Institutio Oratoria

If, on the other hand, each living thing has its own peculiar virtue, in which it excels the rest or, at any rate, the majority (I may instance the courage of the lion and the swiftness of the horse), it may be regarded as certain that the qualities in which man excels the rest are, above all, reason and powers of speech. Why, therefore, should we not consider that the special virtue of man lies just as much in eloquence as in reason? It will be with justice then that Cicero [*](de Or. III. xiv. 55. ) makes Crassus say that

eloquence is one of the highest virtues,

and that Cicero himself calls it a virtue in his letters to Brutus [*](Lost.) and in other passages.

But,

it may be urged,

a bad man will at times produce an exordium or a statement of facts, and will argue a case in a manner that leaves nothing to be desired.

No doubt; even a robber may fight bravely without courage ceasing to be a virtue; even a wicked slave may bear torture without a groan, and we may still continue to regard endurance of pain as worthy of praise. We can point to many acts which are identical with those of virtue, but spring from other sources. However, what I have said here must suffice, as I have already dealt with the question of the usefulness of oratory.