Institutio Oratoria

And those other embellishments which are derived from the arrangement of words contribute greatly to the adornment of our style. They may be compared to what we term the decorations of the forum or a richly-ornamented stage, since they not only adorn, but stand out conspicuously in the midst of other ornaments. The principle governing the use of embellishments and decorations of style is the same: words may be repeated and reiterated or reproduced with some slight change. Sentences may repeatedly commence or end with

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the same word or may begin and end with the same phrase. The same word may be reiterated [*](adiungitur apparently refers to the same figure described in Herodian ( Rh. Gr. iii. 99) as ἐπίζευξις for which he gives as an example Θῆβαι δὲ Θῆβαι, πόλις κ. τ. λ., from Aeschin. Ctes. 133. ) either at the beginning or at the conclusion, or may be repeated, but in a different sense. Words may have the same inflexion or termination or be placed in various antitheses, our language may rise by gradations to a climax, or a number of words may be placed together in asyndeton without connecting particles. Or we may omit something, while making clear the reason for such omission, or correct ourselves with apparent censure of our carelessness, may utter exclamations of admiration or grief, or introduce the same word repeatedly in different cases. The ornaments of thought are, however, more important. They are so frequently employed by Demosthenes that some critics have held that it is in them that the chief beauty of his style resides. And in truth there is hardly a topic in his speeches which is not distinguished by some artificial treatment of the thought, and it must be admitted that speaking involves the embellishment of all, or at any rate most of our thoughts with some form of ornament. As you, Brutus, have such an admirable knowledge of all these methods, it would be waste of time for me to cite all their names or to give illustrations. I shall therefore content myself merely with indicating this topic. Our ideal orator then will speak in such a manner that he will cast the same thought into a number of different forms, will dwell on one point and linger over the same idea. he will often attenuate some one point or deride his opponent, will diverge from his theme and give a bias to his thought, will set forth what he intends to say, after completing his argument will give a brief summary, will

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recall himself to the point which he has left, repeat what he has said, complete his proof by a formal conclusion, embarrass his opponent by asking questions or answer himself in reply to imaginary questions; will desire his words to be taken in a different sense from their literal meaning, will hesitate what argument or form of statement to prefer, will classify and divide, will deliberately omit and ignore some point, and defend himself by anticipation; will transfer the blame of some charge brought against him to his opponent, will often take his audience, and sometimes even his opponent into consultation, will describe the character and talk of particular persons, will put words into the mouths of inanimate objects, divert the minds of the audience from the point at issue, often move them to merriment or laughter, anticipate objections, introduce comparisons, cite precedents, assign and distribute different sentiments to different persons, silence interrupters, assert that there are certain things of which he prefers not to speak, warn his audience to be on their guard against certain things, or venture on a certain licence of speech. Again, he will wax angry, sometimes indulge in rebuke, entreaty or supplication, will clear away unfavourable impressions, swerve a little from his point, utter wishes or execrations, or address his audience in terms of familiar intimacy. There are also other virtues at which he should aim, such as brevity, if his theme demands it, while he will often set forth topics in such vivid language as almost to present them to the very eyes of his audience, or will exaggerate his subject beyond the bounds of possibility. His meaning will frequently be deeper than his words seem to

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indicate, his tone will often be cheerful, and he will often mimic life and character. In fact, as regards this department of oratory, of which I have given you the substance, lie must display eloquence in all its grandest forms.

The student who desires to give a wider consideration to figures of thought and speech will, therefore, have a guide to follow, and 1 would not venture to assert that he could have a better. But I would ask him to read these passages of Cicero with reference to my own views on this subject. For I intend to speak only of those figures of thought which depart from the direct method of statement, and I note that a similar procedure has been adopted by a number of learned scholars.

On the other hand, all those embellishments which differ in character from these are none the less virtues whose importance is such that without them all oratory will be little less than unintelligible. For how can the judge be adequately instructed unless lucidity characterise our performance of the following tasks: explanation, proposition, promise of proofs, definition, distinction, exposition of our own opinion, logical conclusion, defence by anticipation, introduction of comparisons or precedents, disposition and distribution, interruption, repression of those who interrupt us, antithesis, exculpation and personal attack?

Again, what would eloquence do if deprived of the artifices of amplification and its opposite? of which the first requires the gift of signifying more than we say, that is emphasis, together with exaggeration and overstatement of the truth, while the latter requires the power to diminish and palliate. What scope is there for the stronger emotions if the orator is not allowed to give free rein

What pleasure can an orator hope to produce, or what impression even of the most moderate learning, unless he knows how to fix one point in the minds of the audience by repetition, and another by dwelling on it, how to digress from and return to his theme, to divert the blame from himself and transfer it to another, or to decide what points to omit and what to ignore as negligible? It is qualities such as these that give life and vigour to oratory; without them it lies torpid like a body lacking the breath to stir its limbs.

But more than the mere possession of these qualities is required; they must be deployed, each in their proper place and with such variety that every sound may bewitch the hearer with all the charm of music. But these qualities are as a rule open and direct, manifesting themselves without disguise. They do, however, as I have said, admit of figures, as the instances to which I shall proceed will show.

What is more common than to ask or enquire? For both terms are used indifferently, although the one seems to imply a desire for knowledge, and the other a desire to prove something. But whichever term we use, the thing which they represent admits a variety of figures. We will begin with those which serve to increase the force and cogency of proof to which I assign the first place.

A simple question may be illustrated by the line: [*]( quanquam, Spalding: quam cum, A: cum, B. )

1. But who are ye and from what shores are come?

What was that sword of yours doing, Tubero, that was drawn on the field of Pharsalus?

How long, Catiline, will you abuse our patience?

Do you not see that your plots are all laid bare?

How much greater is the fire of his words as they stand than if he had said,

You have abused our patience a long time,

Your plots are all laid bare.

Was Gaius Fidiculanius Falcula, I ask you, brought to justice?

How is it possible?

How can that be?

Or we may ask a question with a view to throw odium on the person to whom it is addressed, as in the words placed by Seneca in the mouth of Medea: [*](Med. 451. )

1. What lands dost bid me seek?

1. Alas, what lands, lie cried,
2. What seas can now receive me?

Do you hear? The will which we impugn is the work of a madman, not of one who lacked natural affection.

They may serve our indignation, as in the line:

1. Are any left
2. That still adore Juno's divinity?

Aen. i. 48.

1. To what dost thou not drive the hearts of men,
2. Accursed greed of gold?

Aen. iii. 56.

as in:

1. Will they not rush to arms and follow forth
2. From all the city?

Aen. iv. 592.

What, then, shall I do?

A figure is also involved in a reply, when one question is asked and another is answered, because it suits the respondent's purpose better to do so, or because it aggravates the charge brought against the accused. For example, a witness for the prosecution was asked whether he had been cudgelled by the plaintiff, and replied,

And what is more, I had done him no harm.

I ask if you killed the man?

He was a robber.

Have you occupied the farm?

It was my own.

Again, the answer may be of such a kind as to make defence precede confession. For example, in the Eclogues [*](Ecl. iii. 17 and 21. ) of Virgil, when one shepherd asks:

1. Did I not see you, villain, snare a goat
2. Of Damon's?

1. I vanquished him in song, and should he not
2. Pay me the prize, my due?

Akin to this kind of answer is the dissimulatory

Before whom do I say this? Before one who, although he was aware of these facts, yet restored me to my country even before he had seen me.

A different form of fictitious question is to be found in the pro Caelio.

Some one will say, 'Is this your moral discipline? Is this the training you would give young men?'

Gentlemen, if there were any man with such vigour of mind, with such innate virtue and self-control, etc.

Had you no house? Yes, you had one. Had you money and to spare? No, you were in actual want.

Again, a question may involve comparison, as, for instance,

Which of the two then could more easily assign a reason for his opinion?

However, it forms a genus in itself, and

For I will say without any intention of aggravating the charge.

I beg you to pardon me, if I have been carried too far.

Anticipation may also be employed to establish the meaning or propriety of words, as in the following case,

Although that was not a punishment, but merely a prevention of crime,

Citizens, I say, if I may call them by that name.

Again, hesitation may lend an impression of truth to our statements, when, for example, we pretend to be at a loss, where to begin or end, or to decide what especially requires to be said or not to be said at all. All speeches are full of such instances, but for the present one will be enough.

As for myself, I know not where to turn. Shall I deny that there was a scandalous rumour that the jury had been bribed, etc.?