Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

Or again they may be introduced without such circumstances, as in the passage beginning

For Quintus Ligarius etc.

[*](pro Lig. i. 2. ) Often, too, we may commence with a fact as Cicero does in the pro Tullio [*](pro Tull. vi. 14. ) :

Marcus Tullius has a farm which he inherited from his father in the territory of Thurium,

or Demosthenes in the speech in defence of Ctesiphonl, [*](§ 18.) —

On the outbreak of the Phocian war.

As regards the conclusion of the statement of facts, there is a controversy with those who would have the statement end where the issue to be determined begins. Here is an example.

After these events the praetor Publius Dolabella issued an interdict in the usual form dealing with rioting and employment of armed men, ordering, without any exception, that Aebutius should restore the property from which he had ejected Caecina. He stated that he had done so. A sum of money was deposited. It is for you to decide to whom this money is to go.

[*]( Cic. pro Caec. viii. 23. ) This rule can always be observed by the prosecutor, but not always by the defendant.

III. In the natural order of things the statement of fact is followed by the verification. For it

v4-6 p.123

is necessary to prove the points which we stated with the proof in view. But before I enter on this portion, I have a few words to say on the opinions held by certain rhetoricians. Most of them are in the habit, as soon as they have completed the statement of facts, of digressing to some pleasant and attractive topic with a view to securing the utmost amount of favour from their audience.

This practice originated in the display of the schools of declaration and thence extended to the courts as soon as causes came to be pleaded, not for the benefit of the parties concerned, but to enable the advocates to flaunt their talents. I imagine that they feared that if the slender stream of concise statement, such as is generally required, were followed by the pugnacious tone inevitable in the arguing of the case, the speech would fall flat owing to the postponement of the pleasures of a more expansive eloquence.

The objection to this practice lies in the fact that they do this without the slightest consideration of the difference between case and case or reflecting whether what they are doing will in any way assist them, on the assumption that it is always expedient and always necessary. Consequently they transfer striking thoughts from the places which they should have occupied elsewhere and concentrate them in this portion of the speech, a practice which involves either the repetition of a number of things that they have already said or their omission from the place which was really theirs owing to the fact that they have already been said.

I admit however that this form of digression can be advantageously appended, not merely to the statement of facts, but to each of the different questions or to the questions as a whole,

v4-6 p.125

so long as the case demand, or at any rate permit it. Indeed such a practice confers great distinction and adornment on a speech, but only if the digression fits in well with the rest of the speech and follows naturally on what has preceded, not if it is thrust in like a wedge parting what should naturally come together.

For there is no part of a speech so closely connected with any other as the statement with the proof, though of course such a digression may be intended as the conclusion of the statement and the beginning of the proof There will therefore sometimes be room for digression; for example if the end of the statement has been concerned with some specially horrible theme, we may embroider the theme as though our indignation must find immediate vent.

This, however, should only be done if there is no question about the facts. Otherwise it is more important to verify your charge than to heighten it, since the horrible nature of a charge is in favour of the accused, until the charge is proved. For it is just the most flagrant crimes that are the most difficult to prove.