Institutio Oratoria
Quintilian
Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.
In this case we shall not have two separate questions, namely, whether every foreigner who goes up on the wall is liable to the penalty, and whether this particular foreigner is liable, since no more forcible argument can be brought against the application of the letter of the law than the fact in dispute, but the only question to be raised will be whether a foreigner may not go on to the wall even for the purpose of saving the city. Therefore we shall rest our case on equity and the intention of the law. It is, however, sometimes possible to draw examples from other laws to show that we cannot always stand by the letter, as Cicero did in his defence of Caecina.
The third method becomes operative when we find something in the actual words of the law which enables us to prove that the intention of the legislator was different.
Anyone who is caught at night with steel in his hands shall be thrown into prison. A man is found wearing a steel ring, and is imprisoned by the magistrate.In this case the use of the word caught is sufficient proof that the word steel was only intended by the law in the sense of a weapon of offence.
But just as the advocate who rests his case on the intention of the law must wherever possible impugn the letter of the law, so he who defends the letter of the law must also seek to gain support from the intention. Again, in cases concerned with wills it sometimes happens that the intention of the testator is clear, though it has not been expressed in writing: an example of this occurs in the trial of Curius, which gave rise to the well-known argument between Lucius Crassus and Scaevola.
A second heir had been appointed in the event of a posthumous son dying while a minor. No posthumous son was born. The next of kin claimed the property. Who could doubt that the intention of the testator was that the same man should inherit in the event of the son not being born who would have inherited in the event of his death? But he had not written this in his will.
Again, the opposite case, that is to say, when what is written is obviously contrary to tile intention of the writer, occurred quite recently. A man who had made a bequest of 5000 sesterces, on altering his will erased the word sesterces and inserted pounds of silver. [*](About 384 sesterces go to the pound of silver.) But it was clear that he had meant not 5000 but 5 pounds of silver, because the weight of silver mentioned in the bequest was unparalleled and incredible.
The same basis includes such general questions as to whether we should stand by the