Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

I would also have students of oratory consider that all the forms of argument which I have just set forth cannot be found in every case, and that when the subject on which we have to speak has been propounded, it is no use considering each separate type of argument and knocking at the door of each with a view to discovering whether they may chance to serve to prove our point, except while we are in the position of mere learners without any knowledge of actual practice.

Such a proceeding merely retards the process of speaking to an incalculable extent, if it is always necessary for us to try each single

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argument and thus learn by experiment what is apt and suitable to our case. In fact I am not sure that it will not be an actual obstacle to progress unless a certain innate penetration and a power of rapid divination seconded by study lead us straight to the arguments which suit our case.

For just as the melody of the voice is most pleasing when accompanied by the lyre, yet if the musician's hand be slow and, unless he first look at the strings and take their measure, hesitate as to which strings match the several notes of the voice, it would be better that he should content himself with the natural music of the voice unaccompanied by any instrument; even so our theory of speaking must be adapted and, like the lyre, attuned to such rules as these.

But it is only by constant practice that we can secure that, just as the hands of the musician, even though his eyes be turned elsewhere, produce bass, treble or intermediate notes by force of habit, so the thought of the orator should suffer no delay owing to the variety and number of possible arguments, but that the latter should present themselves uncalled and, just as letters and syllables require no thought on the part of a writer, so arguments should spontaneously follow the thought of the orator.

The third kind of proof, which is drawn into the service of the case from without, is styled a παράδειγμα by the Greeks, who apply the term to all comparisons of like with like, but more especially to historical parallels. Roman writers have for the most part preferred to give the name of comparison to that which the Greeks style παραβολή, while they translate παράδειγμα by example, although this latter involves comparison, while the former is of

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the nature of an example.

For my own part, I prefer with a view to making my purpose easier of apprehension to regard both as παραδείγματα and to call them examples. Nor am I afraid of being thought to disagree with Cicero, although he does separate comparison from example. [*](de Inv. I. xxx. 49. ) For he divides all arguments into two classes, induction and ratiocination, just as most Greeks [*]( cp. Ar. ah. I. ii. 18. ) divide it into παραδείγματα and ἐπιχειρήματα, explaining παράδειγμα as a rhetorical induction.