Institutio Oratoria
Quintilian
Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.
we may define a word by giving its content as in the preceding instances, or by etymology: we may for instance explain assiduus [*]( Paulus (exc. Fest.) gives the following explanation of this absurd derivation, for which Cicero tells that Aelius Stilo was responsible: Some think that assiduus was originally the epithet applied to one who served in the army at his own expense, contributing an as ( i.e. instead of receiving it)! ) by deriving it from as and do, locuples [*](locheples ( wealthy ) is derived from locus = the posses sors of many places. ) by deriving it from copia locorum, pecuniosus [*](pecuniosus ( moneyed ) is derived from pecus = rich in herds. ) from copiapecorum. Genus, species, difference and property seem more especially to afford scope for definition, for we derive arguments from all of these.
Genus is of little use when we desire to prove a species, but of great value for its elimination. A tree is not necessarily a plane tree, but that which is not a tree is certainly not a plane tree; again, a virtue is not necessarily the virtue of justice, but that which is not a virtue is certainly not justice. We must proceed from the genus to the ultimate species; [*](cp. § 5. ) for example, to say that man is an animal will not suffice; for animal merely gives us the genus: nor yet will the addition of the words
subject to deathbe adequate; for although this epithet gives us a species, it is common to other animals as well. If, however, we define man as a rational animal, we need nothing further to make our meaning clear.
On the other hand species will give us clear proof of genus, but is of little service for its elimination. For example, justice is always a virtue, but that which is not justice may still be a virtue, such as fortitude, constancy or self-control. Genus therefore cannot be eliminated by species unless all the species included in the genus be eliminated, as for instance in the following sentence: That which is neither rational
To these they add property and difference. Properties serve to establish definitions, differences to overthrow them. A property is that which happens to one particular object and that alone; speech and laughter for instance are properties of man. Or it may be something specially belonging to an object, but not to it alone; heating for instance is a property of fire. The same thing may also have a number of properties: light and heat are both properties of fire. Consequently, the omission of any property in a definition will impair it, but the introduction of a property, whatever it may be, will not necessarily establish a definition.
We have, however, often to consider what is a property of some given object; for example, if it should be asserted, on the ground of etymology, that the peculiar property of a tyrannicide is to kill tyrants, we should deny it: for an executioner is not ipso facto a tyrannicide, if he executes a tyrant who has been delivered to him for the purpose, nor again is he a tyrannicide who kills a tyrant unwittingly or against his will.
What is not a property will be a difference: it is, for instance, one thing to be a slave, and another to be in a state of servitude; hence the distinction raised in connexion with persons assigned to their creditors for debt: A slave, if he is manumitted becomes a freedman, but this is not the case with one who is assigned. There are also other points of difference which are dealt with elsewhere. [*](VII. iii. 26. Also III vi. 25.)
Again, the term difference is applied in cases when the genus is divided into species and one species is subdivided. Animal, for instance, is a genus, mortal a species, while terrestrial or biped is a difference: for they are not actually properties, but serve to show
which latter he calls form, from definition and includes them under relation. For example, if a person to whom another man has left all his silver should claim all his silver money as well, he would base his claim upon genus; on the other hand if when a legacy has been left to a married woman holding the position of materfamilias, it should be maintained that the legacy is not due to a woman who never came into the power of her husband, the argument is based on species, since there are two kinds of marriage. [*]( There was the formal marriage per coemptionem, bringing the woman under the power ( in manum )of her husband and giving her the title of materfamilias, and the informal marriage based on cohabitation without involving the wife's coming in manum mariti. ) Cicero [*]( Cic. Top. )
further shows that definition is assisted by division, which he distinguishes from partition, making the latter the dissection of a whole into its parts and the former the division of a genus into its forms or species. The number of parts he regards as being uncertain, as for instance the elements of which a state consists; the forms or species are, however, certain, as for instance the number of forms of government, which we are told are three, democracy, oligarchy, and monarchy. It is true that he does not use these illustrations,
since, as he was writing to Trebatius, [*]( A famous lawyer, cp. III. xi. 18. v. 17. ) he preferred to draw his examples from law. I have chosen my illustrations as being more obvious. Properties have relation to questions of fact as well; for instance, it is the property of a good man to act rightly, of an angry man to be violent in speech or action, and consequently we believe that such acts are committed by persons of the appropriate character, or
In a similar way division is valuable both for proof and refutation. For proof, it is sometimes enough to establish one thing.
To be a citizen, a man must either have been born or made such.For refutation, both points must be disproved:
he was neither born nor made a citizen.
This may be done in many ways, and constitutes a form of argument by elimination, whereby we show sometimes that the whole is false, sometimes that only that which remains alter the process of elimination is true. An example of the first of these two cases would be:
You say that you lent him money. Either you possessed it yourself, received it from another, found it or stole it. If you did not possess it, receive it from another, find or steal it, you did not lend it to him.
The residue after elimination is shown to be true as follows:
This slave whom you claim was either born in your house or bought or given you or left you by will or captured from the enemy or belongs to another.By the elimination of the previous suppositions he is shown to belong to another. This form of argument is risky and must be employed with care; for if, in setting forth the alternatives, we chance to omit one, our whole case will fail, and our audience will be moved to laughter. It is safer to do what Cicero [*](pro Caec. xiii. 37. )
does in the pro Caecina, when he asks,
If this is not the point at issue, what is?For thus all other points are eliminated at one swoop. Or again two contrary propositions may be advanced, either of which if established would suffice
There can be no one so hostile to Cluentius as not to grant me one thing: if it be a fact that the verdict then given was the result of bribery, the bribes must have proceeded either from Habitus or Oppianicus: if I show that they did not proceed from Habitus I prove that they proceeded from Oppianicus: if I demonstrate that they were given by Oppianicus, I clear Habitus.
Or we may give our opponent the choice between two alternatives of which one must necessarily be true, and as a result, whichever he chooses, lie will damage his case. Cicero does this in the pro Oppio: [*]( Oppius was accused of embezzling public money and plotting against the life of M. Aurelius Cotta, governor of Bithynia, where Oppius was serving as quaestor. Cicero's defence of him is lost. )
Was the weapon snatched from his hands when he had attacked Cotta, or when he was trying to commit suicide?and in the pro Vareno: [*](See iv. ii. 26.)
You have a choice between two alternatives: either you must show that the choice of this route by Varenus was due to chance or that it was the result of this man's persuasion and inducement.He then shows that either admission tells against his opponent. Sometimes again,
two propositions are stated of such a character that the admission of either involves the same conclusion, as in the sentence,
We must philosophise, even though we ought not,or as in the common dilemma,
What is the use of a figure, [*](See vii. iv. 28, ix. i. 14, ix. ii. 65.) if its meaning is clear? And what is its use, if it is unintelligible?or,
He who is capable of enduring pain will lie if tortured, and so will he who cannot endure pain.
As there are three divisions of time, so the order of events falls into three stages. For everything has a beginning, growth and consummation, as for instance
I cannot expect a purple-striped toga, when I see that the beginning of the web is black; or the beginning may be inferred from the conclusion: for instance the fact that Sulla resigned the dictatorship is an argument that Sulla did not take up arms with the intention of establishing a tyranny.
Similarly from the growth of a situation we may infer either its beginning or its end, not only in questions of fact but as regards points of equity, such as whether the conclusion is referable to the beginning, that is,
Should the man that began the quarrel be regarded as guilty of the bloodshed with which it ended?Arguments are also drawn from similarities:
If self-control is a virtue, abstinence is also a virtue.
If a guardian should be required to be faithful to his trust, so should an agent.To this class belongs the type of argument called ἐπαγωγή by the Greeks, induction by Cicero. [*](de Inv. i. 31. ) Or arguments may be drawn from unlikes:
It does not follow that if joy is a good thing, pleasure also is a good thing:
It does not follow that what applies to the case of a woman applies also to the case of a ward.Or from contraries:
Frugality is a good thing, since luxury is an evil thing:
If war is the cause of ill, peace will prove a remedy:
If he who does harm unwittingly deserves pardon, he who does good unwittingly does not deserve a reward.
Or from contradictions:
He who is wise is not a fool.Or from consequences necessary or probable [*]( It is possible that Quintilian regards adiuncta as = consequentia. The distinction made above is that made by Cicero, Top. xii. ) :
If justice is a good thing, we must give:v4-6 p.243right judgment
If breach of faith is a bad thing, we must not deceive.And such arguments may also be reversed. Similar to these are the following arguments, which must therefore be classed under this same head, since it is to this that they naturally belong:
A man has not lost what he never had:
A man does not wittingly injure him whom he loves:
If one man has appointed another as his heir, he regarded, still regards and will continue to regard him with affection.However, such arguments, being incontrovertible, are of the nature of absolute indications. [*](See ch. ix.)