Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

Some have recognised only two bases. Archedemus [*](Fr. 11, Arnim.) for instance admits only the conjectural and definitive and refuses to admit the qualitative, since he held that questions of quality take the form of

What is unfair? what is unjust? what is disobedience?
which he terms questions about identity and difference. [*](i.e. the question may be stated Does it conform to our conception of injustice or is it something different? Questions of quality are regarded as questions of definition. )

A different view was held by those who likewise only admitted two bases, but made them the negative and juridical. The negative basis is identical with that which we call the conjectural, to which some give the name of negative absolutely, others only in part, these latter holding that conjecture is employed by the accuser, denial only by the accused.

The juridical is that known in Greek as δικαιολογικός But just as Archedemus would not recognise the qualitative basis, so these reject the definitive which they include in the juridical, holding

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that in these questions we have to enquire whether it is just that the act with which the accused is charged should be called sacrilege or theft or madness.

Pamplihlus held this opinion but subdivided quality into several different species. The majority of later writers have classified bases as follows, involving however no more than a change of names:— those dealing with ascertained facts and those dealing with matters where there is a doubt. For a thing must either be certain or uncertain: if it is uncertain, the basis will be conjectural; if certain, it will be some one of the other bases.

Apollodorus says the same thing when he states that a question must either lie in things external, [*](e.g. circumstantial evidence. ) which give play to conjecture, or in our own opinions: the former he calls πραγματικός the latter περὶ ἐννοίας The same is said by those who employ the terms ἀπροληπτὸς [*](ἀπροληπτός lit. = unpresumed. ) and προληπτικός, that is to say doubtful and presumptive, by this latter term meaning those facts which are beyond a doubt.

Theodorus agrees with them, for he holds that the question is either as to whether such and such a thing is really so, or is concerned with the accidents of something which is an admitted fact: that is to say it is either περὶ οὐσίας or περὶ συμβεβηκότων For in all these cases the first basis is conjectural, while the second belongs to one of the other classes. As for these other classes of basis, Apollodorus holds that there are two, one concerned with quality and the other with the names of things, that is to say a definitive basis. Theodorus makes them four, concerned with existence, quality, quantity and relation.

There are some too who make questions of identity and difference come under the head of quality, others who place it under the head

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of definition. Posidonius [*](Fr. p. 232, Bake.) divides them into two classes, those concerned with words and those concerned with things. In the first case he thinks that the question is whether a word has any meaning; if so, what is its meaning, how many meanings has it, and how does it come to mean what it means? In the latter case, we employ conjecture, which he calls κατ᾽ αἴσθησιν, or inference from perception, quality, definition which he calls κατ᾽ ἔννοιαν, or rational inference, and relation. Hence also comes the division into things written and unwritten.

Even Cornelius Celsus stated that there were two general bases, one concerned with the question whether a thing is, the other with the question of what kind it is. He included definition under the first of these, because enquiry may equally be made as to whether sacrilege has been committed, when a man denies that he has stolen anything from a temple, and when he admits that he has stolen private money from a temple. He divides quality into fact and the letter of the law. Under the head of the letter of the law he places four classes, excluding questions of competence: [*](cp. § 23; translatio and exceptio are virtually identical. The four classes are Intention, Ambiguity, Contradictory Laws, Syllogism. ) quantity and intention he places under the head of conjecture. [*](i.e. the conjectural basis concerned with questions of fact. )

There is also another method of dividing bases into two classes: according to this disputes are either about substance or quality, while quality is treated either in its most general sense or in its special senses.

Substance is dealt with by conjecture: for in enquiring into anything, we ask whether it has been done, is being done, or is likely to be done, and sometimes also consider its intention: this method is preferable to that adopted by those who style the conjectural basis a basis of fact, as though we only enquired into the past and what has

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actually been done.

The consideration of quality under its most general aspect rarely comes up in the courts; I refer to questions such as

whether that is honourable which is generally praised.
With regard to the special aspects of quality, questions sometimes occur about some common term, such as whether sacrilege has been committed when a man has stolen private money from a temple, or about some act with a definite name, when there is no doubt either as to the commission or the nature of the act. Under this heading come all questions about what is honourable, just or expedient.

These bases are said to contain others as well, because quantity is sometimes concerned with conjectural bases, as in the question whether the sun is bigger than the earth, and sometimes with qualitative bases, as in the question what reward or punishment it would be just to assign to some particular person, while questions of competence undoubtedly are concerned with quality, and definition with questions of competence. [*]( See § 11 and the case cited in 38, where the accused would argue that he was guilty not of sacrilege, but of simple theft. )

ratiocinative basis or syllogism[*]( When we argue that a certain case comes under a certain law. cp. § 15. ) and the majority of questions dealing with the letter of the law and intention are based on equity, with the exception that this last question sometimes admits of conjecture as, for instance, concerning the intentions of the legislator: ambiguity, however, must always be explained by conjecture, because as it is clear that the words admit of two interpretations the only question is as to the intention.

A large number of writers recognise general bases; Cicero adopts them in his Orator, [*](Or. xiv. 45. ) and holds that everything that can form the subject of dispute or discussion is covered by the three questions, whether

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it is, what it is, and of what kind it is. The names of these three bases are too obvious for mention. [*](Conjectural, definitive, and qualitative.) The same view is asserted by Patrocles.

Marcus Antonius stated that there were three bases in the following words:—

The things which form the ground of every speech are few and are as follows:—' Was a thing done or not done? 'Was it just or unjust?' 'Was it good or bad?'
But since, when we are said to have been justified in doing anything, this does not merely mean that our action was legal, but further implies that it was just, those who follow Antonius attempt to differentiate these bases with greater exactness. They therefore called them conjectural, legal and juridical, a division which meets with the approval of Verginius as well.

These they then subdivided into species, placing definition under the head of the legal basis, together with all others which are concerned with the letter of the law: such as that of contradictory laws, or ἀντινομία that which rests on the letter of the law and on meaning or intention (which the Greeks call κατὰ ῥητὸν καὶ διάνοιαν and μετάληψις to which latter we give various names, styling it the translative, transumptive or transpositive basis [*](Concerned with questions of competence.) ; the syllogism, which we call the ratiocinative or deductive basis; and those which turn on ambiguity or ἀμφιβολία. I mention these because they are called bases by most writers, though some prefer to call them legal questions.