Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

In a similar way division is valuable both for proof and refutation. For proof, it is sometimes enough to establish one thing.

To be a citizen, a man must either have been born or made such.

For refutation, both points must be disproved:

he was neither born nor made a citizen.

This may be done in many ways, and constitutes a form of argument by elimination, whereby we show sometimes that the whole is false, sometimes that only that which remains alter the process of elimination is true. An example of the first of these two cases would be:

You say that you lent him money. Either you possessed it yourself, received it from another, found it or stole it. If you did not possess it, receive it from another, find or steal it, you did not lend it to him.

The residue after elimination is shown to be true as follows:

This slave whom you claim was either born in your house or bought or given you or left you by will or captured from the enemy or belongs to another.

By the elimination of the previous suppositions he is shown to belong to another. This form of argument is risky and must be employed with care; for if, in setting forth the alternatives, we chance to omit one, our whole case will fail, and our audience will be moved to laughter. It is safer to do what Cicero [*](pro Caec. xiii. 37. )

does in the pro Caecina, when he asks,

If this is not the point at issue, what is?

For thus all other points are eliminated at one swoop. Or again two contrary propositions may be advanced, either of which if established would suffice

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to prove the case. Take the following example from Cicero: [*](pro Cluent. xxiii. 64. )

There can be no one so hostile to Cluentius as not to grant me one thing: if it be a fact that the verdict then given was the result of bribery, the bribes must have proceeded either from Habitus or Oppianicus: if I show that they did not proceed from Habitus I prove that they proceeded from Oppianicus: if I demonstrate that they were given by Oppianicus, I clear Habitus.

Or we may give our opponent the choice between two alternatives of which one must necessarily be true, and as a result, whichever he chooses, lie will damage his case. Cicero does this in the pro Oppio: [*]( Oppius was accused of embezzling public money and plotting against the life of M. Aurelius Cotta, governor of Bithynia, where Oppius was serving as quaestor. Cicero's defence of him is lost. )

Was the weapon snatched from his hands when he had attacked Cotta, or when he was trying to commit suicide?

and in the pro Vareno: [*](See iv. ii. 26.)

You have a choice between two alternatives: either you must show that the choice of this route by Varenus was due to chance or that it was the result of this man's persuasion and inducement.

He then shows that either admission tells against his opponent. Sometimes again,

two propositions are stated of such a character that the admission of either involves the same conclusion, as in the sentence,

We must philosophise, even though we ought not,

or as in the common dilemma,

What is the use of a figure, [*](See vii. iv. 28, ix. i. 14, ix. ii. 65.) if its meaning is clear? And what is its use, if it is unintelligible?

or,

He who is capable of enduring pain will lie if tortured, and so will he who cannot endure pain.

As there are three divisions of time, so the order of events falls into three stages. For everything has a beginning, growth and consummation, as for instance

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a quarrel, blows, murder. Thus arise arguments which lend each other mutual support; for the conclusion is inferred from the beginnings, as in the following case:

I cannot expect a purple-striped toga, when I see that the beginning of the web is black

; or the beginning may be inferred from the conclusion: for instance the fact that Sulla resigned the dictatorship is an argument that Sulla did not take up arms with the intention of establishing a tyranny.

Similarly from the growth of a situation we may infer either its beginning or its end, not only in questions of fact but as regards points of equity, such as whether the conclusion is referable to the beginning, that is,

Should the man that began the quarrel be regarded as guilty of the bloodshed with which it ended?

Arguments are also drawn from similarities:

If self-control is a virtue, abstinence is also a virtue.

If a guardian should be required to be faithful to his trust, so should an agent.

To this class belongs the type of argument called ἐπαγωγή by the Greeks, induction by Cicero. [*](de Inv. i. 31. ) Or arguments may be drawn from unlikes:

It does not follow that if joy is a good thing, pleasure also is a good thing

It does not follow that what applies to the case of a woman applies also to the case of a ward.

Or from contraries:

Frugality is a good thing, since luxury is an evil thing

If war is the cause of ill, peace will prove a remedy

If he who does harm unwittingly deserves pardon, he who does good unwittingly does not deserve a reward.

Or from contradictions:

He who is wise is not a fool.

Or from consequences necessary or probable [*]( It is possible that Quintilian regards adiuncta as = consequentia. The distinction made above is that made by Cicero, Top. xii. ) :

If justice is a good thing, we must give
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right judgment

If breach of faith is a bad thing, we must not deceive.

And such arguments may also be reversed. Similar to these are the following arguments, which must therefore be classed under this same head, since it is to this that they naturally belong:

A man has not lost what he never had

A man does not wittingly injure him whom he loves

If one man has appointed another as his heir, he regarded, still regards and will continue to regard him with affection.

However, such arguments, being incontrovertible, are of the nature of absolute indications. [*](See ch. ix.)

These, however, I call consequent or ἀκόλουθα goodness, for instance, is consequent on wisdom: while in regard to things which merely have taken place afterwards or will take place I use the term insequent or παρεπόμενα, though I do not regard the question of terminology as important. Give them any name you please, as long as the meaning is clear and it is shown that the one depends on time, the other on the nature of things.