Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

As to addressing another in place of the judge, it may be a means of making a point with greater brevity and give it greater force. On this subject I hold the same view that I expressed in dealing with the exordium, as I do on the subject of impersonation. This artifice however is employed not only by Servius Sulpicius in his speech on behalf of Aufidia, when he cries

Am I to suppose that you were drowsed with sleep or weighed down by some
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heavy lethargy?
but by Cicero [*](Verr. v. xlv. 118. ) as well, when in a passage which, like the above, belongs to the statement of facts, in speaking of the ships' captains he says,
You will give so much to enter, etc.

Again in the pro Clueniio [*](pro Clu. xxvi. ) does not the conversation between Staienus and Bulbus conduce to speed and enhance the credibility of the statements ? In case it should be thought that Cicero did this without design (quite an incredible supposition in his case), I would point out that in the Partitiones [*](ix. 31.) he lays it down that the statement of facts should be characterised by passages which will charm and excite admiration or expectation, and marked by unexpected turns, conversations between persons and appeals to every kind of emotion.

We shall, as I have already said, never argue points in the statement of facts, but we may sometimes introduce arguments, as for example Cicero does in the pro Ligario, [*]( ii. 4. Ligarius was accused of having fought for the Pompeians in Africa. Cicero points out that he went out to Africa before the outbreak of war was dreamed of and that his whole attitude was discreet. ) when he says that he ruled his province in such a way that it was to his interest that peace should continue. We shall sometimes also, if occasion demand, insert a brief defence of the facts in the statement and trace the reasons that led up to them.

For we must state our facts like advocates, not witnesses. A statement in its simplest form will run as follows,

Quintus Ligarius went out as legate to C. Considius.
But how will Cicero [*](pro Lig. i. 2. ) put it ?
Quintus Ligarius,
he says,
set out for Africa as legate to Gaius Considius at a time when there was no thought of war.
And again elsewhere [*](ib. ii. 4. )

he says,

Not only not to war, but to a country where there was no thought of war.
And when the sense would have been sufficiently clear had he
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said no more than
Quintus Ligarius would not suffer himself to be entangled in any transaction,
[*](pro Lig. i. 3. ) he adds
for he had his eyes fixed on home and wished to return to his own people.
Thus he made what he stated credible by giving a reason for it and at the same time coloured it with emotion.

I am therefore all the more surprised at those who hold that there should be no appeal to the emotions in the statement of facts. If they were to say

Such appeals should be brief and not on the scale on which they are employed in tile peroration,
I should agree with them; for it is important that the statement should be expeditious. But why, while I am instructing the judge, should I refuse to move him as well?

Why should I not, if it is possible, obtain that effect at the very opening of the case which I am anxious to secure at its conclusion, more especially in view of the fact that I shall find the judge far more amenable to the cogency of my proof, if I have previously filled his mind with anger or pity?

Does not Cicero, [*](Verr. v 62. A Roman citizen might not be scourged. cp. St. Paul. ) in his description of the scourging of a Roman citizen, in a few brief words stir all the emotions, not merely by describing the victim's position, the place where the outrage was committed and the nature of the punishment, but also by praising the courage with which he bore it? For he shows us a man of the highest character who, when beaten with rods, uttered not a moan nor an entreaty, but only cried that lie was a Roman citizen, thereby bringing shame on his oppressor and showing his confidence in the law.