Institutio Oratoria

Cicero has imitated his method in the following

After long lapse of years the Sicilians saw dwelling in their midst, not a second Dionysius or Phalaris (for that island has produced many a cruel tyrant in years gone by), but a new monster with all the old ferocity once familiar to those regions. For, to my thinking, neither Scylla nor Charybdis were ever such foes as he to the ships that sailed those same narrow seas.

The methods of hyperbole by attenuation are the same in number. Compare the Virgilian [*](Ecl. iii. 103. Describing a flock of starved sheep. )

1. Scarce cling they to their bones,

1. Fundum Vetto vocat quem possit mittere funda;
2. Ni tamen exciderit, qua cava funda patet.

Vetto gives the name of farm to an estate which might easily be hurled from a sling, though it might well fall through the hole in the hollow sling, so small is it.

I shrink from recording the faults to which the lack of this sense of proportion has given rise, more especially as they are so well known and obvious. It is enough to say that hyperbole lies, though without any intention to deceive. We must therefore be all the more careful to consider how far we may go in exaggerating facts which our audience may refuse to believe. Again, hyperbole will often cause a laugh. If that was what the orator desired,

Hyperbole is employed even by peasants and uneducated persons, for the good reason that everybody has an innate passion for exaggeration or attenuation of actual facts, and no one is ever contented with the simple truth. But such disregard of truth is pardonable, for it does not involve the definite assertion of the thing that is not. Hyperbole is, moreover, a virtue,

when the subject on which we have to speak is abnormal. For we are allowed to amplify, when the magnitude of the facts passes all words, and in such circumstances our language will be more effective if it goes beyond the truth than if it falls short of it. However, I have said enough on this topic, since I have already dealt with it in my work on the causes of the decline of oratory.

In my last book I spoke of tropes. I now come to figures, called σχήματα in Greek, a topic which is naturally and closely connected with the preceding.

For many authors have considered figures identical with tropes, because whether it be that the latter derive their name from having a certain form or from the fact that they effect alterations in language (a view which has also led to their being styled motions ), it must be admitted that both these features are found in figures as well. Their employment is also the same. For they add force and charm to our matter. There are some again who call tropes figures, Artorius Proculus among them.

Further the resemblance between the two is so close that it is not easy to distinguish between them. For although certain kinds differ, while retaining a general resemblance (since both involve a departure from the simple and straightforward method of expression coupled with a certain rhetorical excellence), on the other hand some are distinguished by the narrowest possible dividing line: for example, while irony belongs to figures of thought just as much as to tropes, [*](See IX. ii. 44.) periphrasis, hyperbaton and onomatopoea [*]( VIII. vi. 59 sqq., 62, 31 respectively. ) have been ranked by distinguished authors as figures of speech rather than tropes.

It is therefore all the more necessary to point out the distinction between the two. The name of trope

Therefore the substitution of one word for another is placed among tropes, as for example in the case of metaphor, metonymy, antonomasia, metalepsis, synecdochè, catachresis, allegory [*](See VIII. vi.) and, as a rule, hyperbole, which may, of course, be concerned either with words or things. Onomatopoea is the creation of a word and therefore involves substitution for the words which we should use but for such creation.

Again although periphrasis often includes the actual word whose place it supplies, it still uses a number of words in place of one. The epithet as a rule involves an element of antonomasia [*](VIII. vi. 29 and 46.) and consequently becomes a trope on account of this affinity. Hyperbaton is a change of order and for this reason many exclude it from tropes. None the less it transfers a word or part of a word from its own place to another.

None of these can be called figures. For a figure does not necessarily involve any alteration either of the order or the strict sense of words. As regards irony, I shall show elsewhere [*](IX. ii. 44.) how in some of its forms it is a trope, in others a figure. For I admit that the name is common to both and am aware of the complicated and minute discussions to which it has given rise. They, however, have no bearing on my present task. For it

even though they adopt a new name, so these artifices will produce exactly the same effect, whether they are styled tropes or figures, since their values lie not in their names, but in their effect. Similarly it makes no difference whether we call a basis conjectural or negative, or concerned with fact or substance, [*](See III. vi. 15, 39.) provided always that we know that the subject of enquiry is the same.

It is best therefore in dealing with these topics to adopt the generally accepted terms and to understand the actual thing, by whatever name it is called. But we must note the fact that trope and figure are often combined in the expression of the same thought, since figures are introduced just as much by the metaphorical as by the literal use of words.

There is, however, a considerable difference of opinion among authors as to the meaning of the name, [*](i.e. figure.) the number of genera and the nature and number of the species into which figures may be divided. The first point for consideration is, therefore, what is meant by a figure. For the term is used in two senses. In the first it is applied to any form in which thought is expressed, just as it is to bodies which, whatever their composition, must have some shape.

In the second and special sense, in which it is called a schema, it means a rational change in meaning or language from the ordinary and simple form, that is to say, a change analogous to that involved by sitting, lying down on something or looking back. Consequently when a student tends

In so doing we speak as if every kind of language possessed a figure: for example cursitare and lectitare [*]( Frequentative forms of curro (run) and lego (read). ) are said to have the same figure, that is to say, they are identical in formation. Therefore in the first and common sense of the word everything is expressed by figures. If we are content with this view, there is good reason for the opinion expressed by Apollodorus (if we may trust the statement of Caecilius on this point) to the effect that he found the rules laid down in this connexion quite incomprehensible.

If, on the other hand, the name is to be applied to certain attitudes, or I might say gestures of language, we must interpret schema in the sense of that which is poetically or rhetorically altered from the simple and obvious method of expression. It will then be true to distinguish between the style which is devoid of figures (or ἀσχημάτιστος ) and that which is adorned with figures (or ἐσχηματισμένη, ).

But Zoilus narrowed down the definition, since he restricted the term schema to cases when the speaker pretends to say something other than that which he actually does say. 1 know that this view meets with common acceptance: it is, in fact, for this reason that we speak of figured controversial themes, of which I shall shortly speak. [*](ix. ii. 65.) We shall then take a figure to mean a form of expression to which a new aspect is given by art.

Some writers have held that there is only one kind of figure, although they differ as regards the reasons which lead them to adopt this view. For