Ab urbe condita
Titus Livius (Livy)
Livy. History of Rome, Volumes 1-2. Roberts, Canon, Rev, translator. London, New York: J. M. Dent and Sons; E. P. Dutton and Co., 1912.
Whilst this war was commencing thus favourably, the other war against the Greeks was approaching its close. Not only were the two towns Palaeopolis and Neapolis cut off from all communication with each other by the enemy's lines, but the townsfolk within the walls were practically prisoners to their own defenders, and were suffering
more from them than from anything which the outside enemy could do; their wives and children were exposed to such extreme indignities as are only inflicted when cities are stormed and sacked. A report
reached them that succours were coming from Tarentum and from the Samnites. They considered that they had more Samnites than they wanted already within their walls, but the force from Tarentum composed of Greeks, they were prepared to welcome, being Greeks themselves, and through their means they hoped
to resist the Samnites and the Nolans no less than the Romans. At last, surrender to the Romans seemed the less of the two evils. Charilaus and Nymphius, the leading men in the
city, arranged with one another the respective parts they were to play. One was to desert to the Roman Commander, the other to remain in the city and prepare it for the successful execution
of their plot. Charilaus was the one who went to Publilius Philo. After expressing the hope that all might turn out for the good and happiness of Palaeopolis and Rome, he went on to say that he had decided to deliver up the fortifications. Whether in doing this he should be found to have preserved
his country or betrayed it depended upon the Roman sense of honour. For himself he made no terms and asked for no conditions, but for his countrymen
he begged rather than stipulated that if his design succeeded the people of Rome should take into consideration the eagerness with which they sought to renew the old friendly relations, and the risk attending their action rather
than their folly and recklessness in breaking the old ties of duty. The Roman commander gave his approval to the proposed scheme and furnished him with 3000 men to seize that part of the city which was in the occupation of the Samnites. L. Quinctius, a military tribune, was in command of this force.
Nymphius at the same time approached the Samnite praetor and persuaded him, now that the whole of the Roman fighting force was either round Palaeopolis or engaged in Samnium, to allow him to sail round with the fleet to the Roman seaboard and ravage not only the coastal districts but even the country close to the city.
But to ensure secrecy he pointed out that it would be necessary to start by night, and that the ships should be at once launched. To expedite matters the whole of the Samnite troops, with the exception of those who were mounting guard in the city, were sent down to the shore.
Here they were so crowded as to impede one another's movements and the confusion was heightened by the darkness and the contradictory orders which Nymphius was giving in order to gain time. Meantime Charilaus had been admitted by his confederates into the city. When the Romans had completely occupied the highest parts of the city, he ordered them to raise a shout, on which the Greeks, acting on the instructions of their leaders kept quiet.
The Nolans escaped at the other end of the city and took the road to Nola. The Samnites, shut out as they were from the city, had less difficulty in getting away but when once out of danger they found themselves in a much more sorry flight.
They had no arms, there was nothing they possessed which was not left behind with the enemy; they returned home stripped and destitute, an object of derision not only to foreigners but even to their own countrymen.
I am quite aware that there is another view of this transaction, according to which it was the Samnites who surrendered, but in the above account I have followed the authorities whom I consider most worthy of credit Neapolis became subsequently the chief seat of the Greek population, and the fact of a treaty being made with that city renders it all the more probable that the re-establishment of friendly relations was due to them.
As it was generally believed that the enemy had been forced by the siege to come to terms, a triumph was decreed to Publilius. Two circumstances happened in connection with his consulship which had never happened before —a prolongation of command and a triumph after he had laid down his command.
This[*](Revolt of the Lucanians.) was followed almost immediately by a war with the Greeks on the eastern coast.
The Tarentines had encouraged the people of Palaeopolis through their long resistance with vain hopes of succour, and when they heard that the Romans had got possession of the place they severely blamed the Palaeopolitans for leaving them in the lurch, as though they were quite guiltless of having behaved in a similar manner themselves.