Noctes Atticae

How Quintus Ennius rivalled [*](The principle of rivalry, the a)gw/n, was a recognized feature of literary technique.) certain verses of Euripides.

IN the Hecuba of Euripides there are some verses remarkable and brilliant in their diction, their thought and their terseness. Hecuba is speaking to Ulysses: [*](v. 293; the translation is that of Way, L.C.L.)

1. Thine high repute, how ill soe'er thou speak'st,
2. Shall sway them; for the same speech carrieth not
3. Like weight from men contemned and men revered.

These verses Quintus Ennius, when he translated that tragedy, rivalled with no little success. The verses of Ennius are the same in number, as follows: [*](v. 165, Ribbeck3.)

1. Though thou speak'st ill, thou wilt the Achivi sway;
2. The selfsame words and speech have other weight
3. When spoken by the great and by the obscure.

Ennius, as I have said, did well; but yet ignobiles and opulenti do not seem to express the full force of a)docou/ntwn and dokou/ntwn; for not all who are obscure are contemned, nor are the great all revered.

Some brief notes about the Pyrronian philosophers and the Academics; and of the difference between them.

THOSE whom we call the Pyrronian philosophers are designated by the Greek name skeptikoi/, or

sceptics,

which means about the same as

inquirers

and

investigators.

For they decide nothing and determine nothing, but are always engaged in inquiring and considering what there is in all nature concerning which it is possible to decide and determine. And moreover they believe that they do not see or hear anything clearly, but that they undergo and experience something like seeing and hearing; but they are in doubt as to the nature and character of those very things which cause them those experiences, and they deliberate about them: and they declare that in everything assurance and absolute truth seem so beyond our grasp, owing to the mingling and confusing of the indications of truth and falsehood, that any man who is not rash and precipitate in his judgment ought to use the language which they say was used by Pyrro, the founder of that philosophy:

Does not this matter stand so, rather than so, or is it neither?

For they deny that proofs of anything and its real qualities can be known and understood, and they try in many ways to point this out and demonstrate it. On this subject Favorinus too with great keenness and subtlety has composed ten books, which he entitled Purrwnei=oi Tro/poi, or The Pyrronian Principles. [*](p. 88, Marres. Apparently a discussion of the arguments by which the Pyrronian philosophers supported their beliefs.)

It is besides a question of long standing, which has been discussed by many Greek writers, whether the Pyrronian and Academic philosophers differ at all, and to what extent. For both are called

sceptics, inquirers and doubters,

since both affirm nothing and believe that nothing is understood. But they say that appearances, which they call fantasi/ai, are produced from all objects, not according to the nature of the objects themselves, but according to the condition of mind or body of those to whom those appearances come. Therefore they call absolutely all things that affect men's senses ta\ pro/s ti. [*](That is, things relative to something else.) This expression means that there is nothing at all that is self-dependent or which has its own power and nature, but that absolutely all things have

reference

v2.p.313

to something else

and seem to be such as their appearance is while they are seen, and such as they are formed by our senses, to which they come, not by the things themselves, from which they have proceeded. But although the Pyrronians and the Academics express themselves very much alike about these matters, yet they are thought to differ from each other both in certain other respects and especially for this reason—because the Academics do, as it were,

comprehend

[*](Comprehendo is used in a technical sense; cf. Cic. Acad. Pr. ii. 47, cum plane compresserat (manum) pugnumque fecerat, comprehensionem illam esse dicebat; also Acad. Post. i. 11, where kata/lhpton is rendered by comprehensio, and kata/lhyin by rebus quae manu prenderentur.) the very fact that nothing can be comprehended, and, as it were, decide that nothing can be decided, while the Pyrronians assert that not even that can by any means be regarded as true, because nothing is regarded as true.