Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

By this means we display the inner thoughts of our adversaries as though they were talking with themselves (but we shall only carry conviction if we represent them as uttering what they may reasonably be supposed to have had in their minds); or without sacrifice of credibility we may introduce conversations between ourselves and others, or of others among themselves, and put words of advice, reproach, complaint, praise or pity into the mouths of appropriate persons.

Nay, we are even allowed in this form of speech to bring down the gods from heaven and raise the dead, while cities also and peoples may find a voice. There are some authorities who restrict the term imepersonation to cases where both persons and words are fictitious, and prefer to call imaginary conversations between men by the Greek name of dialogue, which some [*]( Cornific. op. cit. iv. 43 and 52. ) translate

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by the Latin semnocinatio.

For my own part, I have included both under the same generally accepted term, since we cannot imagine a speech without we also imagine a person to utter it. But when we lend a voice to things to which nature has denied it, we may soften down the figure in the way illustrated by the following passage:

For if my country, which is far dearer to me than life itself, if all Italy, if the whole commonwealth were to address me thus, 'Marcus Tullius, what dost thou?
[*](in Cat. T. xi. 27. ) A bolder figure of the same kind may be illustrated by the following:
Your country, Catiline, pleads with you thus, and though she utters never a word, cries to you, 'For not a few years past no crime has come to pass save through your doing!'
[*](in Cat. I. vii. 18. )

It is also convenient at times to pretend that we have before our eyes the images of things, persons or utterances, or to marvel that the same is not the case with our adversaries or the judges; it is with this design that we use phrases such as

It seems to me,
or
Does it not seem to you?
But such devices make a great demand on our powers of eloquence. For with things which are false and incredible by nature there are but two alternatives: either they will move our hearers with exceptional force because they are beyond the truth, or they will be regarded as empty nothings because they are not the truth.

But we may introduce not only imaginary sayings, but imaginary writings as well, as is done by Asinius in his defence of Liburnia:

Let my mother, who was the object of my love and my delight, who lived for me and gave me life twice in one day [*]( The speech being lost, the allusion in bis — dedit is unintelligible. ) (and so on) inherit nought of my property.
This is in itself a figure, and is doubly so whenever, as in the present case,
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it imitates a document produced by the opposing party.

For a will had been read out by the prosecution, in the following form:

Let Publius Novanius Gallio, to whom as my benefactor I will and owe all that is good, as a testimony to the great affection which he has borne me (then follow other details) be my heir.
In this case the figure borders on parody, a name drawn from songs sung in imitation of others, but employed by an abuse of language to designate imitation in verse or prose.

Again, we often personify the abstract, as Virgil [*](Aen. iv. 174. ) does with Fame, or as Xenophon [*](Mem. ii. 1. ) records that Prodicus did with Virtue and Pleasure, or as Ennius does when, in one of his satires, he represents Life and Death contending with one another. We may also introduce some imaginary person without identifying him, as we do in the phrases,

At this point some one will interpose,
or,
Some one will say.

Or speech may be inserted without any mention of the speaker, as in the line: [*](Aen. ii. 29. The words represent what some Trojan said after the departure of the Greeks. )

  1. Here the Dolopian host
  2. Camped, here the fierce Achilles pitched his tent.
This involves a mixture of figures, since to impersonalion we add the figure known as ellipse, which in this case consists in the omission of any indication as to who is speaking. At times impersonation takes the form of narrative. Thus we find indirect speeches in the historians, as at the opening of Livy's first book [*]( i. 9. These words represent the argument of envoys sent out by Romulus to neighbouring cities. ) :
That cities, like other things, spring from the humblest origins, and that those who are helped by their own valour and the favour of heaven subsequently win great power and a great name for themselves.
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Apostrophe also,

which consists in the diversion of our address from the judge, is wonderfully stirring, whether we attack our adversary as in the passage,

What was that sword of yours doing, Tubero, in the field of Pharsalus?
[*](pro Lig. iii. 9. ) or turn to make some invocation such as,
For I appeal to you, hills and groves of Alba,
[*](pro Mil. xxxi. 85. ) or to entreaty that will bring odium on our opponents, as in the cry,
O Porcian and Sempronian laws.
[*](Verr. V. lxiii. 163. Laws protecting the person of a Roman citizen, and disregarded by Verres. )

But the term apostrophe is also applied to utterances that divert the attention of the hearer from the question before them, as in the following passage:

  1. I swore not with the Greeks
  2. At Aulis to uproot the race of Troy.
Aen. iv. 425. Dido is urging Anna to approach Aeneas and induce Aeneas to postpone his departure. Dido is no enemy from whom he need fly.
There are a number of different figures by which this effect may be produced. We may, for instance, pretend that we expected something different or feared some greater disaster, or that the judges in their ignorance of the facts may regard some point as of more importance than it really is: an example of this latter device is to be found in the exordium to Cicero's defence of Caelius.

With regard to the figure which Cicero [*](de Or. liii. 202. ) calls ocular denonstration, this comes into play when we do not restrict ourselves to mentioning that something was done, but proceed to show how it was done, and do so not merely on broad general lines, but in full detail. In the last book [*]( VIII. Iii. 61 sqq. ) I classified this figure under the head of vivid illustration, while Celsus actually terms it by this name. Others give the name of ὑποτύπωσις to any representation of facts which is made in such vivid language that they appeal to the eye rather than the ear. The

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following will show what I mean:
He came into the forum on fire with criminal madness: his eyes blazed and cruelty was written in every feature of his countenance.
[*](Verr. v. lxii. 161. )

Nor is it only past or present actions which we may imagine: we may equally well present a picture of what is likely to happen or might have happened. This is done with extraordinary skill by Cicero in his defence of Milo, [*](Ch. 32.) where he shows what Clodius would have done, had he succeeded in securing the praetorship. But this transference of time, which is technically called μετάστασις was more modestly used in vivid description by the old orators. For they would preface it by words such as

Imagine that you see
: take, for example, the words of Cicero [*](Not found in extant works of Cicero.) :
Though you cannot see this with your bodily eyes, you can see it with the mind's eye.

Modern authors, however, more especially the declaimers, are bolder, indeed they show the utmost animation in giving rein to their imagination; witness the following passages from Seneca's treatment of the controversial theme in which a father, guided by one of his sons, finds another son in the act of adultery with his stepmother and kills both culprits.

Lead me, I follow, take this old hand of mine and direct it where you will.

And a little later,

See, he says, what for so long you refused to believe. As for myself, I cannot see, night and thick darkness veil my eyes.
This figure is too dramatic: for the story seems to be acted, not narrated.

Some include the clear and vivid description of places under the same heading, while others call it topography. I have found some who speak of irony as dissimulation, but, in view of the fact that this latter name

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does not cover the whole range of this figure, I shall follow my general rule and rest content with the Greek term. Irony involving a figure does not differ from the irony which is a trope, as far as its genus is concerned, since in both cases we understand something which is the opposite of what is actually said; on the other hand, a careful consideration of the species of irony will soon reveal the fact that they differ.

In the first place, the trope is franker in its meaning, and, despite the fact that it implies something other than it says, makes no pretence about it. For the context as a rule is perfectly clear, as, for example, in the following passage from the Catilinarian orations. [*](I. viii. 19.)

Rejected by him, you migrated to your boon-companion, that excellent gentleman Metellus.
In this case the irony lies in two words, and is therefore a specially concise form of trope.

But in the figurative form of irony the speaker disguises his entire meaning, the disguise being apparent rather than confessed. For in the trope the conflict is purely verbal, while in the figure the meaning, and sometimes the whole aspect of our case, conflicts with the language and the tone of voice adopted; nay, a man's whole life may be coloured with irony, as was the case with Socrates, who was called an ironist because he assumed the role of an ignorant man lost in wonder at the wisdom of others. Thus, as continued metaphor develops into allegory, so a sustained series of tropes develops into this figure.

There are, however, certain kinds of this figure which have no connexion with tropes. In the first place, there is the figure which derives its name from negation and is called by some ἀντίφρασις. Here is an example:

I will not plead against you according to the rigour
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of the law, I will not press the point which I should perhaps be able to make good
[*](Verr. v. ii. 4. ) ; or again,
Why should I mention his decrees, his acts of plunder, his acquisition, whether by cession or by force, of certain inheritances?
[*](Phil. II. xxv. 62. ) or
I say nothing of the first wrong inflicted by his lust
; or
I do not even propose to produce the evidence given concerning the 600,000 sesterces
;

or

I might say, etc.
[*](pro Cael. xxii. 53. ) Such kinds of irony may even be sustained at times through whole sections of our argument, as, for instance, where Cicero [*](pro Cluent. lx. 166. ) says,
If I were to plead on this point as though there were some real charge to refute, I should speak at greater length.
It is also irony when we assume the tone of command or concession, as in Virgil's [*](Aen. iv. 381. Dido to Aeneas. She continues by praying for his destruution. )
  1. Go!
  2. Follow the winds to Italy;

or when we concede to our opponents qualities which we are unwilling that they should seem to possess. This is specially effective when we possess these qualities and they do not, as in the following passage, [*](Aen. xi. 383. Turnus addresses Drances, who has been attacking him as the cause of the war and bidding him fight himself, if he would win Lavinia for his bride. )

  1. Brand me as coward, Drances, since thy sword
  2. Has slain such hosts of Trojans.
A like result is produced by reversing this method when we pretend to own to faults which are not ours or which even recoil upon the heads of our opponents, as for example,
  1. 'Twas I that led the Dardan gallant on
  2. To storm the bridal bed of Sparta's queen!
Aen. x. 92. Juno ironically pretends to have brought about the rape of Helen, which was in reality the work of Venus.