Institutio Oratoria

Certain Latin writers have thought it a sufficient distinction to call the general sense

time,

times.

For questions of law turn on time, while it also determines the quality of actions and is of great importance in questions of fact; for instance, occasionally it provides irrefragable

Further, all kinds of arguments may easily be drawn either from facts previous to a certain act, or contemporary or subsequent. As regards antecedent facts the following example will illustrate my meaning;

You threatened to kill him, you went out by night, you started before him.

Some writers have shown themselves over-subtle in their classification of the second class of circumstances, making

a sound was heard

a shout was raised

You hid yourself, you fled, livid spots and swellings appeared on the corpse.

In these considerations are included everything in connexion with words and deeds, but in two distinct ways. For some things are done because something else is like to follow, and others because something else has previously been done, as for instance, when the husband of a beautiful woman is accused of having acted as a procurer on the ground that he bought her after she was found guilty of adultery, or when a debauched character is accused of parricide on the ground that he said to his father

You have rebuked me for the last time.

With regard to accidental circumstances, which also provide matter for arguments, these clearly belong to subsequent time, but are distinguished by a certain special quality, as for instance if I should say,

Scipio was a better general than Hannibal, for he conquered Hannibal

He was a good pilot, for he was never shipwrecked

He was a good farmer, for he gathered in huge harvests

He was a prodigal, for he squandered his patrimony

His life was disgraceful, for he was hated by all.

We must also consider the resources possessed by the parties concerned, more especially when dealing with questions of fact; for it is more credible that a smaller number of persons were killed by a larger, a weaker party by a stronger, sleepers by men that were wide awake, the unsuspecting by the well-prepared, while the converse arguments may be used to prove the opposite.

Such considerations arise both in deliberative and forensic oratory: in the latter they occur in relation to two questions, namely, whether some given person had the will, and whether lie had the power to do the deed; for hope will often create the will to act. Hence the well-known inference in Cicero: [*](pro Mil. x. 29. )

Clodius lay in wait for Milo, not Milo for Clodius, for Clodius had a retinue of sturdy slaves, while Milo was with a party of women; Clodius was mounted, Milo in a carriage, Clodius lightly clad, Milo hampered by a cloak.

With resources we may

To these we may add manner, the Greek τρόπος, in regard to which we ask how a thing was done. Manner is concerned sometimes with quality and the letter of the law [*](See § 40. Also III. vi. 55 and 66.) (we may for instance argue that it was unlawful to kill an adulterer by poison), sometimes with questions of fact, as for example if I argue that an act was committed with a good intent and therefore openly, or with a bad intent and therefore treacherously, by night, in a lonely place.

In all cases, however, in which we enquire into the nature and meaning of an act, and which can be considered by themselves apart from all considerations of persons and all else that gives rise to the actual cause, there are clearly three points to which we must give attention, namely Whether it is, What it is and Of what kind it is. But as there are certain

places

places