Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

But in this latter case we may say that a person is tacitly implied. For the mention of a tyrant doubles the question, and there is an implicit admission of time and quality; but all the same you would scarcely be justified in calling it a cause or definite question. Those questions which I have styled indefinite are also called general: if this is correct, we shall have to call definite questions special questions. But in every special question the general question is implicit, since the genus is logically prior to the species.

And perhaps even in actual causes wherever the notion of quality comes into question, there is a certain intrusion of

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the abstract.

Milo killed Clodius: he was justified in killing one who lay in wait for him.

Does not this raise the general question as to whether we have the right to kill a man who lies in wait for us? What again of conjectures? May not they be of a general character, as for instance,

What was the motive for the crime? hatred? covetousness?

Are we justified in believing confessions made under torture?

Which should carry greater weight, evidence or argument?

As for definitions, everything that they contain is undoubtedly of a general nature.

There are some who hold that even those questions which have reference to persons and particular cases may at times be called theses, provided only they are put slightly differently: for instance, if Orestes be accused, we shall have a cause: whereas if it is put as question, namely

Was Orestes rightly acquitted?

it will be a thesis. To the same class as this last belongs the question

Was Cato right in transferring Marcia to Hortensius?

These persons distinguish a thesis from a cause as follows: a thesis is theoretical in character, while a cause has relation to actual facts, since in the former case we argue merely with a view to abstract truth, while in the latter we have to deal with some particular act.

Some, however, think that general questions are useless to an orator, since no profit is to be derived from proving that we ought to marry or to take part in politics, if we are prevented from so doing by age or ill health. But not all general questions are liable to this kind of objection. For instance questions such as

Is virtue an end in itself?

Is the world governed by providence?

cannot be countered in this way.

Further in questions

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which have reference to a particular person, although it is not sufficient merely to handle the general question, we cannot arrive at any conclusion on the special point until we have first discussed the general question. For how is Cato to deliberate

whether he personally is to marry,

unless the general question

whether marriage is desirable

is first settled? And how is he to deliberate

whether he should marry Marcia,

unless it is proved that it is the duty of Cato to marry?