Institutio Oratoria
Quintilian
Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.
These, however, I call consequent or ἀκόλουθα goodness, for instance, is consequent on wisdom: while in regard to things which merely have taken place afterwards or will take place I use the term insequent or παρεπόμενα, though I do not regard the question of terminology as important. Give them any name you please, as long as the meaning is clear and it is shown that the one depends on time, the other on the nature of things.
I have therefore no hesitation in calling the following forms of argument also consequential, although they argue from the past to the future: some however divide them into two classes, those concerned with action, as in the pro Oppio,
How could he detain against their will those whom he was unable to take to the province against their will?and those concerned with time, as in the Verrines, [*](Verr. I. xlii. 109. The praetor on entering office on Jan. I issued an edict announcing the principles on which his rulings would be given. This edict was an interpretation of the law of Rome, and held good only during the praetor's year of office. )
If the first of January puts an end to the authority of the praetor's edict, why should the commencement of its authority not likewise date from the first of January?
Both these