Institutio Oratoria

If you were to make a partition such as the following,

I will not say that the character of my client is such as to render him incapable of murder, I will only say that he had no motive for murder and that at the time when the deceased was killed he was overseas,

in that case all the proofs which you propose to bring before this, the final proof, must needs seem superfluous to the judge.

For the judge is always in a hurry to reach the most important point. If he has a patient disposition he will merely make a silent appeal to the advocate,

whom he will treat as bound by his promise. On the other hand, if he is busy, or holds exalted position, or is intolerant by nature, he will insist in no very courteous manner on his coming to the point.

For these reasons there are some who disapprove of the partition adopted by Cicero in the pro Cluentio, [*]( iv. 9. Oppianicus had been indicted by Cluentius for an attempt upon his life and condemned. The previous judgments referred to were condemnations of his accomplices, which made Oppianicus' condemnation inevitable. Oppianicus was condemned, and it was alleged that this was due to bribery by Cluentius. Cluentius was now on his trial for the alleged murder of various persons. ) where he premises that he is going to show, first,

that no man was ever arraigned for greater crimes or on stronger evidence than Oppianicus,

secondly,

that previous judgments had been passed by those very judges by whom he was condemned,

and finally,

that Cluentius made no attempt to bribe the jury, but that his opponent did.

They argue that if the third point can be proved, there is no need to have urged the two preceding.

On the other hand you will find no one so unreasonable or so foolish as to deny that the partition in the pro Murena [*](v. 11.) is admirable.

I understand, gentlemen, that the accusation falls into three parts, the first aspersing my client's character, the second dealing with his candidature for the magistracy, and the third with charges of bribery.

These words make the case as clear as possible, and no one division renders any other superfluous.

There are also a number who are in doubt as to a form of defence which I may exemplify as follows:

If I murdered him, I did right; but I did not murder him.

[*](See III. vi 10.) What, they ask, is the value of the first part, if the second can be proved, since they are mutually inconsistent, and if anyone employs both arguments, we should believe neither? This contention is partially justified; we should employ the second alone only if the fact can be proved without a doubt.