Institutio Oratoria

Such arguments may also carry weight in deliberative oratory, as may those drawn from time, which I shall now proceed to discuss. Time may, as I have said elsewhere, [*](III. vi. 25.) be understood in two different senses, general and special. The first sense is seen in words and phrases such as

now,

formerly,

in the reign of Alexander,

in the days of the siege of Troy,

and whenever we speak of past, present or future. The second sense occurs when we speak either of definite periods of time such as

in summer,

in winter,

by night,

by day,

or of fortuitous periods such as

in time of pestilence,

in time of war,

during a banquet.

Certain Latin writers have thought it a sufficient distinction to call the general sense

time,

and the special

times.

In both senses time is of importance in advisory speeches and demonstrative oratory, but not so frequently as in forensic.

For questions of law turn on time, while it also determines the quality of actions and is of great importance in questions of fact; for instance, occasionally it provides irrefragable

proofs, which may be illustrated by a case which I have already cited, [*](v. v. 2.) when one of the signatories to a document has died before the day on which it was signed, or when a person is accused of the commission of some crime, although he was only an infant at the time or not yet born.