Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

For the same things are often put in different ways and the sense remains unaltered though the words are changed, while a figure of thought may include several figures of speech. For the former lies in the conception, the latter in the expression of our thought. The two are frequently combined, however, as in the following passage:

Now, Dolabella, [I have no pity] either for you or for your children
: [*]( Cic. Verr. I. xxx. 77. iam iam is a figure, as being a reduplication, and liberum as being a contraction. ) for the device by which he turns from the judges to Dolabella is a figure of thought, while iam iam (
now
) and liberum (
your children
) are figures of speech.

It is, however, to the best of my knowledge, generally agreed by the majority of authors that there are two classes of figure, namely figures of thought, that is of the mind, feeling or conceptions, since all these terms are used, and figures of speech, that is of words, diction, expression, language or style: the name by which they are known varies, but mere terminology is a matter of indifference. Cornelius Celsus,

however, to figures of thought and speech would add those produced by

glosses
; [*]( See IV. ii. 88. color = the particular aspect given to a case by a skilful representation of the facts —the 'gloss' or varnish put on them by either the accused or the accuser. ) but he has merely been led astray by an excessive passion for novelty. For who can suppose that so learned a man was ignorant of the fact that
glosses
and
reflexions
both come under the heading of thought? We may therefore conclude that, like language itself, figures are necessarily concerned with thought and with words.
v7-9 p.359

As, however, in the natural course of things we conceive ideas before we express them, I must take figures of thought first. Their utility is at once great and manifold, and is revealed with the utmost clearness in every product of oratory. For although it may seem that proof is infinitesimally affected by the figures employed, none the less those same figures lend credibility to our arguments and steal their way secretly into the minds of the judges.

For just as in sword-play it is easy to see, parry, and ward off' direct blows and simple and straightforward thrusts, while side-strokes and feints are less easy to observe and the task of the skilful swordsman is to give the impression that his design is quite other than it actually is, even so the oratory in which there is no guile fights by sheer weight and impetus alone; on the other hand, the fighter who feints and varies his assault is able to attack flank or back as he will, to lure his opponent's weapons from their guard and to outwit him by a slight inclination of the body. Further,

there is no more effective method of exciting the emotions than an apt use of figures. For if the expression of brow, eyes and hands has a powerful effect in stirring the passions, how much more effective must be the aspect of our style itself when composed to produce the result at which we aim? But, above all, figures serve to commend what we say to those that hear us, whether we seek to win approval for our character as pleaders, or to win favour for the cause which we plead, to relieve monotony by variation of our language, or to indicate our meaning in the safest or most seemly way.

But before I proceed to demonstrate what figures best suit the different circumstances, I must

v7-9 p.361
point out that their number is far from being as great as some authorities make out. For I am not in the least disturbed by the various names which the Greeks more especially are so fond of inventing. First of all, then,

I must repudiate the views of those who hold that there are as many types of figure as there are kinds of emotion, on the ground, not that emotions are not qualities of the mind, but that a figure, in its strict, not its general sense, is not simply the expression of anything you choose to select. Consequently the expression in words of anger, grief, pity, fear, confidence or contempt is not a figure, any more than persuasion, threats, entreaty or excuse.

But superficial observers are deceived by the fact that they find figures in all passages dealing with such themes, and select examples of them from speeches; whereas in reality there is no department of oratory which does not admit such figures. But it is one thing to admit i>figure and another to be a figure; I am not going to be frightened out of repeating the term with some frequency in my attempt to make the facts clear. My opponents will, I know,

direct my attention to special figures employed in expressing anger, in entreating for mercy, or appealing to pity, but it does not follow that expressions of anger, appeals to pity or entreaties for mercy are in themselves figures. Cicero, it is true, includes all ornaments of oratory under this head, and in so doing adopts, as it seems to me, a middle course. For he does not hold that all forms of expression are to be regarded as figures, nor, on the other hand, would he restrict the term merely to those expressions whose form varies from ordinary use. But he regards as

v7-9 p.363
figurative all those expressions which are especially striking and most effective in stirring the emotions of the audience. He sets forth this view in two of his works, and that my readers may have the opportunity of realising the judgment of so high an authority, I subjoin what he says verbatim. [*]( The two works are the Orator (xxxix. 134 sqq. )— see sect. and the de ( Oratore III. lii. 201, which is here quoted. )