Institutio Oratoria

I am aware that there have been some who placed competence among rational bases, using as illustrations cases such as,

I killed a man under orders from my general,

I gave the votive offerings in a temple to a tyrant under compulsion,

I deserted owing to the fact that storms or floods or ill health prevented me from rejoining.

From these writers I differ even more widely: for it is not the nature of the legal action itself which is involved in the question of competence, but the cause of the act;

We must therefore accept the view of the authorities followed by Cicero, [*](See § 44.) to the effect that there are three things on which enquiry is made in every case: we ask whether a thing is, that it is, and of that kind it is. Nature herself imposes this upon us. For first of all there must be some subject for the question, since we cannot possibly determine what a thing is, or of what kind it is, until we have first ascertained whether it is, and therefore the first question raised is whether it is. But even when it is clear that a thing is,

it is not immediately obvious what it is. And when we have decided what it is, there remains the question of its quality. These three points once ascertained, there is no further question to ask. These heads cover both definite and indefinite questions. One or more of them is discussed in every demonstrative, deliberative or forensic theme.

These heads again cover all cases in the courts, whether we regard them from the point of view of rational or legal questions. For no legal problem can be settled save by the aid of definition, quality and conjecture.

Those, however, who are engaged in instructing the ignorant will find it useful at first to adopt a slightly less rigid method: the road will not be absolutely straight to begin with, but it will be more open and will provide easier going. I would have them therefore learn above all things