Institutio Oratoria
Quintilian
Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.
Now all these arguments deal with the greater or the less or else with things that are equal, and if we follow up such fine distinctions, there will be no limit to our division into species. For the comparison of things is infinite; things may be more pleasant, more serious, more necessary, more honourable, more useful. I say no more for fear of falling into that very garrulity which I deprecate.
The number of examples of these arguments which I might quote is likewise infinite, but I will only deal with a very few. As an example of argument from something greater take the following example from the pro Caecina [*](XV. 43.)
Shall we suppose that that which alarms whole armies caused no alarm to a peaceful company of lawyers?As an instance of argument from something easier, take this passage
Consider whether it would have been easy for you to secure the praetorship, when he in whose favour you withdrew failed to secure election?
The following [*]( xvi. 45. Caecina had attempted to take possession of lands left him by will, but was driven off by armed force. Cicero has just pointed out that there were precedents for regarding the mere sight of armed men in occupation of the property claimed as sufficient proof of violence. ) provides an example of argument from something more difficult:
I beg you, Tubero, to remark that I, who do not hesitate to speak of my own deed, venture to speak of that performed by Ligarius; and again,
Has not Ligarius reason for hope, when I am permitted to intercede with you for another?For an argument drawn from something less take this passage from the pro Caecinaa [*](pro Lig. iii. 8 and x. 31. Cicero's point is that he has been a much more bitter opponent of Caesar than Ligarius, and yet he has been pardoned while Ligarius has not. ) :
Really! Is the knowledge that the men were armed sufficient to prove that violence was offered, and the fact that he fell into their hands insufficient?Well, then, to give a brief summary of the whole question, arguments are drawn from persons, causes, place and time (which latter we have divided into preceding, contemporary and subsequent), from resources (under which we include instruments), from manner (that is, how a thing has been done), from definition, genus, species, difference, property, elimination, division, beginnings, increase, consummation, likes, unlikes, contradictions, consequents, efficients, effects, results, and comparison, which is subdivided into several species.
I think I should also add that arguments are drawn not merely from admitted facts, but from fictitious suppositions, which the Greeks style καθ᾽ ὑπόθεσιν and that this latter type of argument falls into all the same divisions as those which I have
When I speak of fictitious arguments I mean the proposition of something which, if true, would either solve a problem or contribute to its solution, and secondly the demonstration of the similarity of our hypothesis to the case under consideration. To make this the more readily intelligible to youths who have not yet left school, I will first of all illustrate it by examples of a kind familiar to the young.
There is a law to the effect that
the man who refuses to support his parents is liable to imprisonment.A certain man fails to support his parents and none the less objects to going to prison. He advances the hypothesis that he would be exempt from such a penalty if he were a soldier, an infant. or if he were absent from home on the service of the state. Again in the case where a hero is allowed to choose his reward [*](cp. VII. v. 4. ) we might introduce the hypotheses of his desiring to make himself a tyrant or to overthrow the temples of the gods.