Institutio Oratoria
Quintilian
Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.
Again, may not the same thing be defined in more than one way, as Cicero does when he says,
What do we mean when we say' commonly ': surely we mean 'by all men'?[*](Pro Mur. xxxv. 73. ) May it not be given a wide and varied treatment such as is frequently employed by all orators? For it is rare to find orators falling victims to that form of slavery introduced from the practice of the philosophers and tying themselves down to certain definite words; indeed it is absolutely forbidden by Marcus Antonius in the de Oratore [*]( II xxv. 108 sqq. ) of Cicero. For it is a most dangerous practice, since,
if we make a mistake in a single word, we are like to lose our whole case, and consequently the compromise adopted by Cicero in the pro Caecina [*](XV. 42.) is the safest course to follow; this consists in setting forth the facts without running any risks over the exactness of our terminology. These are his words:
Judges, the violence which threatens our lives and persons is not the only kind of violence: there is a much more serious form which by the threat of death fills our minds with panic and often turns them from their natural condition of stability.
Or again, we may prove before we define, as Cicero does in the Philippics, [*](IX. iii. 7.) where he proves that Servius Sulpicius was killed by Antony and introduces his definition at the conclusion in the following terms:—
For assuredly the murderer was he who was the cause of his death.I would not, however, deny that such rules should be employed, if it will help our case, and that, if we can produce a definition which is at once strong and concise, it will be not merely an ornament to our speech, but will also produce the strongest
The order to be followed in definition is invariable. We first ask what a thing is, and then, whether it is this. [*](i. e. the thing under consideration. ) And there is generally more difficulty in the establishment than in the application of a definition. In determining what a thing is, there are two things which require to be done: we must establish our own definition and destroy that of our opponent. Consequently in the schools,
where we ourselves imagine our opponent's reply, we have to introduce two definitions, which should suit the respective sides of the case as well as it is in our power to make them. But in the courts we must give careful consideration to the question whether our definition may not be superfluous and irrelevant or ambiguous or inconsistent or even of no less service to our opponents than to ourselves, since it will be the fault of the pleader if any of these errors occur. On the other hand, we shall ensure the right definition,
if we first make up our minds what it is precisely that we desire to effect: for, this done, we shall be able to suit our words to serve our purpose. To make my meaning clearer, I will follow my usual practice and quote a familiar example.
A man who has stolen private money from a temple is accused of sacrilege.