Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

Again, a question may involve comparison, as, for instance,

Which of the two then could more easily assign a reason for his opinion?
[*](pro Cluent. xxxviii. 106. ) There are other forms of question as well, some concise, some developed at greater length, some dealing with one thing only, others with several. Anticipation, or, as the Greeks call it, πρόληψις, whereby we forestall objections, is of extraordinary value in pleading; it is frequently employed in all parts of a speech, but is especially useful in the exordium.

However, it forms a genus in itself, and

v7-9 p.385
has several different species. One of these is the defence by anticipation, such as Cicero employs against Quintus Caecilius, [*](Div. in Caec. i. 1. ) where he points out that though previously he himself has always appeared for the defence, he is now undertaking a prosecution. Another is a form of confession, such as he introduces in his defence of Rabirius Postumus, [*](Chs. i. and ix.) where he admits that he himself regards his client as worthy of censure for lending money to the king. Another takes the form of prediction, as in the phrase,
For I will say without any intention of aggravating the charge.
Again, there is a form of self-correction, such as,
I beg you to pardon me, if I have been carried too far.
And, most frequent of all, there is preparation, whereby we state fully why we are going to do something or have done it.

Anticipation may also be employed to establish the meaning or propriety of words, as in the following case,

Although that was not a punishment, but merely a prevention of crime,
[*](From a lost work of Cicero.) while the same effect may be produced by qualification, as in the following sentence,
Citizens, I say, if I may call them by that name.
[*](pro Mur. xxxvii. 80. )

Again, hesitation may lend an impression of truth to our statements, when, for example, we pretend to be at a loss, where to begin or end, or to decide what especially requires to be said or not to be said at all. All speeches are full of such instances, but for the present one will be enough.

As for myself, I know not where to turn. Shall I deny that there was a scandalous rumour that the jury had been bribed, etc.?
[*](pro Cluent. i. 4. )