Institutio Oratoria
Quintilian
Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.
Nor do the Areopagites, when they condemned a boy for plucking out the eyes of quails, seem to have had anything else in their mind than the consideration that such conduct was an indication of a perverted character which might prove hurtful to many, if he had been allowed to grow up. So, too, the popularity of Spurius Maelius and Marcus Manlius was regarded as an indication that they were aiming at supreme power.
However, I fear that this line of reasoning will carry us too far. For if it is an indication of adultery that a woman bathes with men, the fact that she revels with young men or even an intimate friendship will also be indications of the same offence. Again depilation, a voluptuous gait, or womanish attire may be regarded as indications of effeminacy and unmanliness by anyone who thinks that such symptoms are the result of an immoral character, just as blood is the result of a wound: for anything, that springs from the matter under investigation and comes to our notice, may properly be called an indication.
Similarly it is also usual to give the names of signs to frequently observed phenomena, such as prognostics of the weather which we may illustrate by the Vergilian
andVerg. G. i. 431.
- For wind turns Phoebe's face to ruddy gold
ib. i. 388.
- The crow
- With full voice, good-for-naught, invites the rain.
For if tile moon turns red owing to the wind, her hue is certainly a sign of wind. And if, as the same poet infers, [*]( Verg. G. i. 422. ) the condensation and rarification of the atmosphere causes that
concert of bird-voicesof which he speaks, we may agree in regarding it as a sign. We may further note that great things are sometimes indicated by trivial signs, witness the Vergilian crow; that trivial events should be indicated by signs of greater importance is of course no matter for wonder.
I now turn to arguments, the name under which we comprise the ἐνθυμήματα, ἐπιχειρήματα, and ἀποδείξεις of the Greeks, terms which, in spite of their difference, have much the same meaning. For the enthymeme (which we translate by commentun or commentatio, there being no alternative, though we should be wiser to use the Greek name) has three meanings: firstly it means anything conceived in the mind (this is not however the sense of which I am now speaking);
secondly it signifies a proposition with a reason, and thirdly a conclusion of an argument drawn either from denial of consequents or from incompatibles [*](v. viii. 5; xiv. 2. n.) ; although there is some controversy on this point. For there are some who style a conclusion from consequents an epicheireme, while it will be found that the majority hold the view that an epicheireme is a conclusion from incompatibles: [*](See v. xiv. 2, VIII. v. 9.) wherefore Cornificius styles it a contrarium or argument from contraries. Some again call it a rhetorical
syllogism, others an incomplete syllogism, because its parts are not so clearly defined or of the same number as those of the regular syllogism, since such
that is an attempt. It would however, in my opinion, be truer to say that it is not our handling of the subject, but the thing itself which we attempt which should be called an ἐπιχείρημα, that is to say the argument by which we try to prove something and which, even if it has not yet been stated in so many words, has been clearly conceived by the mind.