Institutio Oratoria

even common sayings and popular beliefs may be found to be useful. For they form a sort of testimony, which is rendered all the more impressive by the fact that it was not given to suit special cases, but was the utterance or action of minds swayed neither by prejudice or influence, simply because it seemed the most honourable or honest thing to say or do.

For instance, if I am speaking of the misfortunes of this mortal life, surely it will help me to adduce the opinion of those nations who hold that we should weep over the new-born child and rejoice

do we not regard the precepts of the Seven Wise Men as so many rules of life? If an adulteress is on her trial for poisoning, is she not already to be regarded as condemned by the judgment of Marcus Cato, who asserted that every adulteress was as good as a poisoner? As for reflexions drawn from the poets, not only speeches, but even the works of the philosophers, are full of them; for although the philosophers think everything inferior to their own precepts and writings, they have not thought it beneath their dignity to quote numbers of lines from the poets to lend authority to their statements.

Again, a remarkable example of the weight carried by authority is provided by the fact that when the Megarians disputed the possession of Salamis with the Athenians, the latter prevailed by citing a line from Homer, [*](II. ii. 558. Twelve ships great Ajax brought from Salamis, And ranged them where the Athenian army stood. ) which is not however found in all editions, to the effect that Ajax united his ships with those of the Athenians.

Generally received sayings also become common property owing to the very fact that they are anonymous, as, for instance,

Friends are a treasure,

Conscience is as good as a thousand witnesses,

In the words of the old proverb, birds of a feather flock together.

Some include under this head the supernatural authority that is derived from oracles, as for instance the response asserting that Socrates was the wisest of mankind: indeed, they

Sometimes, again, it may be possible to produce some saying or action of the judge, of our adversary or his advocate in order to prove our point. There have therefore been some writers who have regarded examples and the use of authorities of which I am speaking as belonging to inartificial proofs, on the ground that the orator does not discover them, but receives them readymade. But the point is of great importance.

For witnesses and investigation and the like all make some pronouncement on the actual matter under trial, whereas arguments drawn from without are in themselves useless, unless the pleader has the wit to apply them in such a manner as to support the points which he is trying to make.

Such in the main are the views about proof which I have either heard from others or learned by experience. I would not venture to assert that this is all there is to be said; indeed I would exhort students to make further researches on the subject, for I admit the possibilities of making further discoveries. Still anything that may be discovered will not differ greatly from what I have said here.

It has generally been laid down that an argument to be effective must be based on certainty; for it is obviously impossible to prove what is doubtful by what is no less doubtful. Still some things which are adduced as proof require proof themselves.

You killed your husband, for you were an adulteress.

Your javelin was found in the body of the murdered man.

however, necessary in this connection to point out that there are no stronger proofs than those in which uncertainty has been converted into certainty.

You committed the murder, for your clothes were stained with blood.

In insisting on our strongest arguments we must take them singly, whereas our weaker arguments should be massed together: for it is undesirable that those arguments which are strong in themselves should have their force obscured by the

Consequently arguments which have no individual force on the ground of strength will acquire force in virtue of their number, since all tend to prove the same thing. For instance, if one man is accused of having murdered another for the sake of his property, it may be argued as follows:

You had expectations of succeeding to the inheritance, which was moreover very large: you were a poor man, and at the time in question were specially hard pressed by your creditors: you had also offended him whose heir you were, and knew that he intended to alter his will.

There are certain arguments, which must not merely be stated, but supported as well. If we say,

The motive for the crime was greed,

supposing that we allege hatred as the motive for a crime, whether such hatred was due to envy, injury or unlawful influence, whether it was recent or of long standing, whether it was directed against an

On tile other hand we must not always burden the judge with all the arguments we have discovered, since by so doing we shall at once bore him and render him less inclined to believe us. For he will hardly suppose those proofs to be valid which we ourselves who produce them regard as insufficient. On the other hand, where the facts are fairly obvious, it would be as foolish to argue about them as to bring some artificial light into broad sunlight.

To these proof's some authorities would add those which they call pathetic or emotional. Aristotle [*](Rhet. I. ii. 4. ) indeed holds that the strongest argument in support of a speaker is that he is a good man. This no doubt is the best support, but to seem good is also of value, though the semblance is but a bad second to the reality.

Of this nature is the noble defence of Scaurus.

Quintus Varius of Sucro asserts that Aemilius Scaurus has betrayed the interests of the Roman people: Aemilius Scaurus denies it.

Have I then done what you would have refused to do?

We must however take the character of the judge into consideration and seek out such arguments as will appeal to him. I have already spoken of this in the rules which I laid

Another form of proof is provided by asseveration as in

I did this,

You told me this,

O outrageous crime!