Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

But a simple statement will not suffice, for even the uneducated are capable of that: most of the points will require exaggeration or extenuation as expediency may demand: the method of treatment belongs to the orator, the points themselves belong to the case. We shall win the good-will of the judge not merely by praising him,

which must be done with tact and is an artifice common to both parties, but

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by linking his praise to the furtherance of our own case. For instance, in pleading for a man of good birth we shall appeal to his own high rank, in speaking for the lowly we shall lay stress on his sense of justice, on his pity in pleading the cause of misfortune, and on his severity when we champion the victims of wrong, and so on.

I should also wish, if possible, to be acquainted with the character of the judge. For it will be desirable to enlist their temperaments in the service of our cause, where they are such as are like to be useful, or to mollify them, if they are like to prove adverse, just according as they are harsh, gentle, cheerful, grave, stern, or easy-going. It will, however,

sometimes happen that the judge is hostile to us and friendly to our adversaries. Such cases demand the attention of both parties and I am not sure that the party favoured by the judge does not require to handle the situation with even more care than his opponent. For perverse judges have sometimes a preposterous tendency to give judgment against their friends or in favour of those with whom they have a quarrel, and of committing injustice merely to avoid the appearance of partiality.

Again some have been judges in cases where their own interests were involved. I note, for instance, in the books of observations published by Septimius that Cicero appeared in such a case, while I myself, when I appeared on behalf of Queen Berenice, actually pleaded before her. In such cases we must be guided by the same principles that I have laid down above. The opponent of the judge will emphasise his confidence in the justice of his client's cause, while the advocate of his interests will express the fear that the judge may be influenced

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by a quixotic delicacy.

Further, if the judge is thought to have come into court with a prejudice in favour of one side, we must try to remove or strengthen that prejudice as circumstances may demand. Again occasionally we shall have to calm the judges' fears, as Cicero does in the pro Milone, where he strives to persuade them not to think that Pompey's soldiers have been stationed in the court as a threat to themselves. Or it may be necessary to frighten them, as Cicero does in the Verrines. [*](i. 15.)

There are two ways of bringing fear to bear upon the judges. The commonest and most popular is to threaten them with the displeasure of the Roman people or the transference of the juries to another class [*](e.g. in the Verrines Cicero points out to the jury, then drawn entirely from senators, that they are on their trial. If they fail in their duty, the constitution of the panels will be altered and the equites be admitted as well. ) ; the second is somewhat brutal and is rarely employed, and consists in threatening them with a prosecution for bribery: this is a method which is fairly safe with a large body of judges, since it checks the bad and pleases the good members of the jury, but I should never recommend its employment with a single judge [*]( It must be borne in mind that iudex may be a juryman forming one of a large panel, or a single judge trying a civil action. ) except in the very last resort.