Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

In this case those paragons of eloquence, who laugh at us because we trouble our heads about cases that rarely occur, will always assume the popular rôle. They will defend the uneducated against the eloquent son, the brave against the coward, the son who secured the recall of his kin against the ungrateful son, the son who is content with a portion of the inheritance against the son who would refuse his brother a share in their patrimony.

All these points are actually to be found in the case and are of considerable importance, but they are not such as to render victory a certainty. In such a case they will, as far as possible, search for daring or obscure reflexions (for to-day obscurity is accounted a virtue), and they will think they have given the theme a brilliant treatment by ranting and raving over it. Those, on the other hand, whose ideals are higher, but who restrict themselves merely to the obvious, will note

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the following points, which are, however, purely superficial.

The uneducated son may be excused for not appearing at the trial on the ground that he could contribute nothing to his father's defence: but even the orator has no claim on the gratitude of the accused, since the latter was condemned: [*](Sc. in spite of his own eloquence. ) the man who secured the recall of his kin deserves to receive the inheritance, while the man who refuses to divide it with his brother, more especially with a brother who has deserved so well of him, is avaricious, unnatural and ungrateful: they will further note that the first and essential question is that which turns on the letter and intention of the law; unless this is first disposed of, all subsequent arguments must fall to the ground.

He, however, who follows the guidance of nature will assuredly reflect as follows: the first argument of the uneducated son will be,

My father died intestate and left two sons, my brother and myself; I claim a share in his estate by the law of nations.
Who is so ignorant or so lacking in education as not to make this his opening, even though he does not know what is meant by a proposition? [*](See IV. iv.)

He will then proceed to extol, though with due moderation, the justice of this common law of nations. The next point for our consideration is what reply can be made to so equitable a demand? The answer is clear:—

There is a law which disinherits the man who fails to appear in his father's defence when the latter is accused of treason, and you failed to appear.
This statement will be followed by the necessary praise of the law and denunciation of the man who failed to appear.

So far we have been dealing entirely with

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admitted facts. Let us now return to the claimant. Unless he is hopelessly unintelligent, surely the following argument will suggest itself:—
If the law bars the way, there is no ground for action and the trial becomes a farce. But it is beyond question that the law exists and that the uneducated son did commit the offence for which it enacts a punishment.
What then shall we say?
I had no education.

But if the law applies to all men, it will be of no avail to plead lack of education. We must therefore try to discover whether there be not some point on which the law can be invalidated. We turn for guidance to nature (a point on which I cannot insist too often); what does she suggest save that when the letter of the law is against us, we should discuss its intention? This introduces the general question whether we are to stand by the letter or the spirit. But if we argue this question on general grounds with reference to law in the abstract, we shall go on for ever; it is a question that has never been decided. We must therefore restrict our enquiry to the particular law on which our case turns and try to find some argument against adhesion to the strict letter.

Well, then, is everyone who fails to appear in defence of his father to be disinherited? Are there no exceptions to the rule? At this point the following arguments will spontaneously suggest themselves.

Is an infant liable to the law?
For we may imagine a case where the son is an infant and has failed to appear in his father's support. Again
does the law apply to a man who was away from home or absent on military service or on an embassy?
We have gained a considerable amount of ground; for we
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have established the fact that a man may fail to appear for his father and still inherit.

Our declaimer, who has thought out this line of argument, must now pass over like a Latin flute-player, as Cicero says, [*](Pro Mur. xii. 26. The flute-player went from one actor to another, according as each required accompaniment. ) to the side of the eloquent son and reply,

Granted, but you are not an infant, you were not away from home nor absent on military service.
Is there any answer to this except the previous reply,
I am an uneducated man
?

But to this there is the obvious retort,

Even if you could not actually plead, you might have supported him by your presence,
which is no more than the simple truth. The uneducated son must therefore return to the intention of the legislator.
He wished to punish unfilial conduct, but I am not unfilial.

To this the eloquent son will reply,

The action whereby you deserved disinheritance was unfilial, although penitence or desire for display may have subsequently led you to choose this as your reward. Further, it was owing to you that our father was condemned, since by absenting yourself you appeared to imply that you thought him guilty.
The uneducated son replies,
Nay, you contributed to his condemnation, for you had given offence to many and made our family unpopular.
These arguments are based on conjecture, as also will be the excuse put forward by the uneducated son to the effect that his father advised his absence, as he did not wish to emperil his whole family. All these arguments are involved in the preliminary question as to the letter and the intention of the law.