Institutio Oratoria

It is also often doubtful to which of two antecedents a phrase is to be referred. Hence we get such

My heir shall be bound to give my wife a hundred pounds of silver according to choice,

Ambiguity resulting from the use of two accusatives may be removed by the substitution of the ablative: for example, Lachetem audivi percussisse Demeam (I heard that Demea struck Laches, or that L. struck D.) may be rendered clear by writing a Lachete percussum Demeam (that D. was struck by L.). There is, however, a natural ambiguity in the ablative case itself, as I pointed out in the first book. [*](I. vii. 3.) For example, caelo decurrit aperto [*]( Apparently a misquotation of Virg. Aen. v. 212, pelago decurrit aperto. ) leaves it doubtful whether the poet means he hastened down

through the open sky,

when the sky was opened for him to pass.

Words may be separated by a breathing space or pause. We may, for instance, say statuam, and then, after a slight pause, add auream hastam, or the pause may come between statuam auream and haslam. The addition referred to above would take the form quod elegerit ipse, where ipse will show that the reference to the heir, or quod elegerit ipsa, making the reference to the wife. In cases where ambiguity is caused by the addition of a word, the difficulty may be eliminated by the removal of a word, as in the sentence nos flentes illos deprehendimus. [*]( Does this mean we found them weeping, or we found them weeping for us? The ambiguity is eliminated by the removal of nos. )

Where it is doubtful to what a word or phrase refers, and the word or phrase itself is ambiguous, we shall have to alter several words, as, for example, in the sentence,

My heir shall be bound to give him all his own

v7-9 p.161

property,

his own

He following the instructions of his father-in-law, for whom, because he had not been elected to the college of augurs, he had no great affection, especially as he had given Quintus Scaevola, the younger of his sons-in-law, the preference over himself. .

Again, another source of ambiguity arises from leaving it doubtful in a written document whether a syllable is long or short. Cato, for example, means one thing in the nominative when its second syllable is short, and another in the dative or ablative when the same syllable is long. [*](sc. of the adjective catus, shrewd. ) There are also a number of other forms of ambiguity which it is unnecessary for me to describe at length.

Further, it is quite unimportant how ambiguity arises or how it is remedied. For it is clear in all cases that two interpretations are possible, and as far as the written or spoken word is concerned, it is equally important for both parties. It is therefore a perfectly futile rule which directs us to endeavour, in connexion with this basis, to turn the word in question to suit our own purpose, since, if this is feasible, there is no ambiguity.

In cases of ambiguity the only questions which confront us will be, sometimes which of the two interpretations is most natural, and always which interpretation is most equitable, and what was the intention of the person who wrote or uttered the words. I have, however, given sufficient instructions in the course of my remarks on conjecture and quality, as to the method of treating such questions, whether by the prosecution or the defence.

There is, however, a certain affinity between all these bases. [*](III. vi. 54.) For in definition we enquire into the meaning of a term, and in the syllogism, which is closely connected with definition, [*](See ch. viii. 1.) we consider what was the meaning of the writer, while it is obvious that in the case of contrary laws there are two bases, one concerned with the letter, and the other with the intention. Again, definition is in itself a kind of ambiguity, since it brings out two meanings in the same term.

The basis concerned with the letter and the intention of the law involves a legal question as regards the interpretation of the words, which is identical with the question arising out of contrary laws. Consequently some writers have asserted that all these bases may be resolved into those concerned with the letter and intention, while others hold that in all cases where the letter and the intention of a document have to be considered, it is ambiguity that gives rise to the question at issue. But all these bases are really distinct, for an obscure point of law is not the same as an ambiguous point of law. Definition, then,

involves a general question as to the actual nature of a term, a question which may conceivably have no connexion whatsoever with the content of the case in point. In investigations as to the letter and the intention, the dispute turns on the provisions contained in the law, whereas the syllogism deals with that which is not contained in the law. In disputes arising out of ambiguity we are led from the ambiguous phrase to its conflicting meanings, whereas in the case of contrary laws the fight starts from the conflict of their provisions.

The distinction between these bases has therefore been rightly accepted by the most learned of

There are other details concerning which I can give no instructions without a statement of the particular case on which the orator has to speak. For not only must the whole case be analysed into its component topics and questions, but these subdivisions themselves require to be arranged in the order which is appropriate to them. For example, in the exordium each part has its own special place, first, second and third, etc., while each question and topic requires to be suitably arranged, and the same is true even of isolated general questions. [*](cp. II. iv. 24; III. v. 8. )

For it will not, I imagine, be represented that sufficient skill in division is possessed by the man who, after resolving a controversial theme into questions such as the following, whether a hero is to be granted any reward that he may claim, whether he is allowed to claim private property, whether he may demand any woman in marriage, whether he may claim to marry a woman who already possesses a husband, or this particular woman, then, although it is his duty to deal with the first question first, proceeds to deal with them indiscriminately as each may happen to occur to him, and ignores the fact that the first point which should be discussed is whether we should stand by the letter or the intention of the law, and fails to follow the natural order,

which demands that after beginning with this question he should then proceed to introduce the subsidiary questions, thereby making the structure of his speech

But it is clearly useless to take one or two cases, or even a hundred or a thousand, since their number is infinite. It is the duty of the teacher to demonstrate daily in one kind of case after another what is the natural order and connexion of the parts, so that little by little his pupils may gain the experience which will enable them to deal with other cases of the same character. For it is quite impossible to teach everything that can be accomplished by art.

For example, what painter has ever been taught to reproduce everything in nature? But once he has acquired the general principles of imitation, he will be able to copy whatever is given him. What vase-maker is there who has not succeeded in producing a vase of a type which he had never previously seen?

There are, however, some things which depend not on the teacher, but on the learner. For example, a physician will teach what treatment should be adopted for different diseases, what the dangers are against which he must be on his guard, and what the symptoms by which they may be recognised. But he will not be able to communicate to his pupil the gift of feeling the pulse, or appreciating the variations of colour, breathing and temperature: this will depend on the talent of the individual. Therefore, in most instances, we must rely on ourselves, and must study cases with the utmost care, never

For the most effective, and what is justly styled most economical [*](cp. III. iii. 9. ) arrangement of a case as a whole, is that which cannot be determined except when we have the specific facts before us. It consists in the power to determine when the exordium is necessary and when it should be omitted; when we should make our statement of facts continuous, and when we should subdivide it; when we should begin at the very beginning, when, like Homer, start at the middle or the end;

when we should omit the statement of facts altogether; when we should begin by dealing with the arguments advanced by our opponents, and when with our own; when we should place the strongest proofs first and when the weakest; in what cases we should prefix questions to the exordium, and what preparation is necessary to pave the way for these questions; what arguments the judge will accept at once, and to what he requires to be led by degrees; whether we should refute our opponent's arguments as a whole or in detail; whether we should reserve emotional appeals for the peroration or distribute them throughout the whole speech; whether we should speak first of law or of equity; whether we should first advance (or refute) charges as to past offences or the charges connected with the actual trial;

or, again, if the case is complicated, what order we should adopt, what evidence or documents of any kind should be read out in the course of our speech, and what reserved for a later stage. This gift of arrangement is to oratory what generalship is to war. The skilled commander will know how to distribute his forces