Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

Hence abuse or catachresis of words becomes necessary, while metaphor, also, which is the supreme ornament of oratory, applies words to things with which they have strictly no connexion. Consequently propriety turns not on the actual term, but on the meaning of the term, and must be tested by the touchstone of the understanding, not of the ear.

The second sense in which the word propriety is used occurs when there are a number of things all called by the same name: in this case the original term from which the others are derived is styled the proper term.

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For example, the word vertex means a whirl of water, or of anything else that is whirled in a like manner: then, owing to the fashion of coiling the hair, it comes to mean the top of the head, while finally, from this sense it derives the meaning of the highest point of a mountain. All these things may correctly be called vertices, but the proper use of the term is the first. So, too, solea and tuidus

are employed as names of fish, to mention no other cases. [*]( Lit. i. e. in the proper sense the sole of the foot and a thrush. ) The third kind of propriety is found in the case where a thing which serves a number of purposes has a special name in some one particular context; for example, the proper term for a funeral song is naenia, and for the general's tent augurale. Again, a term which is common to a number of things may be applied in a proper or special sense to some one of them. Thus we use urbs in the special sense of Rome, venales in the special sense of newly-purchased slaves, and Corinthia in the special sense of bronzes, although there are other cities besides Rome, and many other things which may be styled venales besides slaves, and gold and silver are found at Corinth as well as bronze. But the use of such terms implies no special excellence in an orator.

There is, however, a form of propriety of speech which deserves the highest praise, that is to say, the employment of words with the maximum of significance, as, for instance, when Cato [*](Suet. Caes. 53. ) said that

Caesar was thoroughly sober when he undertook the task of overthrowing the constitution,

or as Virgil [*](Ecl. vi. 5. ) spoke of a

thin-drawn strain,

and Horace [*](Odes I. xii. 1, and III. vi. 36. ) of the

shrill pipe,

and

dread Hannibal.

Some also include under this head that form of propriety

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which is derived from characteristic epithets, such as in the Virgilian [*](Georg. i. 295 and Aen. xi. 681. ) phrases,

sweet unfermented wine,

with white teeth.

But of this sort of propriety I shall have to speak elsewhere. [*](SC. ch. vi. )

Propriety is also made to include the appropriate use of words in metaphor, while at times the salient characteristic of an individual comes to be attached to him as a proper name: thus Fabius was called

Cunctator,

the Delayer, on account of the most remarkable of his many military virtues. Some, perhaps, may think that words which mean more than they actually say deserve mention in connexion with clearness, since they assist the understanding. I, however, prefer to place emphasis [*](See IX. ii. 64.) among the ornaments of oratory, since it does not make a thing intelligible, but merely more intelligible.

Obscurity, on the other hand, results from the employment of obsolete words, as, for instance, if an author should search the records of the priests, the earliest treaties and the works of long-forgotten writers with the deliberate design of collecting words that no man living understands. For there are persons who seek to gain a reputation for erudition by such means as this, in order that they may be regarded as the sole depositories of certain forms of knowledge.

Obscurity may also be produced by the use of words which are more familiar in certain districts than in others, or which are of a technical character, such as the wind called

Atabalus,

[*]( An Apulian term for the Scirocco. What is the peculiarity of a sack-ship is unknown. It is possible that with Haupt we should read stlataria, "a broad-beamed merchant-vessel. ) or a

sack-ship,

or in malo cosanum. Such expressions should be avoided if we are pleading before a judge who is ignorant of their meaning, or, if used, should be explained, as may have to be done in the case of what are called homonyms. For

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example, the word taurus may be unintelligible unless we make it clear whether we are speaking of a bull, or a mountain, or a constellation, or the name of a man, or the root of a tree. [*](Reference unknown.)

A greater source of obscurity is, however, to be found in the construction and combination of words, and the ways in which this may occur are still more numerous. Therefore, a sentence should never be so long that it is impossible to follow its drift, nor should its conclusion be unduly postponed by transposition or an excessive use of hyperbaton. [*](See viii. vi. 62.) Still worse is the result when the order of the words is confused as in the line [*](Aen. i. 109. The awkwardness of the order cannot be brought out in English. )

In the midmost sea
Rocks are there by Italians altars called.

Again,

parenthesis, so often employed by orators and historians, and consisting in the insertion of one sentence in the midst of another, may seriously hinder the understanding of a passage, unless the insertion is short. For example, in the passage where Vergil [*](Georg. iii. 79–83. ) describes a colt, the words

Nor fears he empty noises,

are followed by a number of remarks of a totally different form, and it is only four lines later that the poet returns to the point and says,

Then, if tile sound of arms be heard afar,
How to stand still he knows not.

Above all, ambiguity must be avoided,

and by ambiguity I mean not merely the kind of which I have already spoken, where the sense is uncertain, as in the clause Chremetem audivi percussisse Demean, [*](See VII. ix. 10.)

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but also that form of ambiguity which, although it does not actually result in obscuring the sense, falls into the same verbal error as if a man should say visum a se hominem librum scribentem (that he had seen a man writing a book). For although it is clear that the book was being written by the man, [*](i.e. and not the man by the book! ) the sentence is badly put together, and its author has made it as ambiguous as he could.

Again, some writers introduce a whole host of useless words; for, in their eagerness to avoid ordinary methods of expression, and allured by false ideals of beauty they wrap up everything in a multitude of words simply and solely because they are unwilling to make a direct and simple statement of the facts: and then they link up and involve one of those long-winded clauses with others like it, and extend their periods to a length beyond the compass of mortal breath.

Some even expend an infinity of toil to acquire this vice, which, by the way, is nothing new: for I learn from the pages of Livy [*]( Perhaps in his letter to his son, for which see II. v. 20. ) that there was one, a teacher, who instructed his pupils to make all they said obscure, using the Greek word σκότισον (

darken it.

) It was this same habit that gave rise to the famous words of praise,

So much the better: even I could not understand you.