Noctes Atticae

Gellius, Aulus

Gellius, Aulus. The Attic Nights of Aulus Gellius. Rolfe, John C., translator. Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press; William Heinemann, 1927 (printing).

Three epitaphs of three early poets, Naevius, Plautus and Pacuvius, composed by themselves and inscribed upon their tombs.

THERE are three epitaphs of famous poets, Gnaeus Naevius, Plautus and Marcus Pacuvius, composed by themselves and left to be inscribed upon their tombs, which I have thought ought to be included among these notes, because of their distinction and charm.

The epitaph of Naevius, although full of Campanian [*](This has been regarded as evidence that Naevius was a native of Campania; but Campanian arrogance was proverbial.) arrogance, might have been regarded as a just estimate, if he had not written it himself: [*](The authorship of all these epitaphs is questioned: Gudeman thought they came from Varro's Imagines; see Trans. Amer Phil. Assoc. xxv, 150 ff.; cf p. 296. 3, Bährens.)

  1. If that immortals might for mortals weep,
  2. Then would divine Camenae [*](The Latin equivalent of the Greek Muses.) weep for Naevius.
  3. For after he to Orcus as treasure was consigned,
  4. The Romans straight forgot to speak the Latin tongue.

We should be inclined to doubt whether the epitaph of Plautus was really by his own hand, if it had not been quoted by Marcus Varro in the first book of his work On Poets: [*](p. 296. 4, Bährens.)

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  1. Since Plautus has met death, Comedy mourns,
  2. Deserted is the stage; then Laughter, Sport and Wit,
  3. And Music's countless numbers [*](Numeri innumeri was formerly rendered unrhythmic measures and applied to Plautus' supposed irregularities in scansion; it rather refers to the variety of his metres.) all together wept. [*](The metre of the Latin is dactylic hexameter; final a in deserta is lengthened, and s in ludus is suppressed.)

Pacuvius' epitaph is the most modest and simple, worthy of his dignity and good taste: [*](p. 296, 5, Bährens.)

  1. Young man, although you haste, this little stone
  2. Entreats thee to regard it, then to read its tale.
  3. Here lie the bones of Marcus, hight Pacuvius.
  4. Of this I would not have you unaware. Good-bye.

Marcus Varro's definition of the word

indutiae
; to which is added a somewhat careful investigation of the derivation of that word.

MARCUS VARRO, in that book of his Antiquities of Man which treats Of War and Peace, [*](xxii, fr. 1, 2, Mirsch.) defines indutiae (a truce) in two ways.

A truce,
he says,
is peace for a few days in camp;
and again in another place,
A truce is a holiday in war.
But each of these definitions seems to be wittily and happily concise rather than clear or satisfactory. For a truce is not a peace—since war continues, although fighting ceases—nor is it restricted to a camp or to a few days only. For what are we to say if a truce is made for some months, and the
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troops withdraw from camp into the towns? Have we not then also a truce? Again, if a truce is to be defined as only lasting for a few days, what are we to say of the fact, recorded by Quadrigarius in the first book of his Annals, that Gaius Pontius the Samnite asked the Roman dictator for a truce of six hours? [*](Fr. 21, Peter.) The definition
a holiday in war,
too, is rather happy than clear or precise.

Now the Greeks, more significantly and more pointedly, have called such an agreement to cease from fighting e)kexeiri/a, or

a staying of hands,
substituting for one letter of harsher sound a smoother one. [*](That is, e)kexeiri/a instead of an original e)xexeiri/a, from e)/xw and xei/r, the first x, an aspirate, being reduced to the smooth mute k, since in Greek an aspirate may not begin two successive syllables.) For since there is no fighting at such a time and their hands are withheld, they called it e)kexeiri/a. But it surely was not Varro's task to define a truce too scrupulously, and to observe all the laws and canons of definition; for he thought it sufficient to give an explanation of the kind which the Greeks call tu/poi (
typical
) and u(pografai/ (
outline
), rather than o(rismoi/ (
exact definition
).

I have for a long time been inquiring into the derivation of indutiae, but of the many explanations which I have either heard or read this which I am going to mention seems most reasonable. I believe that indutiae is made up of inde uti iam (

that from then on
). The stipulation of a truce is to this effect, that there shall be no fighting and no trouble up to a fixed time, but that after that time all the laws of war shall again be in force. Therefore, since a definite date is set and an agreement is
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made that before that date there shall be no fighting but when that time comes,
that from then on,
fighting shall be resumed: by uniting (as it were) and combining those words which I have mentioned the term indutiae is formed. [*](The correct derivation seems to be from *in-du-tus (cf. duellum for bellum), not in a state of war.)

But Aurelius Opilius, in the first book of his work entitled The Muses, says: [*](p. 88, Fun.)

It is called a truce when enemies pass back and forth from one side to another safely and without strife; from this the name seems to be formed, as if it were initiae, [*](This derivation is clearer from the older form induitiae; see the critical note.) that is, an approach and entrance.
I have not omitted this note of Aurelius, for fear that it might appear to some rival of these Nights a more elegant etymology, merely because he thought that it had escaped my notice when I was investigating the origin of the word.

The answer of the philosopher Taurus, when I asked him whether a wise man ever got angry.

I ONCE asked Taurus in his lecture-room whether a wise man got angry. For after his daily discourses he often gave everyone the opportunity of asking whatever questions he wished. On this occasion he first discussed the disease or passion of anger seriously and at length, setting forth what is to be fund in the books of the ancients and in his own commentaries; then, turning to me who had asked

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the question, he said:
This is what I think about getting angry, but it will not be out of place for you to hear also the opinion of my master Plutarch, a man of great learning and wisdom. Plutarch,
said he,
once gave orders that one of his slaves, a worthless and insolent fellow, but one whose ears had been filled with the teachings and arguments of philosophy, should be stripped of his tunic for some offence or other and flogged. They had begun to beat him, and the slave kept protesting that he did not deserve the flogging; that he was guilty of no wrong, no crime. Finally, while the lashing still went on, he began to shout, no longer uttering complaints or shrieks and groans, but serious reproaches. Plutarch's conduct, he said, was unworthy of a philosopher; to be angry was shameful: his master had often descanted on the evil of anger and had even written an excellent treatise Peri\ )Aorghsi/as; [*](On Freedom from Anger; the work has not survived.) it was in no way consistent with all that was written in that book that its author should fall into a fit of violent rage and punish his slave with many stripes. Then Plutarch calmly and mildly made answer: ' What makes you think, scoundrel, that I am now angry with you. Is it from my expression, my voice, my colour, or even my words, that you believe me to be in the grasp of anger? In my opinion my eyes are not fierce, my expression is not disturbed, I am neither shouting madly nor foaming at the mouth and getting red in the face; I am saying nothing to cause me shame or regret; I am not trembling at all from anger or making violent gestures. For all these actions, if you did but know it, are the usual signs of angry passions.' And with these words, turning to the man who was plying the lash,
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he said: 'In the meantime, while this fellow and I are arguing, do you keep at it.'

Now the sum and substance of Taurus' whole disquisition was this: he did not believe that a)orghsi/a or

freedom from anger,
and a)nalghsi/a, or
lack of sensibility,
were identical; but that a mind not prone to anger was one thing, a spirit a)na/lghtos and a)nai/sqhtos, that is, callous and unfeeling, quite another. For as of all the rest of the emotions which the Latin philosophers call affects or affectiones, and the Greeks pa/qh, so of the one which, when it becomes a cruel desire for vengeance, is called
anger,
he did not recommend as expedient a total lack, ste/rhsis as the Greeks say, but a moderate amount, which they call metrio/ths.

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How Socrates used to train himself in physical endurance; and of the temperate habits of that philosopher.

Among voluntary tasks and exercises for strengthening his body for any chance demands upon its endurance we are told that Socrates habitually practised this one: he would stand, so the story goes, in one fixed position, all day and all night, from early dawn until the next sunrise, open-eyed, motionless, in his very tracks and with face and eyes riveted to the same spot in deep meditation, as if his mind and soul had been, as it were, withdrawn from his body. When Favorinus in his discussion of the man's fortitude and his many other virtues had reached this point, he said:

He often stood from sun to sun, more rigid than the tree trunks.
[*](Fr. 66. Marres.)

His temperance also is said to have been so great, that he lived almost the whole period of his life with health unimpaired. Even amid the havoc of that plague which, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, devastated Athens with a deadly species of disease, by temperate and abstemious habits he is said to have avoided the ill-effects of indulgence and retained his physical vigour so completely, that he was not at all affected by the calamity common to all.

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What rules of courtesy should be observed by fathers and sons in taking their places at able, keeping their seats, and similar matters at home and elsewhere, when the sons are magistrates and the fathers private citizens; and a discourse of the philosopher Taurus on this subject, with an illustration taken from Roman history.

THE governor of the province of Crete, a man of senatorial rank, had come to Athens for the purpose of visiting and becoming acquainted with the philosopher Taurus, and in company with this same governor was his father. Taurus, having just dismissed his pupils, was sitting before the door of his room, and we stood by his side conversing with him. In came the governor of the province and with him his father. Taurus arose quietly, and after salutations had been exchanged, sat down again. Presently the single chair that was at hand was brought and placed near them, while others were being fetched. Taurus invited the governor's father to be seated; to which he replied:

Rather let this man take the seat, since he is a magistrate of the Roman people.
Without prejudicing the case,
said Taurus,
do you meanwhile sit down, while we look into the matter and inquire whether it is more proper for you, who are the father, to sit, or your son, who is a magistrate.
And when the father had seated himself, and another chair had been placed near by for his son also, Taurus discussed the question with what, by the gods! was a most excellent valuation of honours and duties.

The substance of the discussions was this: In public places, functions and acts the rights of fathers,

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compared with tile authority of sons who are magistrates, give way somewhat and are eclipsed; but when they are sitting together unofficially in the intimacy of home life, or walking about, or even reclining at a dinner-party of intimate friends, then the official distinctions between a son who is a magistrate and a father who is a private citizen are at an end, while those that are natural and inherent come into play.
Now, your visit to me,
said he,
our present conversation, and this discussion of duties are private actions. Therefore enjoy the same priority of honours at my house which it is proper for you to enjoy in your own home as the older man.

These remarks and others to the same purport were made by Taurus at once seriously and pleasantly. Moreover, it has seemed not out of place to add what I have read in Claudius about the etiquette of father and son under such circumstances. I therefore quote Quadrigarius' actual words, transcribed from the sixth book of his Annals [*](Fr. 57. Peter.) "The consuls then elected were Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus for the second time and Quintus Fabius Maximus, son of the Maximus who had been consul the year before. The father, at the time proconsul, mounted upon a horse met his son the consul, and because lie was his father, would not dismount, nor did the lictors, who knew that the two men lived in the most perfect harmony, presume to order him to do so. As the father drew near, the consul said:

What next?
The lictor in attendance quickly understood and ordered Maximus the proconsul to dismount. Fabius obeyed the order and warmly commended his son for asserting the authority which he had as the gift of the people."

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For what reason our forefathers inserted the aspirate h in certain verbs and nouns.

THE letter h (or perhaps it should be called a breathing rather than a letter) was added by our forefathers to give strength and vigour to the pronunciation of many words, in order that they might have a fresher and livelier sound; and this they seem to have done from their devotion to the Attic language, and under its influence. It is well known that the people of Attica, contrary to the usage of the other Greek races, pronounced i(xqu/s (fish), i(/ppos (horse), and many other words besides, with a rough breathing on the first letter. [*](I find no authority for this. Brugmann in Müller's Handbuch, II, 61 (end) cites i(/ppos as a word which originally had a smooth breathing and acquired the rough from the combination o( i)/ppos. Since the i in i)xqu/s is prosthetic, i(xqu/s, if it existed must have had the same origin, but Brugmann does not cite it. See also Indoger. Forsch. xxii, p. 197 (gives some additional information).) In the same way our ancestors said lachrumae (tears), sepulchrum (burial-place), ahenum (of bronze), vehemens (violent), incohare (begin), helluari (gormandize), hallucinari (dream), honera (burdens), honustum (burdened). For in all these words there seems to be no reason for that letter, or breathing, except to increase the force and vigour of the sound by adding certain sinews, so to speak.

But apropos of the inclusion of ahenum among my examples, I recall that Fidus Optatus, a grammarian of considerable repute in Rome, showed me a remarkably old copy of the second book of the Aeneid, bought in the Sigillaria [*](A street or quarter in Rome where the little images were sold which were given as presents at the festival of the Sigillaria; this was on Dec. 21 and 22, an extension of the Saturnalia, although not a religious holiday. The aureus was the standard gold coin of the Romans, of the value of 100 sesterces; its weight varied at different periods.) for twenty pieces of gold, which was believed to have belonged to

v1.p.131
Virgil himself. In that book, although the following two lines were written thus: [*](ii. 469 f. )
  1. Before the entrance-court, hard by the gate,
  2. With sheen of brazen (aena) arms proud Pyrrhus gleams,
we observed that the letter h had been added above the line, changing aena to ahena. So too in the best manuscripts we find this verse of Virgil's written as follows: [*](Georg. i. 296.)
  1. Or skims with leaves the bubbling brass's (aleni) wave.

The reason given by Gavius Bassus for calling a certain kind of judicial inquiry divitiatio; and the explanation that others have given of the same term.

WHEN inquiry is made about the choice of a prosecutor, and judgment is rendered on the question to which of two or more persons the prosecution of a defendant, or a share in the prosecution, is to be entrusted, this process and examination by jurors is called divinatio.[*](Cf. Cicero's Divinatio in Caecilium, preliminary to the prosecution of Verres.) The reason for the use of this term is a matter of frequent inquiry.

Gavius Bassus, in the third book of his work On the Origin of Terms, says: [*](Fr. I. Fun.)

This kind of trial is called divinatio because the juror ought in a sense to divine what verdict it is proper for him to give.
The explanation offered in these words of Gavius Bassus is far from complete, or rather, it is inadequate and meagre. But at least he seems to be trying to show that divinatio is used because in
v1.p.133
other trials it is the habit of the juror to be influenced by what he has heard and by what has been shown by evidence or by witnesses; but in this instance, when a prosecutor is to be selected, the considerations which can influence a juror are very few and slight, and therefore he must, so to speak,
divine
what man is the better fitted to make the accusation.

Thus Bassus. But some others think that the divinatio is so called because, while prosecutor and defendant are two things that are, as it were, related and connected, so that neither can exist without the other, yet in this form of trial, while there is already a defendant, there is as yet no prosecutor, and therefore the factor which is still lacking and unknown—namely, what man is to be the prosecutor—must be supplied by divination.

How elegantly and clearly the philosopher Favorinus described the difference between the style of Plato and that of Lysias.

FAVORINUS used to say of Plato and Lysias:

If you take a single word from a discourse of Plato or change it, and do it with the utmost skill, you will nevertheless mar the elegance of his style; if you do the same to Lysias, you will obscure his meaning.

On some words which Virgil is asserted to have used carelessly and negligently; and the answer to be made to those who bring this false charge.

SOME grammarians of an earlier time, men by no means without learning and repute, who wrote

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commentaries on Virgil, and among them Annaeus Cornutus, criticize the poet's use of a word in the following verses [*](Eel. vi. 75. ff.) as careless and negligent:
  1. That, her white waist with howling monsters girt,
  2. Dread Scylla knocked about (vexasse) Ulysses' ships
  3. Amid the swirling depths, and, piteous sight!
  4. The trembling sailors with her sea-dogs rent.
They think, namely, that vexasse is a weak word, indicating a slight and trivial annoyance, and not adapted to such a horror as the sudden seizing and rending of human beings by a ruthless monster.

They also criticize another word in the following: [*](Georg. iii. 4)

  1. Who has not heard
  2. Of king Eurystheus' pitiless commands
  3. And altars of Busiris, the unpraised (inlaudati)?
Inlaudati, they say, is not at all a suitable world, but is quite inadequate to express abhorrence of a wretch who, because he used to sacrifice guests from all over the world, was not merely
undeserving of praise,
but rather deserving of the abhorrence and execration of the whole human race.

They have criticized still another word in the verse: [*](Aen. x. 314.)

  1. Through tunic rough (squalentem) with gold the sword drank from his pierced side,
on the ground that it is out of place to say auro squalentem, since the filth of squalor is quite opposed to the brilliance and splendour of gold.

Now as to the word vexasse, I believe the following answer may be made: vexasse is an intensive verb, and is obviously derived from ve-

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here, in which there is already some notion of compulsion by another; for a man who is carried is not his own master. But vexare, which is derived from vehere, unquestionably implies greater force and impulse. For vexare is properly used of one who is seized and carried away, and dragged about hither and yon; just as taxare denotes more forcible and repeated action than tangere, from which it is undoubtedly derived; and iactare a much fuller and more vigorous action than iacere, from which it comes; and quassare something severer and more violent than quatere. Therefore, merely because vexare is commonly used of the annoyance of smoke or wind or dust is no reason why the original force and meaning of the word should be lost; and that meaning was preserved by the earlier writers who, as became them, spoke correctly and clearly.

Marcus Cato, in the speech which he wrote On the Achaeans, [*](xxxv. Jordan.) has these words:

And when Hannibal was rending and harrying (vexaret) the land of Italy.
'hat is to say, Cato used vexare of the effect on Italy of Hannibal's conduct, at a time when no species of disaster, cruelty or savagery could be imagined which Italy did not suffer from his hands. Marcus Tullius, in his fourth Oration against Verres, wrote:
This [*](The temple of Artemis at Syracuse; § 122.) was so pillaged and ravaged by that wretch, that it did not seem to have been laid waste (vexata) by an enemy who in the heat of war still felt some religious scruple and some respect for customary law, but by barbarous pirates.

But concerning inlaudatus it seems possible to give two answers. One is of this kind: There is absolutely no one who is of so perverted a character

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as not sometimes to do or say something that can be commended (laudari.) And therefore this very ancient line has become a familiar proverb:
  1. Oft-times even a fool expresses himself to the purpose.
But one who, on the contrary, in his every act and at all times, deserves no praise (laude) at all is inlaudatus, and such a man is the very worst and most despicable of all mortals, just as freedom from all reproach makes one inculpatus (blameless). Now inculpatus is the synonym for perfect goodness; therefore conversely inlaudatus represents the limit of extreme wickedness. It is for that reason that Homer usually bestows high praise, not by enumerating virtues, but by denying faults; for example: [*](Iliad iv. 366, 768, etc.)
And not unwillingly they charged,
and again: [*](Iliad iv. 223.)
  1. Not then would you divine Atrides see
  2. Confused, inactive, nor yet loath to fight.
Epicurus too in a similar way defined the greatest pleasure as the removal and absence of all pain, in these words: [*](Sent. iii. p. 72, Ussing.)
The utmost height of pleasure is the removal of all that pains.
Again Virgil on the same principle called the Stygian pool
unlovely.
[*](Georg. iv. 479; Aen. vi. 438.) For just as he expressed abhorrence of the
unpraised
man by the denial of praise, so he abhorred the
unlovable
by the denial of love. Another defence of inlaudatus is this: laudare in early Latin means
to name
and
cite.
Thus in civil actions they use laudare of an authority, when he is cited. Conversely, the inlaudatus is the same as
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the inlaudabilis, namely, one who is worthy neither of mention nor remembrance, and is never to be named; as, for example, in days gone by the common council of Asia decreed that no one should ever mention the name of the man who had burned the temple of Diana at Ephesus. [*](He is said to have set fire to the temple in order to make himself notorious for all time; see Val. Max. viii. 14. Exb. 5. His name, Herostratus, was preserved by Theopompus.)

There remains the third criticism, his use of the expression

a tunic rough with gold.
But squalentem signifies a quantity or thick layer of gold, laid on so as to resemble scales. For squalere is used of the thick, rough scales (squamae) which are to be seen on the skins of fish or snakes. This is made clear both by others and indeed by this same poet in several passages; thus: [*](Aen. xi. 770.)
  1. A skin his covering was, plumed with brazen scales (squamis)
  2. And clasped with gold.
and again: [*](Aen. xi. 487.)
  1. And now has he his flashing breastplate donned,
  2. Bristling with brazen scales (squamis).
Accius too in the Pelopidae writes thus: [*](v. 517, Ribbeck3.)
  1. This serpent's scales (squamae) rough gold and purple wrought.
Thus we see that squalere was applied to whatever was overloaded and excessively crowded with anything, in order that its strange appearance might strike terror into those who looked upon it. So too on neglected and scaly bodies the deep layer of dirt was called squalor, and by long and continued use in that sense the entire word has become so corrupted, that finally squalor has come to be used of nothing but filth.

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Of the obedience of children to their parents; and quotations on this subject from the writings of the philosophers, in which it is inquired whether all a father's commands should be obeyed.

IT is a frequent subject of discussion with philosophers, whether a father should always be obeyed, whatever the nature of his commands. As to this question writers On Duty, both Greeks and our own countrymen, have stated that there are three opinions to be noticed and considered, and these they have differentiated with great acuteness The first is, that all a father's commands must be obeyed; the second, that in some he is to be obeyed, in others not; the third, that it is not necessary to yield to and obey one's father in anything.

Since at first sight this last opinion is altogether shameful, I shall begin by stating what has been said on that point.

A father's command,
they say,
is either right or wrong. If it is right, it is not to be obeyed because it is his order, but the thing must be done because it is right that it be done. If his command is wrong, surely that should on no account be done which ought not to be done.
Thus they arrive at the conclusion that a father's command should never be obeyed. But I have neither heard that this view has met with approval —for it is a mere quibble, both silly and foolish, as I shall presently show—nor can the opinion which we stated first, that all a father's commands are to be obeyed, be regarded as true and acceptable. For what if he shall command treason to one's country, a mother's murder, or some other base or impious
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deed? The intermediate view, therefore, has seemed best and safest, that some commands are to be obeyed and others not. But yet they say that commands which ought not to be obeyed must nevertheless be declined gently and respectfully, without excessive aversion or bitter recrimination, and rather left undone than spurned.

But that conclusion from which it is inferred, as has been said above, that a father is never to be obeyed, is faulty, and may be refuted and disposed of as follows: All human actions are, as learned men have decided, either honourable or base. Whatever is inherently right or honourable, such as keeping faith, defending one's country, loving one's friend's, ought to be done whether a father commands it or not; but whatever is of the opposite nature, and is base and altogether evil, should not be done even at a father's order. Actions, however, which lie between these, and are called by the Greeks now me/sa, or

neutral,
and now a)dia/fora, or
indifferent,
such as going to war, tilling the fields, seeking office, pleading causes, marrying a wife, going when ordered, coming when called; since these and similar actions are in themselves neither honourable nor base, but are to be approved or disapproved exactly according to the manner in which we perform them: for this reason they believe that in every kind of action of this description a father should be obeyed; as for instance, if he should order his son to marry a wife or to plead for the accused. For since each of these acts, in its actual nature and of itself, is neither honourable nor base, if a father should command it, he ought to be obeyed. But if he should order his son to
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marry a woman of ill repute, infamous and criminal, or to speak in defence of a Catiline, a Tubulus, [*](Catiline and Clodius are too notorious to require comment. L. Hostilius Tubulus, praetor in 142 B. C., accepted bribes when presiding at a trial for murder. Cic., De Nal. Deorum i. 63 and elsewhere, cites him as an example of iniquity. ) or a Publius Clodius, of course he ought not to be obeyed, since by the addition of a certain degree of evil these acts cease to be inherently neutral and indifferent. Hence the premise of those who say that
the commands of a father are either honourable or base
is incomplete, and it cannot be considered what the Greeks call
sound and regular disjunctive proposition.
For that disjunctive premise lacks the third member,
or are neither honourable nor base.
If this be added, the conclusion cannot be drawn that a father's command must never be obeyed.

The unfairness of Plutarch's criticism of Epicurus' knowledge of the syllogism.

PLUTARCH, in the second book of his essay On Homer,[*](vii, p. 100, Bern.) asserts that Epicurus made use of an incomplete, perverted and faulty syllogism, and he quotes Epicurus' own words: [*](Sent. II, p. 71, Ussing.)

Death is nothing to us, for what is dissolved is without perception, and what is without perception is nothing to us.
Now Epicurus,
says Plutarch, "omitted what he ought to have stated as his major premise, that death is a dissolution of body and soul, and then, to prove something else, he goes on to use the very premise that he had omitted, as if it had been stated and conceded. But this syllogism," says Plutarch,
cannot advance, unless that premise be first presented.

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What Plutarch wrote as to the form and sequence of a syllogism is true enough; for if you wish to argue and reason according to the teaching of the schools, you ought to say:

Death is the dissolution of soul and body; but what is dissolved is without perception; and what is without perception is nothing to us.
But we cannot suppose that Epicurus, being the man he was, omitted that part of the syllogism through ignorance, or that it was his intention to state a syllogism complete in all its members and limitations, as is done in the schools of the logicians; but since the separation of body and soul by death is self-evident, he of course did not think it necessary to call attention to what was perfectly obvious to everyone. For the same reason, too, he put the conclusion of the syllogism, not at the end, but at the beginning; for who does not see that this also was not due to inadvertence?

In Plato too you will often find syllogisms in which the order prescribed in the schools is disregarded and inverted, with a kind of lofty disdain of criticism.

How the same Plutarch, with obvious captiousness, criticized the use of a word by Epicurus.

IN the same book, [*](vii, p. 101, Bern.) Plutarch also finds fault a second time with Epicurus for using an inappropriate word and giving it an incorrect meaning. Now Epicurus wrote as follows: [*](Sect. iii, p. 72, Ussing.)

The utmost height of pleasure is the removal of everything that pains.
Plutarch declares that he ought not to have said
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of everything that pains,
but
of everything that is painful
; for it is the removal of pain, he explains, that should be indicated, not of that which causes pain.

In bringing this charge against Epicurus Plutarch is

word-chasing
with excessive minuteness and almost with frigidity; for far from hunting up such verbal meticulousness and such refinements of diction, Epicurus hunts them down. [*](There is an obvious word-play on sectatur and insectatur.)

The meaning of favisae Capitolinae; and what Marcus Varro replied to Servius Sulpicius, who asked him about that term.

SERVIUS SULPICIUS, an authority on civil law and a man well versed in letters, wrote [*](p. 140, Bremer. ) to Marcus Varro and asked him to explain the meaning of a term which was used in the records of the censors; the term in question was favisae Capitolinae. Varro wrote in reply [*](p. 199, Bipont.) that he recalled that Quintus Catulus, when in charge of the restoration of the Capitol, [*](After the destruction of the temple by fire in 83 B.C. In spite of Caesar's opposition (Suet. Jul. xv), Catulus dedicated the new temple in 69 B. C.) had said that it had been his desire to lower the area Capitolina, [*](The open space in front of and around the temple of Jupiter.) in order that the ascent to the temple might have more steps and that the podium might be higher, to correspond with the elevation and size of the pediment [*](Sulla and Catulus in their restorations of the Capitoline temple used columns that were taller than those of the earlier building. Catulus wished to make the podium (or elevated platform) higher, to correspond with the greater elevation and size of the pediment (or gable). This he could have done most easily by lowering the area about the temple.) ; but that he had been unable to carry out his plan because the favisae had prevented. These, he said, were certain underground chambers and cisterns in the area, in which

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it was the custom to store ancient statues that had fallen from the temple, and some other consecrated objects from among the votive offerings. And then Varro goes on to say in the same letter, that he had never found any explanation of the term favisae in literature, but that Quintus Valerius Soranus used to assert that what we called by their Greek name thesauri (treasuries) the early Latins termed favisae, their reason being that there was deposited in them, not uncoined copper and silver, but stamped and minted money. His theory therefore was, he said, that the second letter had dropped out of the word flavisae, and that certain chambers and pits, which the attendants of the Capitol used for the preservation of old and sacred objects, were called favisae. [*](For original flavisae, from flare. Minted or coined money had to be softened or melted before being cast or struck, and for this process the word isflare; hence the directors of the mint were called Triumviri Auro Argento Aere Flando Feriundo, where aere is of course an old dative. Favisa is apparently for *fovisa and cognate with forea, pit.)

Numerous important details about Sicinius Dentatus, the distinguished warrior.

WE read in the annals that Lucius Sicinius Dentatus, who was tribune of the commons in the consulship of Spurius Tarpeius and Aulus Aternius, [*](454 B.C.) was a warrior of incredible energy; that he won a name for his exceeding great valour, and was called the Roman Achilles. It is said that he fought with the enemy in one hundred and twenty battles, and had not a scar on his back, but forty-five in front; that golden crowns were given him eight

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times, the siege crown once, mural crowns three times, and civic crowns fourteen times; that eighty-three neck-chains were awarded him, more than one hundred and sixty armlets, and eighteen spears; he was presented besides with twenty-five decorations [*](The Romans awarded a great variety of military prizes, which are here enumerated, for the most part, in descending order of importance. Phalerae were discs of metal worn on the breast like medals, or sometimes on the harness of horses; the spears were hastae purae, unused (hence bloodless ) and perhaps sometimes headless weapons, although they are represented with heads on two tombstones (Cagnat et Chapot, Arch. Rom. ii, p. 359, and Bonner Jahrbücher, 114 (1905), Plate 1, Fig. 4). Besides golden crowns without a particular designation, there were others which are enunerated and described in v. 6.) ; he had a number of spoils of war, [*](The armour of the defeated antagonist; cf. Livy xxii. 6. 5. etc.) many of which were won in single combat; he took part with his generals in nine triumphal processions.

A law of Solon, the result of careful thought and consideration, which at first sight seems unfair and unjust, but on close examination is found to be altogether helpful and salutary.

AMONG those very early laws of Solon which were inscribed upon wooden tablets at Athens, and which, promulgated by him, the Athenians ratified by penalties and oaths, to ensure their permanence, Aristotle says [*](Cf. Pol. )Aqhn. 8.) that there was one to this effect:

If because of strife and disagreement civil dissension shall ensue and a division of the people into two parties, and if for that reason each side, led by their angry feelings, shall take up arms and fight, then if anyone at that time, and in such a condition of civil discord, shall not ally himself with one or the other faction, but by himself and apart shall hold aloof from the common calamity of the State, let hint be deprived of his home, his country, and all his property, and be an exile and an outlaw.

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When I read this law of Solon, who was a man of extraordinary wisdom, I was at first filled with something like great amazement, and I asked myself why it was that those who had held themselves aloof from dissension and civil strife were thought to be deserving of punishment. Then those who had profoundly and thoroughly studied the purpose and meaning of the law declared that it was designed, not to increase, but to terminate, dissension. And that is exactly so. For if all good men, who have been unequal to checking the dissension at the outset, do not abandon the aroused and frenzied people, but divide and ally themselves with one or the other faction, then the result will be, that when they have become members of the two opposing parties, and, being men of more than ordinary influence, have begun to guide and direct those parties, harmony can best be restored and established through the efforts of such men, controlling and soothing as they will the members of their respective factions, and desiring to reconcile rather than destroy their opponents.

The philosopher Favorinus thought that this same course ought to be adopted also with brothers, or with friends, who are at odds; that is, that those who are neutral and kindly disposed towards both parties, if they have had little influence in bringing about a reconciliation because they have not made their friendly feelings evident, should then take sides, some one and some the other, and through this manifestation of devotion pave the way for restoring harmony.

But as it is,
said he,
most of the friends of both parties make a merit of abandoning the two disputants, leaving them to the tender
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mercies of ill-disposed or greedy advisers, who, animated by hatred or by avarice, add fuel to their strife and inflame their passions.