining within bounds the violence of well-nigh ungovernable pain. He uttered no shrieks, no complaints, not even any unseemly outcries; yet, as you saw, there were obvious signs of a battle between soul and body for the man's possession.
Then one of the disciples of Taurus, a young man not untrained in philosophy, said:
If the bitterness of pain is such that it struggles against the will and judgment, forcing a man to groan involuntarily and confess the evil of his violent disorder, why is it said among the Stoics that pain is a thing indifferent and not an evil? Furthermore, why can a Stoic be compelled to do anything, or how can pain compel him, when the Stoics say that pain exerts no compulsion, and that a wise man cannot be forced to anything?[*](iii. 168, Arn.)
To this Taurus, with a face that was now somewhat more cheerful, for he seemed pleased at being lured into a discussion, replied as follows:
If this friend of ours were now in better health, he would have defended such unavoidable groans against reproach and, I dare say, would have answered your question; but you know that I am no great friend of the Stoics, or rather, of the Stoa; for it is oftenv2.p.377inconsistent with itself and with us, as is shown in the book which I have written on that subject. But to oblige you, I will say 'unlearnedly and clearly,' as the adage has it, what I imagine that any Stoic now present would have said more intricately and cleverly. For you know, I suppose, that old and familiar proverb: [*](Aristophanes, Frogs, 1445.)
- Less eruditely speak and clearer, please.
And with that preamble he discoursed as follows about the pain and groans of the ailing Stoic: [*](iii. 181, Arn.)
Nature,said he, "who produced us, implanted in us and incorporated in the very elements from which we sprang a love and affection for ourselves, to such a degree that nothing whatever is dearer or of more importance to us than ourselves. And this, she thought, would be the underlying principle for assuring the perpetuation of the human race, if each one of us, as soon as he saw the light, should have a knowledge and understanding first of all of those things which the philosophers of old have called ta\ prw=ta kata\ fu/sin, or 'the first principles of nature'; that is, that he might delight in all that was agreeable to his body and shrink from everything disagreeable. Later, with increasing years, reason developed from its first elements, and reflection in taking counsel, and the consideration of honour and true expediency, and a wiser and more careful choice of advantages as opposed to disadvantages; and in this way the dignity of virtue and honour became so preeminent and so superior, that any disadvantage from without which prevented our holding and retaining this quality was despised. Nothing was considered truly and wholly good unless it was honourable, and
But very likely,said he,
because of the mere fact that he struggles and groans, someone may ask, if pain is not an evil, why it is necessary to groan and struggle? It is because all things which are notsaid he, "but also in that of some of the wise men of that same school (such as Panaetius, [*](Fr. 14, Fowler.) a serious and learned man) are disapproved and rejected."v2.p.381evil are not also wholly lacking in annoyance, but there are very many things which, though free from any great harm or baneful effect, as not being base, [*](That is, they do not involve any guilt.) are none the less opposed to the gentleness and mercy of nature through a certain inexplicable and inevitable law of nature herself. These, then, a wise man can endure and put up with, but he cannot exclude them altogether from his consciousness; for a)nalghsi/a, or 'insensibility,' and a)pa/qeia, or 'lack of feeling,' not only in my judgment,
"But why is a Stoic philosopher, upon whom they say no compulsion can be exerted, compelled to utter groans against his will? It is true that no compulsion can be exerted upon a wise man when he has the opportunity of using his reason; but when nature compels, then reason also, the gift of nature, is compelled. Inquire also, if you please, why a man involuntarily winks when someone's hand is suddenly directed against his eyes, why when the sky is lit up by a flash of lightning he involuntarily drops his head and closes his eyes, why as the thunder grows louder he gradually becomes terrified, why he is shaken by sneezing, why he sweats in the heat of the sun or grows cold amid severe frosts. For these and many other things are not under the control of the will, the judgment, or the reason, but are decrees of nature and of necessity.
Moreover, that is not fortitude which, like a giant, struggles against nature and goes beyond her bounds, either through insensibility of spirit, orv2.p.383savage pride, or some unhappy and compulsory practice in bearing pain—such as we heard of in a certain savage gladiator of Caesar's school, who used to laugh when his wounds were probed by the doctors—but that is true and noble fortitude which our forefathers called a knowledge of what is endurable and unendurable. From this it is evident that there are some insupportable trials, from the undergoing or endurance of which brave men may shrink.
When Taurus had said this and seemed to intend to say even more, we reached our carriages and entered them.
On the Enigma.
THE kind of composition which the Greeks call
enigmas,some of our early writers called scirpi, or
rushes.[*](Apparently so called from the involved pattern of plaited rushes.) An example is the enigma composed of three iambic trimeters which I recently found— very old, by Jove! and very neat. I have left it unanswered, in order to excite the ingenuity of my readers in seeking for an answer. The three verses are these:
He who does not wish to puzzle himself too long will find the answer [*](The answer is Terminus. Once minus and twice minus = thrice (ter) minus. In the cella of Jupiter on the Capitolium, or possibly in the pronaos, there was a terminal cippus, representing Terminus, who refused to be removed from his original site.) in the second book of Varro's Latin Language, addressed to Marcellus. [*](Fr. 55. G. & S.)
- I know not if he's minus once or twice,
- Or both of these, who would not give his place,
- As I once heard it said, to Jove himself.
Why Gnaeus Dolabella, the proconsul, referred to the court of the Areopagus the case of a woman charged with poisoning and admitting the fact.
WHEN Gnaeus Dolabella was governing the province of Asia with proconsular authority, a woman of Smyrna was brought before him. This woman had killed her husband and her son at the same time by secretly giving them poison. She confessed the crime, and said that she had reason for it, since her husband and son had treacherously done to death another son of hers by a former husband, an excellent and blameless youth; and there was no dispute about the truth of this statement. Dolabella referred the matter to his council. No member of the council ventured to render a decision in so difficult a case, since the confession of the poisoning which had resulted in the death of the husband and son seemed to call for punishment, while at the same time a just penalty had thereby been inflicted upon two wicked men. Dolabella referred the question to the Areopagites [*](A very ancient court at Athens, so called because it held its meetings on the Areopagus, or Hill of Mars.) at Athens, as judges of greater authority and experience. The Areopagites, after having heard the case, summoned the woman and her accuser to appear after a hundred years. Thus the woman's crime was not condoned, for the laws did not permit that, nor, though guilty, was she condemned and punished for a pardonable offence. The story is told in the ninth book of Valerius Maximus' work on Memorable Occurrences and Sayings. [*](viii. 1 amb. 2, Kempf; Gellius' reference is wrong.)
Noteworthy reconciliations between famous men.
PUBLIUS AFRICANUS the elder and Tiberius Gracchus, father of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, men illustrious for their great exploits, the high offices which they held, and the uprightness of their lives, often disagreed about public questions, and for that reason, or some other, were not friends. When this hostility had lasted for a long time, the feast was offered to Jupiter on the appointed day, [*](On the 13th of September, which was also the anniversary of the founding of the Capitoline Temple. See Fowler, .Roman Festivals, pp. 217 f.) and on the occasion of that ceremony the senate banqueted in the Capitol. It chanced that the two men were placed side by side at the same table, and immediately, as if the immortal gods, acting as arbiters at the feast of Jupiter, Greatest and Best of Gods, had joined their hands, they became the best of friends. And not only did friendship spring up between them, but at the same time their families were united by a marriage; for Publius Scipio, having a daughter that was unwedded and marriageable at the time, thereupon on the spot betrothed her to Tiberius Gracchus, whom he had chosen and approved at a time when judgment is most strict; that is, while he was his personal enemy.
Aemilius Lepidus, too, and Fulvius Flaccus, men of noble birth, who had held the highest offices, and occupied an exalted place in public life, were opposed to each other in a bitter hatred and enmity of long standing. Later, the people chose them censors at the same time. Then they, as soon as their election was proclaimed by the herald, in the Campus Martius itself, before the assembly was
What is meant by
ambiguouswords; and that even honos was such a word.
ONE may very often see and notice in the early writings many words which at present in ordinary conversation have one fixed meaning, but which then were so indifferent and general, that they could signify and include two opposite things. Some of these are well known, such as tempestas (weather), valitudo (health), facinus (act), dolus (device), gratia (favour), industria (activity). [*](Tempestas means good or bad weather; valitudo, good or ill health, etc.) For it is well-nigh a matter of general knowledge that these are ambiguous and can be used either in a good or in a bad sense.
That periculm (trial), too, and venenum (drug) and contagium (contagion) were not used, as they now are, only in a bad sense, you may learn from many examples of that usage. But the use of honor as an indifferent word, so that people even spoke of
bad honour,signifying
wrongor
injury,is indeed very rare. However, Quintus Metellus Numidicus, in a speech which he delivered On his Triumph, used these words: [*](O. B. F., p. 275, Meyer.2)
In this affair, by as much as the whole of you are more important than my single self, by so much he inflicts upon you greater insult and injury than on me; and by as much as honest men are more willing to suffer wrong than toHe says,v2.p.391do wrong to another, by so much has he shown worse honour (peiorem honorem) to you than to me; for he wishes me to suffer injustice, Romans, and you to inflict it, so that I may be left with cause for complaint, and you may be open to reproach.
he has shown worse honour to you than to me,and the meaning of the expression is the same as when he himself says, just before that,
he has inflicted a greater injury and insult on you than on me.
In addition to the citation of this word, I thought I ought to quote the following saying from the speech of Quintus Metellus, in order to point out that it is a precept of Socrates; the saying in question is:
It is worse to be unjust than to suffer injustice.[*](Plato, Gorgias, p. 473 A; 489 A; 508 B.)
That aeditumus is a Latin word.
Aeditimus[*](So the MSS.; aeditumus is a variant spelling.) is a Latin word and an old one at that, formed in the same way as finitimus and legilimus. In place of it many to-day say aedituus by a new and false usage, as if it were derived from guarding the temples. [*](That is, from aedes and tueor.) This ought to be enough to say as a warning [*](There is a lacuna in the text.) . . . because of certain rude and persistent disputants, who are not to be restrained except by the citation of authorities.
Marcus Varro, in the second book of his Latin Language addressed to Marcellus, thinks [*](Fr. 56, G. & S.) that we ought to use aedituus rather than aedituus, because the latter is made up by a late invention, while the former is pure and of ancient origin. Laevius too,
one who guards the temples,is made. In the most reliable copies of Marcus Tullius' Fourth Oration against Verres I find it written: [*](ii. 4. 96.)
The custodians (aeditumi) and guards quickly perceive it,but in the ordinary copies aeditui is read. There is an Atellan farce of Pomponius' entitled Aeditumus. In it is this line: [*](v. 2, Ribbeck. 3)
Titus Lucretius too in his poem [*](vi. 1273.) speaks of aedituentes, instead of aeditui. [*](Both aeditumus and aedituus are good Latin words. The former is made like finitumus and originally meant belonging to a temple; it derived its meaning guardian of a temple from aedituus (aedes and tueor).)
- As soon as I attend you and keep your temple-door (aeditumor).
That those are deceived who sin in the confident hope of being undetected, since there is no permanent concealment of wrongdoing; and on that subject a discourse of the philosopher Peregrinus and a saying of the poet Sophocles.
WHEN I was at Athens, I met a philosopher named Peregrinus, who was later surnamed Proteus, a man of dignity and fortitude, living in a hut outside the city. And visiting him frequently, I heard him say many things that were in truth helpful and noble. Among these I particularly recall the following:
He used to say that a wise man would not commit a sin, even if he knew that neither gods nor men
But,said he,
if men know that nothing at all can be hidden for very long, they will sin more reluctantly and more secretly.Therefore he said that one should have on his lips these verses of Sophocles, the wisest of poets: [*](Fr. 280 N2)
- See to it lest you try aught to conceal;
- Time sees and hears all, and will all reveal.
Another one of the old poets, whose name has escaped my memory at present, called Truth the daughter of Time.
A witty reply of Marcus Cicero, in which he strives to refute the charge of a direct falsehood.
THIS also is part of a rhetorical training, cunningly and cleverly to admit charges not attended with danger, so that if something base is thrown up to you which cannot be denied, you may turn it off by a jocular reply, making the thing seem deserving of laughter rather than censure. This we read that Cicero did, when by a witty and clever remark he
Therefore, if I buy the house, let it be considered that I did receive the money.But when later he had bought the house and was twitted in the senate with this falsehood by friends, he laughed heartily, saying as he did so:
You are men devoid of common sense, if you do not know that it is the part of a prudent and careful head of a family to get rid of rival purchasers by declaring that he does not intend to buy something that he wishes to purchase.
What is meant by the expression
within the Kalends,whether it signifies
before the Kalendsor
on the Kalends,or both; also the meaning of
within the Oceanand
within Mount Taurusin a speech of Marcus Tullius, and of
within the limitin one of his letters.
WHEN I had been named by the consuls a judge extraordinary at Rome, [*](From early times the examination of the evidence in cases at law was turned over by the magistrates to private persons, who acted under instruction from the magistrate. Lawsuits consisted of two parts: a preliminary hearing before the magistrate (in iure) and the proceedings in iudicio before the private judge. Gellius mentions a similar appointment by the praetors in xiv. 2. 1.) and ordered to give judgment
within the Kalends,I asked Sulpicius Apollinaris,
within the Kalendsincluded the Kalends themselves; and I told him that I had been duly appointed, that the Kalends had been set as the limit, and that I was to give judgment
withinthat day.
Why,said he,
do you make this inquiry of me rather than of some one of those who are students of the law and learned in it, whom you are accustomed to take into your counsel when about to act as judge?Then I answered him as follows:
If I needed information about some ancient point of law that had been established, one that was contested and ambiguous, or one that was newly ratified, I should naturally have gone to inquire of those whom you mention. But when the meaning, use and nature of Latin words is to be investigated, I should indeed be stupid and mentally blind, if, having the opportunity of consulting you, I had gone to another rather than to you.
Hear then,said he,
my opinion about the meaning of the word, [*](That is, intra,) but be it understood that you will not act according to what I shall say about its nature, but according to what you shall learn to be the interpretation agreed upon by all, or by very many, men; for not only are the true and proper significations of common words changed by long usage, but even the provisions of the laws themselves become a dead letter by tacit consent.
Then he proceeded to discourse, in my hearing and that of several others, in about this fashion:
When the time,said he, "is so defined that the judge is to render a decision 'within the Kalends, everyone at once jumps to the conclusion that there is no doubt that the verdict may lawfully be rendered before the Kalends, and I observe that the only
'Within the Kalends,' then, is not 'before the Kalends,' but 'on the Kalends'; that is, on the very day on which the Kalends fall. Therefore, according to the meaning of the word itself, one who is ordered to give judgment 'within the Kalends,' unless he do so on the Kalends, acts contrary to the order contained in the phrase; for if he does so earlier, he renders a decision not ' within' but ' before the Kalends.' But somehow or other the utterly absurd interpretation has been generally adopted,v2.p.403that ' within the Kalends' evidently means also ' on this side of the Kalends' or 'before the Kalends'; for these are nearly the same thing. And, besides, it is doubted whether a decision may be rendered on the Kalends also, since it must be rendered neither beyond nor before that date, but 'within the Kalends,' a time which lies between these; that is to say, ' on the Kalends.' But no doubt usage has gained the victory, the mistress not only of all things, but particularly of language.
After this very learned and clear discussion of the subject by Apollinaris, I then spoke as follows:
It occurred to me,said I,
before coming to you, to inquire and investigate how our ancestors used the particle in question. Accordingly, I found that Tullius in his Third Oration against Verres wrote thus: [*](ii. 3. 207.) 'There is no place within the ocean (intra oceanum) either so distant or so hidden, that the licentiousness and injustice of our countrymen has not penetrated it.' He uses 'within the ocean' contrary to your reasoning; for he does not, I think, wish to say 'in the ocean,' but he indicates all the lands which are surrounded by the ocean and to which our countrymen have access; and these are 'this side the ocean,' not 'in the ocean.' For he cannot be supposed to mean some islands or other, which are spoken of as far within the waters of the ocean itself.
Then with a smile Sulpicius Apollinaris replied:
Keenly and cleverly, by Heaven! have you confronted me with this Ciceronian passage; but Cicero said ' within the ocean,' not, as you interpret it, ' this side ocean.' What pray can be said to be 'on this side of the ocean,' when the ocean surrounds andv2.p.405encircles all lands on every side? [*](The Greeks of early times regarded the ocean as a great river encircling the earth.) For that which is 'on this side' of a thing, is outside of that thing; but how can that be said to be ' within' which is without? But if the ocean were only on one side of the world, then the land in that part might be said to be 'this side the ocean,' or 'before the ocean.' But since the ocean surrounds all lands completely and everywhere, nothing is on this side of it, but, all lands being walled in by the embrace of its waters, everything which is included within its shore is in its midst, just as in truth the sun moves, not on this side of the heavens, but within and in them.
At the time, what Sulpicius Apollinaris said seemed to be learned and acute. But later, in a volume of Letters to Servius Sulpicius by Marcus Tullius, I found
within moderation(intra modum) used in the same sense that those give to
within the Kalendswho mean to say
this side of the Kalends.These are the words of Cicero, which I quote: [*](Ad Fam. IV. 4. 4.)
But yet since I have avoided the displeasure of Caesar, who would perhaps think that I did not regard the present government as constitutional if I kept silence altogether, I shall do this [*](i.e., take part in politics.) moderately, or even less than moderately (intra modum), so as to consult both his wishes and my own desires.He first said
I shall do this moderately,that is, to a fair and temperate degree; then, as if this expression did not please him and he wished to correct it, he added
or even within moderation,thus indicating that he would do it to a less extent than might be considered moderate; that is, not up to the very limit, but somewhat short of, or
on this side ofthe limit.
Also in the speech which he wrote In Defence of Publius Sestius Cicero says
within Mount Taurusin such a way as to mean, not
on Mount Taurus,but
as far as the mountain and including the mountain itself.These are Cicero's own words in the speech which I have mentioned: [*](§ 58)
Our forbears, having overcome Antiochus the Great after a mighty struggle on land and sea, ordered him to confine his realm 'within Mount Taurus.' Asia, which they had taken from him, they gave to Attalus, to be his kingdom.Cicero says:
They ordered him to confine his realm within Mount Taurus,which is not the same as when we say
within the room,unless
within the mountainmay appear to mean what is within the regions which are separated by the interposition of Mount Taurus. [*](This is the usage of the Greek geographers, such as Strabo, who uses e)/sw tou= i)sqmou= and e)/sw tou= Tau/rou in the sense of south of the isthmus and south of Taurus. ) For just as one who is
within a roomis not in the walls of the room, but is within the walls by which the room is enclosed, which walls themselves are yet equally in the room, just so one who rules
within Mount Taurus,not only rules on Mount Taurus but also in those regions which are bounded by Mount Taurus.
According therefore to the analogy of the words of Marcus Tullius may not one who is bidden to make a decision
within the Kalendslawfully make it before the Kalends and on the Kalends themselves? And this results, not from a sort of privilege conceded to ignorant usage, but from an accurate regard for reason, since all time which is embraced by the day of the Kalends is correctly said to be
within the Kalends.
The meaning and origin of the particle saltem.
WE were inquiring what the original meaning of the particle saltem (at least) was, and what was the derivation of the word; for it seems to have been so formed from the first that it does not appear, like some aids to expression, to have been adopted inconsiderately and irregularly. And there was one man who said that he had read in the Grammatical Notes of Publius Nigidius [*](p. 19, 66, Swoboda.) that saltem was derived from si aliter, and that this itself was an elliptical expression, since the complete sentence was si aliter non potest,
if otherwise, it cannot be.But I myself have nowhere come upon that statement in those Notes of Publius Nigidius, although I have read them, I think, with some care.
However, that phrase si aliter non potest does not seem at variance with the meaning of the word under discussion. But yet to condense so many words into a very few letters shows a kind of misplaced subtlety. There was also another man, devoted to books and letters, who said that saltem seemed to him to be formed by the syncope of a medial u, saying that what we call saltem was originally salute.
For when some other things have been requested and refused, then,said he,
we are accustomed, as if about to make a final request which ought by no means to be denied, to say ' this at least (saltem) ought to be done or given,' as if at last seeking safety salutem, which it is surely most just to grant and to obtain.But this also,
That Sisenna in his Histories has frequently used adverbs of the type of celatim, vellicatim and saltuatim.
WHILE diligently reading the History of Sisenna, I observed that he used adverbs of this form: cursim (rapidly), properatim (hastily), celatim, vellicatim, salluatim. Of these the first two, since they are more common, do not require illustration. The rest are to be found in the sixth book of the Histories in these passages:
He arranged his men in ambush as secretly (celatim) as he could.[*](Fr. 126, Peter2.) Also in another place: [*](Fr. 127. Peter2.)
I have written of the events of one summer in Asia and Greece in a consecutive form, that I might not by writing piecemeal or in disconnected fashion (vellicatim aut saltuatim) confuse the minds of my readers.[*](These adverbs too are accusatives; see note 1 on chapter xiv.)
A somewhat careful inquiry into these words of Marcus Tullius in his first Oration against Antony:
But many things seem to threaten contrary even to nature and to fate; and a discussion of the question whether the words
fateand
naturemean the same thing or something different.
MARCUS CICERO, in his first Oration against Antony,[*](Phil. i. 10.) has left us these words:
I hastened then to follow him whom those present did not follow; not that I might be of any service, for I had no hope of that nor could I promise it, but in order that if anything to which human nature is liable should happen to me (and many things seem to threaten contrary even to nature and contrary to fate) I might leave what I have said to-day as a witness to my country of my constant devotion to its interests.Cicero says
contrary to nature and contrary to fate.Whether he intended both words,
fateand
nature,to have the same meaning and has used two words to designate one thing, [*](This is the recognized figure of speech known as hendiadys.) or whether he so divided and separated them that nature seems to bring some casualties and fate others, I think ought to be investigated; and this question ought especially to be asked—how it is that he has said that many things to which humanity is liable can happen contrary to fate, when the plan and order and a kind of unconquerable necessity of fate are so ordained that
But there is no doubt that Cicero referred to a violent and sudden death, which may properly seem to happen contrary to nature.
- Lest, spite of fate, you enter Hades' home.
[*](Iliad, xx. 336.)
But why he has put just that kind of death outside the decrees of fate it is not the part of this work to investigate, nor is this the time. The point, however, must not be passed by, that Virgil too had that same opinion about fate which Cicero had, when in his fourth book he said of Elissa, who inflicted a violent death upon herself: [*](Aen. iv. 696.)
just as if, in making an end of life, those deaths which are violent do not seem to come by fate's decree. Cicero, however, seems to have followed the words of Demosthenes, a man gifted with equal wisdom and eloquence, which express about the same idea concerning nature and fate. For Demosthenes in that splendid oration entitled On the Crown wrote as follows [*](205, p. 296.) :
- For since she perished not by fate's decree,
- Nor earned her death;
He who thinks that he was born only for his parents, awaits the death appointed by fate, the natural death; but he who thinks that he was born also for his country, will be ready to die that he may not see his country enslaved.What Cicero seems to have called
fateand
nature,Demosthenes long before termed
fateand
the natural death.For
a natural deathis one which comes in the course of fate and nature, as it were, and is caused by no force from without.
About an intimate talk of the poets Pacuvius and Accius in the town of Tarentum.
THOSE who have had leisure and inclination to inquire into the life and times of learned men and hand them down to memory, have related the following anecdote of the tragic poets Marcus Pacuvius and Lucius Accius:
Pacuvius,they say,
when already enfeebled by advanced age and constant bodily illness, had withdrawn from Rome to Tarentum. Then Accius, who was a much younger man, coming to Tarentum on his way to Asia, visited Pacuvius, and being hospitably received and detained by him for several days, at his request read him his tragedy entitled Atreus.Then they say that Pacuvius remarked that what he had written seemed sonorous and full of dignity, but that nevertheless it appeared to him somewhat harsh and rugged.
What you say is true,replied Accius,
and I do not greatly regret it; for it gives me hope that what I write hereafter will be better. For they say it is with the mind as it is with fruits; those which are at first harsh and bitter, later become mild and sweet; but those which at once grow mellow and soft, and are juicy in the beginning, presently become, not ripe, but decayed. Accordingly, it has seemed to me that something should be left in the products of the intellect for time and age to mellow.
Whether the words necessitudo and necessitas differ from each other in meaning.
IT is a circumstance decidedly calling for laughter and ridicule, when many grammarians assert that necessitudo and necessitas are unlike and different, in that necessitas is an urgent and compelling force, but necessitudo is a certain right and binding claim of consecrated intimacy, and that this is its only meaning. But just as it makes no difference at all whether you say suavitudo or suavitas (sweetness), acerbitudo or acerbitas (bitterness), acritudo or acritas (sharpness), as Accius wrote in his Neoptolemus, [*](467, Ribbeck3.) in the same way no reason can be assigned for separating necessitudo and necessitas. Accordingly, in the books of the early writers you may often find necessitudo used of that which is necessary; but necessitas certainly is seldom applied to the law and duty of respect and relationship, in spite of the fact that those who are united by that very law and duty of relationship and intimacy are called necessarii (kinsfolk). However, in a speech of Gaius Caesar, [*](i.e. Gaius lulius Caesar.) In Support of the Plautian Law, I found necessitas used for necessitudo, that is for the bond of relationship. His words are as follows: [*](ii., p. 121, Dinter; O. R. F.2, p. 412.)
To me indeed it seems that, as our kinship (necessitas) demanded, I have failed neither in labour, in pains, nor in industry.
I have written this with regard to the lack of
For he had heard his father, Lucius Aemilius Paulus, say that a really able general never engaged in a pitched battle, unless the utmost necessity (necessitudo) demanded, or the most favourable opportunity offered.
Copy of a letter of Alexander to his mother Olympias; and Olympias' witty reply.
IN many of the records of Alexander's deeds, and not long ago in the book of Marcus Varro entitled Orestes or On Madness, I have read [*](p. 255, Riese.) that Olympias, the wife of Philip, wrote a very witty reply to her son Alexander. For he had addressed his mother as follows:
King Alexander, son of Jupiter Hammon, greets his mother Olympias.Olympias replied to this effect:
Pray, my son,said she,
be silent, and do not slander me or accuse me before Juno; undoubtedly she will take cruel vengeance on me, if you admit in your letters that I am her husband's paramour.This courteous reply of a wise and prudent woman to her arrogant son seemed to warn him in a mild and polite fashion to give up the foolish idea which lie had formed from his great victories, from the flattery of his courtiers, and from his incredible success—that he was the son of Jupiter.
On the philosophers Aristotle, Theophrastus and Eudemus; and of the graceful tact of Aristotle in selecting a successor as head of his school.
THE philosopher Aristotle, being already nearly sixty-two years of age, was sickly and weak of body and had slender hope of life. Then the whole band of his disciples came to him, begging and entreating that he should himself choose a successor to his position and his office, to whom, as to himself, they might apply after his last day, to complete and perfect their knowledge of the studies into which he had initiated them. There were at the time in his school many good men, but two were conspicuous, Theophrastus and Eudemus, who excelled the rest in talent and learning. The former was from the island of Lesbos, but Eudemus from Rhodes. Aristotle replied that he would do what they asked, so soon as the opportunity came.
A little later, in the presence of the same men who had asked him to appoint a master, he said that the wine he was then drinking did not suit his health, but was unwholesome and harsh; that therefore they ought to look for a foreign wine, something either from Rhodes or from Lesbos. He asked them to procure both kinds for him, and said that he would use the one which he liked the better. They went, sought, found, brought. Then Aristotle asked for the Rhodian and tasting it said:
This is truly a sound and pleasant wine.Then he called for the Lesbian. Tasting that also, he remarked:
Both are very good indeed, but the Lesbian is the sweeter.When he said this, no one doubted that gracefully, and at the same time tactfully, he had
The term which the early Latins used for the Greek word prosw|di/ai; also that the term barbarismus was used neither by the early Romans nor by the people of Attica.
WHAT the Greeks call prosw|di/ai, or
tones,[*](The Greeks had a pitch accent, pronouncing the accented syllable with a higher tone.) our early scholars called now notae vocum, or
marks of tone,now moderamenta, or
guides,now accenticulae, or
accents,and now voculationes, or
intonations.But the fault which we designate when we say now that anyone speaks barbare, or
outlandishly,they did not call
outlandishbut
rustic,and they said that those speaking with that fault spoke
in a countrified manner(rustice). Publius Nigidius, in his Grammatical Notes [*](Fr. 39, Swoboda.) says:
Speech becomes rustic, if you misplace the aspirates.[*](Cf. Catull. lxxxiv.) Whether therefore those who before the time of the deified Augustus expressed themselves purely and properly used the word barbarismus (outlandishness), which is now common, I for my part have not yet been able to discover.
That Homer in his poems and Herodotus in his Histories spoke differently of the nature of the lion.
HERODOTUS, in the third book of his Histories, has left the statement that lionesses give birth but once during their whole life, and at that one birth that
But the lioness, although a strong and most courageous animal, gives birth once only in her lifetime to one cub; for in giving birth she discharges her womb with the whelp.Homer, however, says that lions (for so he calls the females also, using the masculine or
common(epicene) gender, as the grammarians call it) produce and rear many whelps. The verses in which he plainly says this are these: [*](Iliad, xvii. 133.)
In another passage also he indicates the same thing: [*](Iliad, xviii. 318.)
- He stood, like to a lion before its young,
- Beset by hunters in a gloomy wood
- And leading them away.
- With many a groan, like lion of strong beard,
- From which a hunter stole away its young
- Amid dense woods.
Since this disagreement and difference between the most famous of poets and the most eminent of historians troubled me, I thought best to consult that very thorough treatise which the philosopher Aristotle wrote On Animals. And what I find that he has written there upon this subject I shall include in these notes, in Aristotle's own language. [*](The passage is not quoted; see critical note. Aristotle tells us that the lioness gives birth to young every year, usually two, at most six, sometimes only one. The current idea that the womb is discharged with the young is absurd; it arose from the fact that lions are rare and that the inventor of the story did not know the real reason, which is that their habitat is of limited extent. The lionesses in Syria give birth five times, producing at first five cubs, then one less at each successive birth.)
That the poet Afranius wisely and prettily called Wisdom the daughter of Experience and Memory.
THAT was a fine and true thought of the poet Afranius about the birth of Wisdom and the means of acquiring it, when he said that she was the daughter of Experience and Memory. For in that way he shows that one who wishes to be wise in human affairs does not need books alone or instruction in rhetoric and dialectics, but ought also to occupy and train himself in becoming intimately acquainted with and testing real life, and in firmly fixing in his memory all such acts and events; and accordingly he must learn wisdom and judgment from the teaching of actual experience, not from what books only, or masters, through vain words and fantasies, have foolishly represented as though in a farce or a dream. The verses of Afranius are in a Roman comedy called The Chair:[*](298, Ribbeck3.)
There is also a line of Pacuvius to about the same purport, which the philosopher Macedo, a good man and my intimate friend, thought ought to be written over the doors of all temples: [*](348, Ribbeck3.)
- My sire Experience was, me Memory bore,
- In Greece called Sophia, Wisdom in Rome.
For he said that nothing could be more shameful or insufferable than that idle, lazy folk, disguised with beard and cloak, should change the character and
- I hate base men who preach philosophy.