Institutio Oratoria
Quintilian
Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.
Or we may admit the judges to our deliberations, a device which is frequently called into play. We may say,
What do you advise?or,
I ask you,or,
What, then, should have been done?Cato, for example, says,
Come now, if you had been in his place, what else would you have done?And in another passage,
Imagine this to be a matter which concerns us all, and assume you have been placed in charge of the whole affair.
Sometimes, however, in such forms of communication we may add something unexpected, a device which is in itself a figure, as Cicero does in the Verrines:
What then? What think you? Perhaps you expect to hear of some theft or plunder.[*](v. 5. 10.) Then, after keeping the minds of the judges in suspense for a considerable time, he adds something much worse. This figure is termed suspension by Celsus. It has two forms.
For we may adopt exactly the opposite procedure to that just mentioned, and after raising expectation of a sequel of the most serious nature, we may drop to something which is of a trivial character, and may even imply no offence at all. But since this does not necessarily involve any form of communication, some have given it the name of paradox or surprise.
I do not agree with those who extend the name of figure to a statement that something has happened unexpectedly to the
Gentlemen, I never thought it would come to pass that, when Scaurus was the accused, I should have to entreat you not to allow influence to carry any weight on his behalf.
The figure known as concession springs from practically the same source as communication; it occurs when we leave some things to the judgment of the jury, or even in some cases of our opponents, as when Calvus says to Vatinius,
Summon all your assurance and assert that you have a better claim than Cato to be elected praetor.
The figures best adapted for intensifying emotion consist chiefly in simulation. For we may feign that we are angry, glad, afraid, filled with wonder, grief or indignation, or that we wish something, and so on. Hence we get passages like the following:
I am free, I breathe again,[*](pro Mil. xviii. 47. ) or,
It is well,or,
What madness is this?[*](pro Muren. vi. 14. ) or,
Alas! for these degenerate days or,
Woe is me; for though all my tears are shed my grief still clings to me deep-rooted in my heart,[*](Phil.. xxvi. 64. ) or,
To this some give the name of exclamation,Unknown.
- Gape now, wide earth.
and include it among figures of speech. When, however, such exclamations are genuine, they do not come under the head of our present topic: it is only those which are simulated and artfully designed which can with any certainty be regarded as figures. The same is true of free speech, which Corificius [*]( The author of Auct. ad Herennium, iv. 36. ) calls licence, and the Greeks παῤῥησία. For what has less of the figure about it than true freedom? On the other hand, freedom of speech may frequently be made a
For when Cicero in his defence for Ligarius says,
After war had begun, Caesar, and was well on its way to a conclusion, I deliberately, of my own free will and under no compulsion, joined the forces of your opponents,[*](iii. 7.) he has in his mind something more than a desire to serve the interests of Ligarius, for there is no better way of praising the clemency of the victor.
On the other hand, in the sentence,
What else was our aim, Tubero, than that we might secure the power which he now holds?[*](iv. 10. We = the Pompeian party. He = Caesar.) he succeeds with admirable art in representing the cause of both parties as being good, and in so doing mollifies him whose cause was really bad. A bolder form of figure, which in Cicero's opinion [*](Orat. xxv. 85. ) demands greater effort, is impersonation, or προσωποποιΐα This is a device which lends wonderful variety and animation to oratory.
By this means we display the inner thoughts of our adversaries as though they were talking with themselves (but we shall only carry conviction if we represent them as uttering what they may reasonably be supposed to have had in their minds); or without sacrifice of credibility we may introduce conversations between ourselves and others, or of others among themselves, and put words of advice, reproach, complaint, praise or pity into the mouths of appropriate persons.
Nay, we are even allowed in this form of speech to bring down the gods from heaven and raise the dead, while cities also and peoples may find a voice. There are some authorities who restrict the term imepersonation to cases where both persons and words are fictitious, and prefer to call imaginary conversations between men by the Greek name of dialogue, which some [*]( Cornific. op. cit. iv. 43 and 52. ) translate